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Abstract 
Since the advent of modernism, sentimentality has increasingly fallen from 
grace as a tenable mode of expression in literary fiction. Originally valued 
highly, sentimentality has come to be associated with an unrefined sense of 
taste and with bad faith. In the case of postmodernist fiction, the critical 
reception of that fiction would have us believe, sentimentality has been 
finally eclipsed, together with most other modes of affect. 
A number of novels by postmodernist authors, however, wed senti­
mentality as well as other modes of affect with a decidedly postmodernist 
aesthetics. In this study, I investigate what shape sentimentality may assume, 
and in what kinds of configurations it may be found, in postmodernist fiction. 
In the novels I consider, sentimentality is articulated with a postmodernist 
aesthetics, which involves techniques such as double-coding and reflexivity, 
but also with a postmodern ethico-spiritual thinking that involves notions of 
alterity, sensibility and vulnerability. Thus, the novels approach what I call an 
aesthetics of vulnerability. As a shorthand for the shape sentimentality 
assumes through this combination of postmodernist aesthetics and ethico-
spiritual thinking, I introduce the phrase "the sentimentum". 
In uncovering the aesthetics of vulnerability and the nature of the 
sentimentum, I focus on the novels of the British author, Graham Swift, as 
these strike me as exemplary for my investigation. Throughout his oeuvre, I 
argue, Swift approaches a more affirmative vision of a postmodern senti­
mentality. Thus, Swift's narratives also gradually become more vulnerable in 
the sense of laying themselves bare to scepticism and criticism, as they 
display sentimental and romantic notions without qualifying and undermining 
them. 
However, the ambitions of my thesis are both larger and more general 
than illuminating a single author's oeuvre: I am seeking to alter definitions of 
postmodernist fiction as well as the terms of its theorization. Hence, in my 
conclusion, I consider a more general movement toward an aesthetics of 
vulnerability in postmodernist fiction. I discuss novels by Julian Barnes, 
Penelope Lively, and Jeanette Winterson in order to show the wider appli­
cations of the concepts of an ae sthetics of vulnerability and of the sentimen­
tum. 
Key words: Twentieth-century-literature, postmodernism, sentimentality, 
sensibility, affect, emotion, love, ethics, spirituality, the-sentimentum, Swift-
Graham, Barnes-Julian, Lively-Penelope, Winterson-Jeanette. 
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Taste that requires an added element of charm 
and emotion for its delight, not to speak of 
adopting this as the measure of its approval, has 
not yet emerged from barbarism. 
—Immanuel Kant 
As for expression and feelings or emotions, the 
liberation, in contemporary society, from the 
older anomie of the centered subject may also 
mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a 
liberation from every other kind of feeling as 
well, since there is no longer a self present to do 
the feeling. 
—Fredric Jameson 
. . . Hm . . . Memorable . . . what? (He peers 
closer.) Equinox, memorable equinox. (He raises 
his head, stares blankly front. Puzzled.) 
Memorable equinox? . . . (Pause. He shrugs his 
shoulders, peers again at the ledger, reads.) 
Farewell to—(he turns page)—love. 
—Krapp 's Last Tape, Samuel Beckett 
donT geT senTimental. it always ends up 
dRRiveLLLL. 
—"Let Down", Thom Yorke 
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Introduction 
Once a discourse is thus driven by its own 
momentum into the backwater of the 
"unreal", exiled from all gregarity, it has 
no recourse but to become the site, 
however exiguous, of an affirmation. That 
affirmation is, in short, the subject of the 
book which begins here .. . 
—Roland Barthes 
"With the risk of sounding sentimental", Graham Swift said in an interview 
in 1994, "I have to say that I'm on the side of love against t ruth. Heart and 
feeling are important—though that is a point of view that probably won't 
strike a chord with today's literary critics. I write as a vulnerable human 
being for other vulnerable human beings" ("Intervju" 30; my translation). 
Swift would seem to be right: heart and feeling hold few shares in the current 
critical lingo. They are the poor relatives literary criticism would rather 
disown, that it feels it has to condescend to talk to in their own infantile 
babbling tongue, but only if absolutely necessary, and typically in passing, 
whilst discussing "bigger" issues. Moreover, while it is not all that 
controversial to be "against truth" today, it is uncommon to be on love's side 
against truth.1 To claim to be on love's side is to ran "the risk of sounding 
sentimental", and "sentimental" is indeed one of the much-maligned words of 
the last hundred years or so. From "sentimentality" to "cool": such is the 
general story of the last few centuries of Western culture, and from the New 
Criticism through structuralism to deconstruction, literary criticism has 
followed suit. As the century inaugurated by Nietzsche and Freud progressed, 
criticism spoke increasingly, and disenchantedly, about "power" and 
"desire", usually in the same breath. "Love" and "sentimentality", however, 
have been reserved for historicist discussions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century novel.2 When it comes to the contemporary novel, it seems 
1 To say that one is "against truth" may mean various things: that one simply does not believe 
there is such a thing as truth; that one believes that there is no one truth as pertains to an issue, 
but truths, locally and temporally dependent; or that one acknowledges the existence of truth, but 
believes that truth is not an end in itself and is not necessarily desirable. Given the epistemology 
implied throughout Swift's novels, I believe he uses the phrase in the latter sense. 
2 An example of how dominant a signifier "desire" has become is that when Catherine Belsey 
published her study of love stories in W estern culture in 1994, she gave it the title Desire. Even 
an older study like Leslie Fiedler's Love and Death in the American Novel ultimately deals with 
the failure of the American novel to portray adult sexual desire and relations. Intimately 
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impossible to talk about these things. There is no proper language for love 
and sentimentality. One ends up with something undeveloped, embarrassing, 
primordial, or even obscene, as Roland Barthes suggests in A Lover's 
Discourse: "Discredited by modern opinion, love's sentimentality must be 
assumed by the amorous subject as a powerful transgression which leaves 
him alone and exposed; by a reversal of values, it is this sentimentality which 
today constitutes love's obscenity" (175). 
In Postmodernity, Ethics and the Novel, Andrew Gibson makes related 
observations about the fate of sensibility, a concept historically and 
semantical ly closely related, but not identical, to sentimentality.3 Using the 
concept in the modified sense, influenced by the ethical thinking of 
Emmanuel Levinas, of "the power to be affected" (164), Gibson argues that 
sensibility . . . repeatedly turns out to be the problematic other of 
criticism as will to power, a will that is actually that of criticism 
itself, but that it insistently descries in the literary work. The 
advent of theory hardly changes this configuration at all. Rather, 
the modern subjection of sensibility is precisely completed by 
theory, not only because of the triumphant prioritization of 
intellect in the theoretical discourses dominant in t he 1970s and 
1980s, but because the concept of affect that is dominant in 
theory—in Foucault, Deleuze and much of Derrida and Lyo-
tard—is of affect as "force" or "libidinal economy", repeatedly 
theorized in post-Nietzschean, Dionysian, unremittingly virile 
terms as an active violence, a movement outwards towards an 
object, rather than susceptibility or openness to the event. (164) 
However, Gibson's study, published recently, is itself one of the signs we 
may now begin to note of unease and discomfort with the expulsion of 
sensibility, and perhaps also sentimentality (although Gibson prefers a 
discourse on affect to one on emotion and sentimentality), from our critical 
midst. Notably, we may trace such signs in poststructuralist theory itself, 
back to the Barthes of the Fragments and Camera Lucida, as well as the 
connected with the rise in importance of feminist and gender studies, the thinking of desire, or 
eros, has served to preclude a more Platonic and ethico-spiritual notion of love in literary and 
cultural studies. However, as Danuta Fjellestad suggests, "it is likely that the erotic rhetoric in 
criticism has reached its point of exhaustion. One of the first signals of it was Rristeva's Tales of 
Love in which she situates the psychoanalytic discourse in the space of love, not, as previously, 
desire" (204). Lending some support to my ambitions in this study, Fjellestad hazards that "[a] 
return to issues of love and affection in literature, then, is likely to be the next critical project". 
J See Jerome McGann's The Poetics of Sensibility for a thorough discussion of the differences 
and similarities between the two, as well as their joint historical genesis. See also Fred Kaplan's 
Sacred Tears, especially 16-20. 
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Derrida of The Postcard? 
This present study takes heed of those signs. It is animated by my wish 
to open literary criticism to considerations of what shape sentimentality may 
take, or in what configurations it may exist, in postmodernist fiction. In my 
attempt at this opening, I focus on the novels of the British author, Graham 
Swift, as they strike me as seminal in their blending of sentimentality with 
postmodernist aesthetics and with a postmodern ethico-spiritual imagi­
nation—a blending resulting in what I have chosen to call, in shorthand, "the 
sentimentum".5 In postmodernism, I argue, sentimentality is reinscribed in 
the somewhat different terms of the sentimentum. The various traditional 
senses of sentimentality persist, but in a new kind of ethico-spiritual and 
aesthetic configuration. That configuration forms the sentimentum, the nexus 
of a postmodern sentimentality. 
In other words, what I wish to explore in this thesis is what happens to 
sentimentality when it is placed within the perimeters of the postmodern 
imagination, with its ethics of alterity and its creed of "indetermanence".6 
One reason for focusing on Swift in this exploration is that his oeuvre forms a 
capsule history of the development of post-war fiction from modernism 
through late modernism to postmodernism. As such, Swift's oeuvre lends 
itself perfectly to a tracing of the emergence of the sentimentum vis-à-vis the 
two major artistic paradigms of the last hundred years.7 
More specifically, then, my aim in this study is to read Graham Swift's 
texts as shaped by a concern with the sentimental, and to investigate how this 
4 As Diane Elam puts it, Derrida's book "is both larded with philosophical allusions and with 
explicitly clichéd sentimentality" (149). 
5 I will elaborate my conception of "postmodern ethico-spirituality" in the first chapter of this 
thesis. For the moment, I will note that by "spiritual" I do not mean religious in the traditional 
sense—1 am rather a fter the same thing as Ihab Hassan is when he states in a recent interview 
that "[t]he spiritual extends over a broad band of noetic experiences, from common intuitions to 
mystical revelations, from aesthetic appreciation to the sentiment of the sublime, from 
inspiration in science and art to intimations of immortality, and so forth" ("Postmodernism, Etc." 
369). Like Hassan, I am "interested in discovering, or rather, rediscovering, the relations 
between the spiritual impulse of human beings and our daily lives in a culture of irony, kitsch, 
disbelief' and "particularly interested in discerning the nexus between spirit, nihilism, and 
language" (369). Cf. Susan Sontag's swift definition in "The Aesthetics of Silence": "Spirituality 
= plans, terminologies, ideas of deportment aimed at resolving the painful structural 
contradictions inherent in the human situation, at the completion of human consciousness, at 
transcendence" (181). 
Ä The term "indetermanence" was coined by Ihab Hassan; it denotes a dialogic of indeterminacy 
and immanence, "indeterminacy lodged in immanence". See "Toward a Concept of 
Postmodernism" (92-93) for an elaboration of the term. 
71 will restrict myself in this study to Swift's novels, for reasons of space and cohesion, but also 
because the short stories collected in Learning to Swim are seldom aesthetically postmodernist in 
an obvious way and hence do not bear directly on the discussion of the sentimentum. 
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concern activates and determines both the themes and the forms of his 
novels. As this concern structures themes and forms, the texts disengage with 
the sense of abandon found in the ontological and epistemological play 
typical of authors branded "postmodernist"; or, to be more precise, the sense 
of abandon typically identified as postmodernist by critics. Through a 
postmodernist aesthetics that re-examines rather than renounces realism, and 
that allows sentimental and ironic modes equal prominence, Swift's oeuvre 
moves toward the expression of the sentimentum and toward an aesthetics of 
vulnerability. In this way, a reconciliation of realist referential pretences and 
postmodernist textual play takes place, as well as a reconciliation of 
sentimentality and irony. Both these reconciliations are integral to the 
sentimentum. 
I describe, then, a temporal transition: throughout his oeuvre, Swift 
moves toward the fulfilment of what I call an aesthetics of vulnerability, 
which allows what I call the sentimentum place within a postmodernism 
typically described as ironic, parodie and marked by what Fredric Jameson 
has called "the waning of affect". By an aesthetics of vulnerability, I mean an 
aesthetics which, still governed by a postmodern imagination, discards to 
some extent the incessant irony and self-consciousness we have come to 
associate with postmodernist fiction, and which thus risks what has become 
an impeccable relativism for the benefit of a more affirmative turn. In other 
words, this aesthetics of vulnerability entails the baring of the text to critical 
scorn through the text's flaunting of beliefs that in their very moment of 
affirmation are fragile and vulnerable to scepticism as well as cynicism.8 This 
aesthetics also works on a more thematic level, as the text of the sentimentum 
dramatizes an ethics of alterity that involves the laying bare of oneself to 
wounding by the other, the making-vulnerable of oneself. Both this aesthetics 
of vulnerability and the ethics of vulnerability just touched upon are, again, 
gradually more pronounced and affirmed through each successive installment 
in Swift's oeuvre. 
However, I do not introduce the concepts of the sentimentum and of an 
aesthetics of vulnerability simply as a means of understanding the works of 
one single author. My ambition is to bring attention to an aesthetic and 
thematic configuration that may be found in a number of postmodernist 
novels. Hence, in my conclusion, I present comparative and complementary 
readings of novels by Julian Barnes, Penelope Lively and Jeanette Winterson 
that illustrate the wider application of the concept of the sentimentum. What 
8 This is also the case with Derrida's The Postcard; as Diane Elam emphasizes in her discussion 
of Derrida's text, though, "something more than either an inflated sense of the significance of his 
own personal life or an unavowable desire on Derrida's part to make himself a laughing stock 
seems to be at stake here" (149). 
4 
Introduction 
interests me in the novels of Swift, Barnes, Lively and Winterson is their 
reinscription—and reinvention—of an ethico-spiritual vision from within the 
thematics and forms of postmodern discourse, without the result that the 
sceptical and critical imagination of postmodernism stifles or decentres the 
ethical, the spiritual, or, indeed, the sentimental. 
Once again, though, criticism has not, so far, been particularly awake 
to this aspect of postmodernist fiction. Hence, in what follows in this 
introduction, I survey the critical discourses on postmodernist fiction in 
general and on Swift's works in particular, in order to see in what ways 
issues of sentimentality, ethics and spirituality have been accommodated in 
those discourses, and to locate the gaps I wish to fill and the resistances I 
wish to loosen. This introduction then rounds off with an outline of my 
argument in the following chapters, which include an elaboration of my 
conceptions of postmodernism and of the sentimentum, readings of Swift's 
six novels to date, as well as a conclusion in which 1 broaden my critical 
outlook. 
Reclamation work: Aspects of the sentimentum in the critical discourse 
on postmodernism 
As I touched upon above, sentimentality, not to say any mode of affect, has 
been viewed as being at odds with the aesthetics and politics of 
postmodernism, as have to a large extent the other aspects—if divide them 
we must—of the sentimentum: ethics and spirituality. While ethics and 
spirituality have begun to be re-thought within postmodern philosophy in the 
wake of, for instance, Levinas, Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, the notion of 
"the waning of affect" presented by Jameson in his influential essay on 
postmodernism has pretty much reigned supreme.9 Jameson's assessment 
strikes me as unduly facile, though. Juxtaposing Vincent Van Gogh's 
painting "A Pair of Boots" with Andy Warhol's "Diamond Dust Shoes", 
Jameson finds in the former the possibility of re-establishing a context for the 
work and of recreating the work as a socially symbolic act invested with 
affect, whereas the latter is just a mechanical reproduction and reification, 
resulting in a fetish devoid of affective charge. Since Jameson wants to 
extrapolate from this juxtaposition and make a point about modernism and 
postmodernism in general, the main problem to me here is that Van Gogh's 
painting is not the instance of High Modernism, and neither is Warhol's the 
instance of postmodernism.10 Rather, both paintings are embryonic in relation 
9 See Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, especially 10-16. 
10 Charles Bernstein conducts a similar critique in "In the Middle of Modernism in the Middle of 
Capitalism on the Outskirts of New York": "Jameson starts with an overgeneralization: that the 
5 
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to the respective movements. Furthermore, as Hal Foster illustrates in a 
recent study, Warhol's images may be read "as referential and simulacral, 
connected and disconnected, affective and affectless, critical and compla­
cent", in terms of what Foster calls "traumatic realism" (The Return of the 
Real 130). 
Still, while a change seems on the way in the thinking of affect within 
postmodernism, as evidenced by for example Gibson and Foster, this think­
ing is still usually marked by a sense of contradiction or anomaly. At any 
rate, it seldom—if at all—links affect to sentimentality or sensibility. For 
instance, Brian Massumi, in an essay titled "The Autonomy of Affect", notes 
that "[t]here seems to be a growing feeling within media, literary and art 
theory that affect is central to an understanding of our information and 
image-based late-capitalist culture, in which so-called master narratives are 
perceived to have foundered", and that "Fredric Jameson notwithstanding, 
belief has waned for many, but not affect" (221). According to Massumi, 
"[t]he problem is that there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to 
affect" (221). Fie also suggests that ethics be "a designation for the project of 
thinking affect" (222). Thus, it may seem that my thinking follows Mas-
sumi's. However, Massumi's conception of affect is cast in distinctly De-
leuze-Guattarian terms, involving quantum or virtual states, infinite speeds, 
schizophrenic bursts.11 It also turns out that "[t]he implied ethics of the 
project is the value attached—without foundation, with desire only—to the 
multiplication of the powers of existence, to ever-divergent regimes of action 
and expression" (227). In other words, Massumi's discourse on affect (rather 
than of affect) becomes one of desire, of power, of action and expression, 
rather than the one of receptivity and disinterested care that I am concerned 
with here, following primarily Levinas. It is thus not surprising that Massumi 
proceeds to think affect along a distinctly political axis, concluding with 
observations of partisan politics vis-à-vis manipulations of affect via the 
media, and suggesting that "[ajffect holds a key to rethinking postmodern 
power after ideology" (235). 
Now, while Massumi's argument is fine per se, it serves as an 
illustration of how I do not primarily think the ethico-emotional throughout 
works of the modernists are completely assimilated by the culture and now seem to artists 'like a 
set of dead classics' [p. 56]. He then describes the 'deconstruction of expression' as evidenced in 
the movement from 'high-modernist' (?) Vincent Van Gogh to 'the central figure in 
contemporary visual arts', Andy Warhol (a kind of postmodern hyperbole that sacrifices critical 
distance for dubious leveling)" (92). 
11 Cf. Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus and What Is Philosophy?. In the latter, 
Deleuze and Guattari champion "the concept", which is the product of philosophy and "is infinite 
through its survey or its speed" (21), above "the function", which is "a freeze-frame", "a Slow-
motion" (118), the petrified object of science. 
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this study: through desire, power, action, speed. Rather, I think it through 
receptivity, vulnerability, disinterestedness, slow-motion (which is not the 
same as freeze-frame). Thus, I arrive at the postmodern form of 
sentimentality and of sensibility involved in the sentimentum. 
However, I am indeed also interested in traces of a more traditional 
sentimentality, mainly involved in discourses of love and mourning, and in 
how that sentimentality attains a quality tenable or plausible in our 
postmodern clime—and in postmodernist fiction. Critical interest in this 
aspect of postmodernism and of postmodernist fiction has been scarce, as 
evidenced by the fact that when I carried out combined searches of the MLA 
Bibliography for "postmodernism" and "love", "emotions", "feelings", "af­
fect", "sentiment" and "sentimentality", 1 came up with, respectively, eight, 
three, three, two, zero and zero entries. Subsequently checking all the MLA 
Bibliography entries for a number of British authors of roughly the same 
(postmodern) generation as Swift,12 I came up with eight hundred and 
seventy-seven articles, but only one that clearly deals with love. It is an 
article on Tan McEwan's fiction, and it is symptomatically called "The 
Absurdity of Love: Parodie Relationships in Ian McEwan's 'Reflections of A 
Kept Age' and 'Dead as They Come'" (Slay). As we can see, then, if talked 
about at all in c onjunction with contemporary literature, love is absurd and 
relationships are parodie. 
This ousting of love from the postmodern temple is not surprising, 
however, if we recall Umberto Eco's famous definition of postmodernism in 
his Postscript to the Name of the Rose: 
1 think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a 
very cultivated woman and knows he cannot say to her, "I love 
you madly", because he knows that she knows (and that she 
knows that he knows) that these words have already been written 
by Barbara Cartland. Still, there is a solution. He can say, "As 
Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly". At this point, 
having avoided false innocence, having said clearly that it is no 
longer possible to speak innocently, he will nevertheless have 
said what he wanted to say to the woman: that he loves her, but 
he loves her in an age of lost innocence. If the woman goes 
along with this, she will have received a declaration of love all 
the same. Neither of the two speakers will feel innocent, both 
will h ave accepted the challenge of the past, of the already said, 
which cannot be eliminated, but will consciously and with 
12 The authors were, besides Swift, Peter Ackroyd, Martin Amis, John Banville, Julian Barnes, 
Angela Carter, Bruce Chatwin, Jenny Diski, Kazuo Ishiguro, Ian MeEwan, Timothy Mo, Ben 
Okri, Caryl Phillips, Salman Rushdie, D.M. Thomas and Jeanette Winterson. 
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pleasure play the game of irony . . . But both will have 
succeeded, once again, in speaking of love. (67) 
Thus, Eco is simultaneously one of the few to discuss postmodernism in 
terms of love, and the one to elaborately establish "genuine", unabashed love 
as, if not untenable, then unspeakable in that same postmodernism. 
In her discussion of British postmodernist authors in the chapter of 
Desire called "Postmodern Love", Catherine Belsey adheres much to Eco's 
notion of postmodern love as ironic double coding. However, she also 
suggests that loving in postmodernity may amount to fantasizing against 
better knowledge: "To the degree . . . that postmodernity . . . represents a 
radically sceptical attitude to metaphysics, a fundamental questioning of 
presence, transcendence, certainty and all absolutes, the postmodern 
condition brings with it an incredulity towards true love" (72). Love, in 
Belsey's account, is first and foremost erotic, desirous, passionate; that is, 
while it may be as much "of the soul" as "of the flesh", love in Belsey's 
discussion of postmodernist fiction does not denote the true ethical moment 
in the Levinasian sense, nor does it denote the more traditional and perhaps 
less radical notion of agape. Rather, Belsey's argument vacillates somewhat 
confusingly between the terms "love", "desire" and "sexuality": "[DJesire is 
more voluble than ever before ... It produces a proliferation of knowledges: 
therapies, sexologies, arts of love. . . . And above all desire tells stories—at 
the cinema, in the popular press, on television ('every other night, on TV, 
someone says: I love you')" (76). To me, there are two problems with 
Belsey's discussion: first, it does not problematize, complexify and multiply 
the meanings of "love" and "desire", and second, it st ays with the desiring 
subject which is bound up in itself, that is, the modern self. I would, 
contrastingly, like to privilege a notion of love not as desirous, but as 
disinterested, the offering of oneself to and for the other. 
Nonetheless, Belsey has many good points about love/desire in 
postmodernist fiction. She refers to the postmodern ironies and inde-
terminacies of Julian Barnes's Flaubert's Parrot and Talking It Over, 
Jeanette Winterson's The Passion and Written on the Body, A.S. Byatt's 
Possession and Anne Rice's Vampire Chronicles, and notes these novels' 
simultaneous inscription and subversion of the romance paradigm. 
Postmodern love, Belsey concludes, is "at once sceptical and idealizing, and 
therefore restless, unsatisfied, dis-placed and, in the last analysis, solitary" 
(91). This could indeed be an assessment of Bill Unwin, the narrator of 
Swift's Ever After, but to me Belsey's conclusion is unduly overstated: at 
once sceptical and idealizing, yes; necessarily unsatisfied and solitary, no. I 
would maintain that both satisfaction and a genuine romantic bond are 
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possible in postmodernism, and in postmodernist fiction. 
Considering such a possibility, but also reminding ourselves that love 
is intricately linked to loss, we should note Brian McHale's grand gesture of 
concluding that postmodernist fiction is primarily about not only love, but 
also death (Postmodernist Fiction 219-32). However, McHale's discussion of 
love and death in the postmodernist novel focuses quite exclusively on 
formal aspects of narrative and does not engage with broader ethico-spiritual 
issues. Thus, although his argument is largely convincing as such, McHale 
does not quite approach the kind of discourse on love and death that I am 
interested in here. To begin with, McHale identifies love with "erotic love" 
and the '"romantic triangle' of desire and rivalry" (222). Describing "[t]he 
author's relation to his or her characters, too ... as a form of love", McHale 
does invest that relation with more than eroticism when he points to the 
condition "where the author respects and takes delight in the characters' 
independent existence". Turning next to the relationship between text and 
reader, however, he speaks again of "the erotic relation" and of narratives as 
seductive, "in the sense that they solicit and attempt to manipulate 
relationship". What McHale is primarily interested in is love as "metalepsis"; 
that is, "[i]f authors love their characters, and if texts seduce their readers, 
then these relations involve violations of ontological boundaries". Of course, 
"these metaleptic relations are permanent features of modern western litera­
ture", but whereas "'traditional' fiction keeps them more or less in the back­
ground, out of reach of fictional self-consciousness . . . postmodernist writing 
systematically foregrounds them" (222-23). Postmodernist writing does this, 
McHale argues, chiefly by recourse to the second-person pronoun, "you", 
directly addressing the reader. This one-way communication is often even 
abusive, something McHale reconciles with the notion of love by asserting 
that the abuse of the reader "may function as a seductive strategy, a 'lover's 
quarrel' deliberately staged as the prelude to a tender reconciliation" (226). 
McHale concludes his discussion by stating that "[i]t should be clear now 
what I mean when 1 say postmodernist writing is 'about' love. I am not so 
interested in its potential for representing love between fictional characters, 
or for investigating the theme of love . . . , as in its modeling of erotic 
relations through foregrounded violations of ontological boundaries" (227). 
Once again, eroticism and violation are the terms of love for McHale, which 
suggests that he is actually operating with decidedly modern, profane notions 
of love. 
More rewarding for my purposes in this thesis—that is, the projection 
of the sentimentum and the location of its various aspects in postmodernist 
fiction and in the discourse on postmodernist fiction—is McHale's discussion 
of death. McHale begins the discussion by noting how the deathbed scenes of 
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eighteenth and nineteenth century fiction are transformed in modernist 
fiction, "turned inward", into the device of the deathbed monologue (228). In 
the deathbed monologue, "life has been equated with discourse, death with 
the end of discourse and silence". The classical forerunner of this position is 
of course Scheherazade, who has to continue telling her stories in order to 
literally survive. Postmodernism takes this awareness one step further, 
bringing it into the foreground. In postmodernist fiction, the narrator must 
continue to speak in order to lilerarily survive; that is, the narrator only exists 
in terms of the fiction s/he is producing, and at the point the production of 
discourse ends, the narrator ends. Notable in this respect are, in McHale's 
view, texts by John Barth, Steve Katz, Maggie Gee, J.M.G. LeClézio and 
Raymond Federman, with Laurence Sterne as a forerunner. 
Postmodernism not only foregrounds this attempt at escaping death, 
however. Some "postmodernist writers have attempted to imagine tran­
scendence; filibustering fate even beyond the supposedly ultimate limit of 
death itself, they project discourse into death" (230). McHale cites texts by 
Beckett, Robbe-Grillet, Flann O'Brien, Guy Davenport, Stanley Elkin and 
Russell Hoban as examples of this attempt at transcendence. (I may add Swift 
to that list; in Out of This World, Harry Beech's dead wife Anne narrates one 
chapter, and in Last Orders Jack Dodds, whose ashes are being carried to the 
sea, does the same.) Following Gabriel Josipovici, McHale ends up with the 
fruitful notion of postmodernist fiction, especially in its most metafictional 
form, as a dress-rehearsal for death: "the shattering of the fictional illusion 
leaves the reader 'outside' the fictional consciousness with which he or she 
has been identifying, forcing the reader to give up this consciousness and, by 
analogy, to give up her or his own, in a kind of dress-rehearsal for death" 
(231). 
As in the case of love, though, McHale does not enter into any 
elaborate discussion of the spiritual or the ethical. McHale is interested 
finally not in the possibilities and actualities of death as a theme in 
postmodernist fiction, but in its metaleptic function: "[postmodernist writing 
models or simulates death; it produces simulacra of death through con­
frontations between worlds, through transgressions of ontological levels or 
boundaries" (232). Hence, McHale's concluding claim has a somewhat 
hollow ring, as he writes that since "[w]e have all but lost the ars 
moriendi . . . [postmodernist writing may be one of our last resources for 
preparing ourselves, in imagination, for the single act which we must 
assuredly all perform unaided, with no hope of doing it over if we get it 
wrong the first time"; it seems to me unlikely that anyone would find the 
basis and strength for dying well by reading Lost in the Funhouse or 
Gravity's Rainbow. 
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Nonetheless, McHale's suggestions must have had an influence on the 
only existing fall-length study of love in postmodernist fiction: Postmodern 
Discourses of Love by Mira Sakrajda.13 Sakrajda's thesis contains analyses of 
works by Pynchon, Barth, Coover, Gass and Barthelme, that is, the literary 
tricksters of the first wave of American postmodernist fiction. Sakrajda 
"seeks to demonstrate that postmodernism should be viewed as intellectually 
and emotionally ambivalent rather than totally liberated from the 'con­
straints' of Western cultural tradition which embraces such principles as 
center, value and meaning" (1356A). In her reading of Pynchon, she "focuses 
on three works in which the theme of caring and human connectedness vis-a­
vis [s/Y] entropie disintegration is most relevant" and shows "that in 
Pynchon's fiction 'continuities' and 'humanist essences' are not simply 
inscribed and then subverted—they linger on amidst what appears to be a 
holocaust of value and meaning". Obviously taking the cue from McHale, 
she then reveals in her discussion of "the literary appropriations of love in 
seminal metafictions by Barth, Coover and Gass" that "although all autotelic 
writing shifts the problematics of love onto the problematics of discourse, 
individual works differ considerably in how they negotiate their relation in 
the world". The examination of Barthelme's short fiction "traces Barthelme's 
effort to 'enspirit the spiritless', at whose basis is his assertion of the primacy 
of personal love that spills over to the affirmation of love in general". 
Sakrajda's concluding remarks "concern the possibility of reinventing 
spirituality within the parameters of postmodernism". She thus covers a lot of 
the ground I wish to cover in the present thesis, albeit with a focus on five 
authors who are somewhat different in their (postmodern) temperament from 
Swift. 
if we broaden our discussion to include the more widely encompassing 
signifier "emotion", the most interesting book on postmodernism to appear is 
surely the volume titled Emotion in Postmodernism (Hoffmann and Hornung, 
eds.). A collection of papers from a symposium on the subject, the volume 
does however not deliver anything like the affirmation I am striving toward, 
and which I intend to show in this thesis that Swift and other postmodern 
writers are striving toward. Although the preface states that "these articles 
demonstrate the necessity of re-evaluating the role of emotion in our 
postmodern times to move beyond Fredric Jameson's schematic position 
about the waning of affect", the opening sentence of the circular announcing 
the symposium reads: "It is hardly surprising that displays of emotion appear 
to be absent from postmodern art and postmodern discourse" (qtd. in Bertens 
13 Written as a dissertation under the name Miroslawa Kozyra-Sakrajda, Postmodern Discourses 
of Love is in the process of being published by Peter Lang. I mu st make do here with the entry in 
Dissertation Abstracts International. 
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25). The articles duly view emotion in postmodernism as a problematic 
anomaly, or as something to be sought out in hitherto untrod ways and 
places.14 Even those sceptical toward the notion that postmodernism self-
evidently precludes emotion are at a loss when trying to find counter-
evidence. Significantly, this holds for the field of literature too: in his essay 
on emotion in postmodernist fiction, Hans Bertens states that "I have no 
quarrel with the claim that emotion is largely absent from postmodern art 
(literary art, that is). What I take exception to is the idea that this is hardly 
surprising" (28). That is, Bertens takes it for granted that emotion is absent 
from postmodernist literature, but does not believe that emotion must 
necessarily be absent from postmodernist literature. Indeed, as one reads on 
in his article, one finds him observing that "[it does] not necessarily follow 
that the deconstruction of character that we see in a good many postmodern 
novels should inevitably lead to an absence of emotion. . . . One can agree 
that postmodern characters lack stability but such a lack of stability does not 
preclude emotion; it is, on the contrary, a wellspring of—usually contra­
dictory—emotions" (28). Bertens cites as an actual exemplar of that 
wellspring of emotions the character Bloch in Peter Handke's Die Angst des 
Tormanns beim Elfmeter (The Goalie's Anxiety at the Penalty Kick). 
However, and this is where things get very interesting, Bertens concludes that 
"yet, while the postmodern dismissal of autonomy and the subsequent turn 
towards agency does on the theoretical level not at all exclude emotion, as 
Bloch's example illustrates, one hesitates to call Bloch postmodern exactly 
because he displays powerful, even if confused, emotions" (29; emphasis 
mine). This hesitation on the part of Bertens seems to me highly indicative of 
the anxiety and reluctance among critics as regards the accommodation of 
141 will restrict my discussion here to the article by Hans Bertens. Let me, however, give a few 
brief quotes to show the tenor of other articles: "[111 postmodern fiction] integrating feelings like 
joy, anxiety, or pain often lose their clearcut contours, are diffused if they are registered at all 
into what one might call 'mood', which itself does not necessarily have a definable cause, but is 
rather marked by indecision as to its reason and its target" (Hoffmann 188); "[E]motions in 
postmodernity ... do not represent an inner self or a core of existence. Rather, they have a 
shallow character" (Vester 241); "[Postmodernism] has led to an overloading of aesthetic 
distance, to a point where emotion is shunned and cannot be rendered any more without being 
immediately ironized, or at least relativized and questioned" (Grabes 335); "[T]here has been an 
unmistakable return of emotion, both in art and in literature, since the mid-Seventies. . . . Yet one 
has to say that even there the manner of representation is throughout distanced and cool, as if the 
narrators were observing animals in a laboratory" (Grabes 341-42); "Postmodern literature 
arouses neither emotions nor tears" (Keitel 350); "I think that remnants or residues of an 
emotional involvement with the literary text do indeed surface in reading postmodern texts. 
Here, however—as opposed to conventions in the Victorian novel—the traces of affective 
involvement in the reading process are converted into unspe'eiflc reactions" (Keitel 352). I am 
not suggesting that these statements are necessarily wrong, but that they are overstatements or 
only hold for certain instances of postmodernist fiction. 
1 2  
Introduction 
emotion within the perimeters of postmodernism. 
After having made his conclusion about Bloch, Bertens enters upon an 
extensive discussion of postmodernist vis-à-vis modernist visual art that 
eventually yields Bertens's actual notion of what constitutes postmodern 
literary art: 
Postmodern visual art continues modernism's discursivity in 
radicalizing the anti-representationalist impulse that is latently 
present in modernist art while it adopts a figuralism that is 
wholly at odds with visual modernism. Postmodern literary art 
only radicalizes that anti-representationalist impulse, its ironical 
perspective leading to an intellectualism that leaves no room for 
such worldly matters as emotions. (34) 
This may be true of the, interestingly very few, examples of American 
postmodernist fiction that Bertens cites: Pynchon's Vineland and Doctorow's 
Ragtime. As I argue, however, it is not patently true of many other, par­
ticularly British, postmodernist works of fiction. 
An explanation of how Bertens reaches his conclusion—that is, that 
emotion is absent from postmodernist fiction—is found if we turn to the 
premise of his essay, stated at its beginning: "[I]n postmodern times James 
Joyce's Molly Bloom would not be in bed, between waking and sleeping, and 
reserve her thoughts, if we may call them thoughts, to herself, but would 
instead offer them to the world on the Oprah Winfrey show" (25). Since 
Bertens is unable to locate this juxtaposition of Bloom and Winfrey, or a 
similar juxtaposition, in postmodernist fiction, he concludes that "postmodern 
fiction can only ironize and caricature [contemporary] culture. In spit e of all 
claims that postmodernism has closed the gap between élite and mass culture 
it emphatically has not and one can safely predict that it will not do so either: 
postmodernism feels indeed free to eclectically ransack it, but its attitude 
towards mass culture is one of undisguised disdain" (34). As one can infer 
from this assessment, another of Bertens's premises is that in postmodern 
times emotion is ca tegorically public, televised, hyperreal; hence the need in 
an accurate postmodem portrayal of emotion to have it spoken and acted out 
in front of a live studio audience and, beyond the cameras, a multi-million 
TV audience. Indeed, Bertens goes on to refer to the Baudrillardean and 
Jamesonian notion that "with the disappearance of the real it has become 
impossible to have emotions that engage an authentic reality" (34). However, 
Bertens's point is precisely the one I would make: that Jameson and 
Baudrillard have overstated the disappearance of the real; to which I would 
add that emotions that have as their subjects and objects, as it were, the 
simulacrum or the hyperreal are still emotions. All the same, although 
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Bertens claims that postmodernist fiction need not necessarily be emotionally 
bereft, he finds that it actually is. Interestingly for my purposes, Bertens 
finally reveals that such is the case with British postmodernist fiction as well: 
"Unfortunately, virtually all postmodern writers would seem to subscribe to 
this bleak and hopeless vision of lost authenticity—and not just in the U.S. In 
her recent study of English fiction since the 1960s Patricia Waugh tells us 
that over the last thirty years English writers, too, have been busy packaging 
unrelieved gloom in po stmodern wrappings" (36). 5 Needless to say, I do not 
agree with this assessment, and will offer ample evidence to the contrary in 
my readings of Swift in chapters two through four, and with reference to 
other authors in my conclusion. 
It transpires, however, that Bertens would argue that the kind of 
emotional structures and representations that 1 have in mind are not what 
postmodernist fiction ought to deal with were it to portray postmodern 
culture and society as they now stand: "Postmodern fiction does not deal 
adequately with emotion because its implicit and rather élitist humanism has 
no way of coping with the public display of emotions that day after day 
ravage our television screens" (37). Yet, look at Bertens's choice of words: 
"ravage", indeed—Bertens betrays his own distance from, and dislike of, 
those public displays of emotions, just like anyone who is able to identify the 
mechanisms and stakes involved in those displays would. Bertens seems to 
suggest that the closing of the gap between élite and mass culture would 
entail a complicity with contemporary popular culture on the part of 
postmodern art. I fail to see why this should be the case, however. As 
theorists like Charles Jencks and Linda Hutcheon have observed, the 
characteristic and resourcefulness of postmodernist art lies precisely in its 
double coding, in its simultaneous inscription and subversion. Hence, it is 
expected that postmodernist fiction inscribe mass culture and subject it to a 
critique—as long as it a lso subjects élite culture to a critique, and not least 
subjects itself to a critique, ultimately subjecting those critiques in turn to a 
critique, and so on, in a revolving spiral of, not dialectic, but dialogic, 
reasoning. 
Staying with the issue of affect, or emotion, I would like to turn now to 
Cristopher Nash's recent book, The Unravelling of the Postmodern Mind. 
The blurb for the book is promising: "Instead of looking at the world through 
the filter of philosophical abstraction, [Nash's book] is expressly and 
radically about affect. About what it feels like to (want to) be postmodern". 
However, Nash does resort to what constitutes an abstraction and a kind of 
master narrative of postmodernism, as he sets himself the task of showing 
" Bertens is referring to Waugh's The Harvest of the Sixties, which, incidentally, does not 
present as unnuanced a view of English literature as Bertens suggests. 
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how postmodern philosophical tenets and postmodernist aesthetic practices 
correspond to the psychological and behavioural profile of clinical narcissism 
or "narcissance", as Nash chooses to call it in order to mark a difference from 
the popular connotations of "narcissism". By way of analogy, postmodern 
notions of the decentring or death of the subject, of the death of the author 
and the end of originality, of self-consciousness, of self-reflexive and inter-
textual artistic practices, of the pluralization of, and oscillation between, 
beliefs and perspectives are explained as the symptoms of a narcissant frame 
of mind. As a result, Nash's argument is not very pluralistic itself. It stays 
with the emotional register of the narcissant, which entails "a shallowness of 
emotional life in relation to others and a shunning of intimacy", "extreme 
depression and feelings of emptiness alternating with manic hyperactivity 
and elation" and "a chronic need to damp-down deeper-running emotional 
affect" (61). The lengthier section of the book that focuses on affect is called 
"Emotional Resources: Depression, Mania, Paranoia, Apathy", which in­
dicates, somewhat ironically, that postmodernism is not very emotionally 
resourceful. Indeed, any notion of sentimentality, for instance, is reserved for 
Nash's argument that postmodernism "has been especially effective in 
attacking the slick glamour-shielded-and-wielded 'clean' sentimental middle-
class conformism that first inspired a generation growing up in the 1950s and 
1960s to postmodern revolt" (204; emphasis mine). Now, Nash may be right 
to a large extent: narcissant traits and their increase in recent years may 
account for the formulation of postmodernism and the successful dis­
semination of its theories and practices. However, I doubt that this is the 
whole story. In tra cing the persistence of the sentimental in postmodernism 
and in locating an ethics of alterity at work in postmodernist fiction, I 
establish an alternative or complement to Nash's "postmodern world 
picture". 
Refocusing my discussion onto said ethics of alterity, I may note that 
the same people who organized the symposium that yielded Emotion in 
Postmodernism put together, only one year earlier, a symposium on 
postmodernism and ethics, papers from which were collected in t he volume 
Ethics and Aesthetics: The Moral Turn of Postmodernism. However, the 
discussions in the two volumes seldom overlap or enter into dialogue with 
one another. Hence, they do not begin to establish the convergence of 
emotion and ethics that I am interested in. Still, the discussions in Ethics and 
Aesthetics do, as the title signals, establish a connection between ethics and 
aesthetics, and many of the articles do engage Levinas, Bauman and a few 
other of the philosophers of postmodern ethics which I lean on here. Yet, 
they do not bring the full resources of postmodern ethico-aesthetics to bear 
on postmodernist fiction. As with Emotion in Postmodernism, this is much 
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due to the various scholars' narrow notions of what constitutes postmodernist 
fiction. 
For instance, Christopher Butler's aim is "to describe some of the 
moral dilemmas which arise within much postmodern art and theory, given 
its inadequate conception of the person (and of moral sentiment)" (69). To 
Butler, "[t]he point of the [postmodem] work seems to reside in our grasp of 
the epistemology behind its aesthetic strategy, rather than its human content, 
and it too often carries little more than a (political) message about the 
circumstances of its own production" (69). Butler leaves to a footnote his 
qualification that his "arguments also apply ... to much of the work of 
A p p l e ,  B a r t h ,  B a r t h e l m e ,  B r a u t i g a n ,  C a l v i n o ,  D a v e n p o r t ,  D e  L i l l o  [ s i c ] ,  
Federman, Gass, Handke, Michaels, Robbe-Grillet, Sukenick and Von-negut 
. . . [b\ut not . . . and marking a significant difference, to Abish, Barthes, 
Beckett, Borges, Butor, Carter, Fowles, Gray, Hawkes, Kosinski, Ondaatje, 
Pynchon, Rushdie, . . . Simon, Sorrentino, Spark, and others" (71, n.6; 
emphasis mine). Although Butler admits, then, that there are postmodern 
authors who do not solely deal in a somewhat dispassionate, aloof self-
referentiality, it would have been interesting to learn exactly how DeLillo and 
Vonnegut are significantly different to Hawkes and Pynchon, and that to the 
disadvantage of the former. Nevertheless, using Robert Coover's Gerald's 
Party as his illustration, Butler concludes that in postmodernist fiction, "[ t]he 
focus has shifted, from emotional attitudes which imply the perception of an 
autonomous person toward an 'intellectual' focusing of attention, devoid of 
sympathetic moral sentiment" (73). However, while Butler's general 
argument, about the dilemmas of postmodern moral philosophy and the 
inadequacy of much postmodern art in presenting characters that elicit 
sympathy, is well-sustained and raises many important questions, his 
assessment of postmodern fiction is ultimately not convincing, in that it 
glosses over the variety of said fiction; Butler does not acknowledge the 
accumulating breadth of postmodern thought and art over the last two 
decades. Butler faults postmodernism in general for not formulating a 
communal vision that accommodates the individual within the grid of 
interpersonal relations and vice versa. However, we do not have to look long 
for texts that manage to articulate such a communal vision in a decidedly 
postmodern language, either in philo sophy (Bauman's Postmodern Ethics) or 
in literature (Swift's Last Orders). 
We have to look to Gibson's Postmodernity, Ethics and the Novel for 
an elaborate account of what a postmodern ethics might entail vis-à-vis 
postmodernist fiction. Gibson refers quite extensively to B.S. Johnson, 
Robert Pinget, Beckett, Jean Rhys, Rushdie, Ishiguro and Winterson, making 
a case for the literary imagination as the site par excellence for working 
16 
Introduction 
through and maintaining alterity. Indeed, Gibson's conception of ethics owes 
a lot to Levinas, to whom Gibson attributes "a relevant, sophisticated, many-
sided, non-foundational ethics" (16). However, it is with reference to Drucilla 
Cornell that Gibson establishes his sense of the power of the imagination: 
The power in question ... is not the moral power of the 
imagination as understood by humanism. It is not a power of 
"deep comprehension" of what is already there, but rather one of 
speculation and adumb ration, a power to brea k up the give n, to 
admit and elab orate the poss ible. The imag ination is crucial in 
producing what, with Adorno in mind, Cornell calls the 
"redemptive perspectives" that "displace and estrange the 
world", so that "we are made aware that we are in exile". (16) 
Most importantly, Gibson comes closer than anyone else in establishing a 
link between ethics and affect akin to the one I wish to make myself, as he 
considers in the final section of his book "how far a non-cognitive, 
Levinasian ethics of fiction might also be an ethics of affect, with reference to 
two key, related concepts, sensibility and receptivity" (17; emphases mine). I 
do not wish to suggest by this statement that affect and affectivity are 
synonymous to sentiment and sentimentality, or that Levinas's notion of 
sensibility is in sustained accordance with the classical sense of the term; nor 
would Gibson suggest any such thing. Rather, Gibson develops his sense of 
sensibility in relation to the historical uses of the term while arguing that 
"radically rethought", sensibility "may now take on an ethical significance" 
(162). If the eighteenth century saw "sensibility as a disposition to refined or 
delicate emotion, including compassion" (162), and the subsequent modernist 
revolution meant the subjection of sensibility to cognition, intellect and form 
as propagated by T.S. Eliot, then sensibility, after its rethinking in a 
postmodern culture, is now "to be understood as distinct from cognition in 
that it does not direct itself at an object with the intention of mastering it, but 
is rather characterized by a mode of openness and attentiveness. It might 
effectively be thought of as a capacity for being mastered, a receptiveness 
which even precedes cognition and makes cognition possible" (162). As 
Gibson observes, the twentieth century witnessed "a decisive triumph over 
and subjection of sensibility, a modern transformation, intellectualization, 
even professionalization and thereby a comprehensive derogation of sen­
sibility" (163). Sensibility did retain "something like its older sense", but as 
such it became "a negative term, designating a power of feeling that remains 
after the fall, after the cataclysm of dissociation, an altogether cruder and 
more negligible faculty" (163). As we saw Gibson point out above, 
throughout the twentieth century sensibility increasingly became "the 
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problematic other of criticism" (163). It is against this backdrop that Gibson 
seeks "to explore the persistent, ethical significance of sensibility in 
Levinas's work, connecting it with a similar persistence in Bataille" (164). 
Neither Levinas nor Bataille, as Gibson points out, are wholly opposed to 
calculation or systematization, but they both offer alternatives in the form of 
expenditure and openendedness. By positing sensibility "before cognition 
and ontology alike . . . Levinas reverses the modern formulation of sensibility 
as it appears in Eliot and Leavis" (164-65). Similarly, "for Bataille, 
expenditure is prior to accumulation and production, prodigality or generosity 
to calculation, the general to any restricted economy" (166). In modernity, 
contrarily, impulses have been directed by an imperative to withhold, to 
calculate and to detach oneself. As Gibson concludes, "|i]t remains for a 
postmodern ethics to reassert archaic sensibility within the rational 
economies, to put the sensibility back into sense" (167). With an eye on 
feminism, Gibson finds this ethics struggling to get through in novels by Jean 
Rhys and Anaïs Nin. In his subsequent development of an ethics of reception 
and receptivity, Gibson pursues that ethics with a view on cultural identity in 
novels by Timothy Mo, Kazuo Ishiguro and Salman Rushdie. Gibson thus 
shows how a p ostmodern ethics may be inflected by, or brought to bear on, 
gender and cultural identity as they are represented in narrative. 
A perspective on narrative that has many points in common with 
Gibson's is found in Mark Ledbetter's Victims and the Postmodern 
Narrative, which contains readings of such acclaimed works of post­
modernist fiction as Toni Morrison's Beloved, Patrick Siiskind's Perfume and 
D.M. Thomas's The White Hotel. In the very first sentence of his book, 
Ledbetter wipes the literary critical slate clean of disinterestedness and 
detachment, as he writes: "Reading and writing about literature are my acts 
of confession, and they are the ways I begin my ethical understanding of how 
I live in the world" (ix). He continues with what reads as a distillation of 
current ideas in literary criticism, such as that of Derek Attridge, and 
philosophy, such as that of Adriana Cavarero: 
16 See Attridge's "Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other" and Cavarero's Relating 
Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. Attridge tries to work out how best to respond to the 
narratives of others, and to narratives as others. Response and responsibility are inseparable in 
Attridge's thought: "[A] full response to the otherness of the text includes an awareness of, a 
respect for, and in a certain sense ... a taking of responsibility for, the creativity of its author" 
(25). Cavarero deals with the notion of identities as narrative formations. She argues for the 
possibility of each individual's formation of one unique life-narrative that would serve as an 
answer to the question "Who am /?", bracketing the question "Who/What is ManT\ Thus, 
Cavarero aligns herself with the postmodern resistance to universalism and generalization which 
we find in, for instance, Levinas and Lyotard. 1 must admit to some consternation, though, when 
Cavarero writes that "[u]nlike philosophy, which for millennia has persisted in capturing the 
universal in the trap of definition, narration reveals the finite in its fragile uniqueness, and sings 
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What it means to be human, to be ethical and to be narrative are 
very similar issues. As Bakhtin suggests, to be human is to enter 
into conversation with myriad narratives from which we gain an 
understanding of ourselves and of the world in w hich we live. 
These narratives may be the diverse and interesting lives of 
human beings who occupy our global surroundings. These 
narratives may be the creative writings, misnamed fictions, 
which represent one of the many constructive and artistic 
exercises by humans to gain some understanding of what it 
means to live in the world ethically, (ix) 
While Ledbetter's focus is on the violence perpetrated by the body politic on 
bodies gendered, raced and classed, and on the suppression of victims in, or 
exclusion of victims from, narratives, he adds that his argument "could/ 
should easily be expanded" and that "there is always another person, group, 
and voice to be considered" (xii, n.3). This statement strikes me as being of 
great virtue, and there is also too great a virtue in many of Ledbetter's points 
for them to be restricted to discussions of political acts of victimization; 
Ledbetter poses many questions and draws many conclusions that are of the 
utmost importance for the study of narrative tout court, as, for instance, when 
he asks: 
Could it be that an in terruption in the text, where the story line 
appears broken and our own expectations for the narrative are 
not met, is the narrative's most profound and defining moment? 
Could the story be calling us to a closer look at its failure to 
clarify, conclude or justify an issue that is simply too complex 
and ambiguous to be settled by simple description and narrative 
consistency? I am convinced that such "problems" in narrative 
serve an interpretative purpose of pointing us towards a narrative 
ethic. (2) 
Instead of our tendency to "avoid narrative's interruptions, in particular if 
they call into question existing understandings of how we are to live in the 
world" (3), we thus ought to cultivate vulnerability, opening ourselves to 
wounding by the otherness of the narrative. "Wounding" is of course a bodily 
metaphor, and bodily metaphors are important to Ledbetter's critical project, 
as he views a break with the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy as decisive for 
its glory" (3). True, t his resists a universalizing and generalizing impulse, but it still caters to 
programmes of revelation and finity that would sit uneasily with a Levinasian or Lyotardian 
ethics. Moreover, the positing of one unique life-narrative still rests on some amount of monistic 
thinking: where, in this account, is plurality and the acknowledgement of the elusive quality of 
each lived second? 
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an engagement with others in their specific incarnations. Thus, body 
metaphor is a way of approaching the actual bodily ways human beings have 
of existing in and relating to their world. 
This insistence on a holistic view of mind and body is of some 
importance to my project, as the mistrust of the body goes hand in hand with 
the mistrust of sentimentality in our culture: as Ledbetter points out, "[o]ur 
culture has a history of phrases which suggests that the body, as the home of 
the emotions, is not trustworthy and is not dependable. 'You are thinking 
with your heart and not your head."' (11). Contrastingly, "[w]hen we choose 
a language that is physical and emotional in our attempt to know—know 
anything—we speak an act of embodiment. Body metaphor celebrates the 
senses and says no to any Cartesian split that makes our bodies second class 
citizens to the mind" (12).17 Importantly, as Ledbetter is quick to observe, 
"seeing the world in t his way becomes an invitation to hurt and discomfort. 
Those things/events/persons to whom we are willing to attach ourselves 
intimately, with our bodies, are those things/events/persons we endow with 
the abilities to cause us the most pain" (12). In this way, suffering, wounding 
and agony enter what I would call a sentimental relation to the world. 
And thus, we find Ledbetter formulating an ethics and a hermeneutics 
of vulnerability much akin to the one I wish to explore in this study. In 
Ledbetter's view, "[b]ody metaphor becomes an ethic when it seeks to know 
and to describe what it means for the body to be wounded, physically and/or 
emotionally, and furthermore to describe the extent of recovery from the 
wound, while maintaining a sensitive awareness of the wound's remnant, the 
scar" (15; emphasis mine). Suffering attains a kind of universality that has 
both banal and profound aspects: "From the smallest scar on our knees which 
reminds us of a fall in childhood, to the large scar on our hearts which 
reminds us of the death of a parent or spouse, we are persistently defining 
who we are in relation to violation" (16). At this point, one may find that 
Ledbetter's perspective precludes the possibility of redemption and that it 
lacks an acknowledgement of the ways in which we define ourselves in 
relation to our triumphs, our encounters with tenderness and our will to love. 
But Ledbetter's point is precisely that in order to be responsible and ethical 
we must bracket the healthy body and focus on the wounds, the scars and the 
violations. And so the critic too must look beyond the healthy surface of the 
1 
' Marianne Noble similarly suggests—in relation to eighteenth and nineteenth century theories 
of sentimentality, but also in relation to the Barthes of Camera Lucida—that "[t]o know 
sentimentally is to know with the body, to privilege a primary gut response to cognition over a 
secondary intellectual one" (77). This is too straightforward and binary, I think, as it sets up a 
division of sentiment-body/intellect-mind that renders the latter supplemental, instead of 
neutralizing the binarism under the heading of, I would suggest, "senti/mentality". 
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text to uncover its ruptures and wounds, and must also aspire in his/her 
readings not to closure, but to open and vulnerable readings: "The critic's 
comments on the substance of any narrative ethic must be stated from a 
posture of suggestion and vulnerability, asking to be argued with and shown 
to be wrong and not from a posture of confidence and certainty" (20; 
emphasis mine). 
With and through the question of affect vis-à-vis ethics, especially in 
the Levinasian. sense, we enter the question of a postmodern "spirituality". 
For, does not an ethics of alterity rest on traditions of self-transcendence, of 
kenosis and of profound unknowing that all fall under the heading of 
"spirituality"? Indeed, in the wake of Levinas and Derrida, Mark C. Taylor 
has developed a postmodern "a/theology" and an "altarity", Edith Wyscho-
grod has written on "saints and postmodernism", and John D. Caputo has 
considered "the tears and prayers of Jacques Derrida" and has co-edited God, 
the Gift and Postmodernism, featuring papers by Derrida, Wyschogrod and 
Jean-Luc Marion.18 In their introduction to those papers, Caputo and Michael 
J. Scanlon set the scene by observing that 
[mjuch to the horror of the secularizing deconstructors, the 
notorious "free play of signitiers"", which frees us from the 
shackles of the transcendental signified, and the famous saying, 
"there is nothing outside the text", which set off a Dionysian 
dance on the grave of the old God, has taken the form of a 
kenotics of faith. The deferral of presence turns out to imply 
messianic waiting and expectation, and the deconstruction of 
presence turns out to be not a denial of God but a critique of the 
idols of presence, which has at least as much to do with Moses' 
complaint with Aaron as with Nietzsche. (5) 
However, the most thorough and wide-reaching investigations yet into 
postmodernism and spirituality are found in Shadow of Spirit: Post­
modernism and Religion, edited by Philippa Berry and Andrew Wemick. The 
essays in this volume are not concerned so much with the world religions or 
with religiosity per se, as with precisely the shadows or, more accurately, 
traces of spirituality in postmodern discourses. Whether the writers are 
agnostic, a/theological or religious, the inseparability of ethics and 
spirituality is usually clear from their papers. Yet, the only works of literature 
touched upon in the volume are the Bible, Eliot's Four Quartets and Eco's 
The Name of the Rose. In other words, in this volume on postmodernism and 
spirituality, only three works of literature are referred to all in all, of which 
18 See Taylor's ERRING: A Postmodern A/theology and Altarity, Wyschogrod's Saints and 
Postmodernism and Caputo's The Prayers and Tears of Derrida, respectively. 
21 
An Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
only one is properly postmodernist. One should of course note that the 
volume's contributors are not literary critics but philosophers and 
theologians, but still one may wonder what happened to the notion of 
literature as a temple for secular spirituality. 
This question is, somewhat unexpectedly, raised by Martin Amis in an 
interview in BOMB in 1987: "In fact, I 've never understood why the idea of 
literature as religion was demolished so quickly. It seems to me that would be 
a tenable way of looking at it" (196). The possibilities of that "way of 
looking at it" are investigated in the recent collection The Novel, Spirituality 
and Modern Culture, edited by Paul S. Fiddes. In this collection of essays, 
eight novelists, among them Donna Tartt and Jill Paton Walsh, write about 
their craft in relation to spirituality. Most of the novelists think spirituality 
along eschatological and divine lines—Tartt, for instance, is a devout 
Catholic—and so conclude that the novel, as a secular art form, is in­
hospitable to expressions of spirituality. In his introduction to the collection, 
however, Fiddes discusses the relation between spirituality and literature with 
reference to the complications of postmodern philosophy and criticism, and 
suggests that if one is to find spirituality and indeed God in the novel, one 
should perhaps not think them eschatologically or in terms of presence. As 
Fiddes points out, "it has been a mark of so-called postmodern literary 
criticism to point out that the end always 'bursts open'", and, as he further 
observes, if Karl Barth is right in his insistence "on the 'secularity' of the 
Word of God", on God's choosing "worldly objects through which to reveal 
himself', then "God is bound always to be veiled in the very act of 
unveiling" (6). Consequently, Fiddes argues that "while the novel as a whole 
may embody characteristics of our present culture, there is a kind of 'spiritual 
deconstruction' possible, in w hich characters, descriptive passages and turns 
of plot may at least hint at another reality which transcends the material and 
mundane, and which may offer traces of the supremely Other" (10). In the 
very least, Fiddes would seem to suggest, literature may follow Levinas in 
"finding in the face of others a 'trace' of the supremely Other, of the absent 
God who has always just 'passed by'" (15). This, I would argue, is the kind 
of spiritual expression we may find in po stmodernist fiction. Yet, there are 
few references to postmodernist fiction in the essays of the collection; we 
find brief and vague invocations of Jorge Luis Borges, Anthony Burgess, 
Angela Carter, William Golding, Russell Hoban, Toni Morrison, Salman 
Rushdie and Jeanette Winterson. Postmodernism as a whole is seen by most 
of the authors as adverse to spirituality and to any attempt at resolution; for 
instance, Sara Maitland claims that in postmodernism "there is no possibility 
of even imagining that there might be something called truth" (88), and that 
"postmodernist reading strategies create a distracting haze around fictional 
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texts which makes them even less able to carry the examination of 
significance and divinity to which we might like to have literary access" (89). 
A corrective to this view is found in Edith Wyschogrod's formidable 
and daring Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy. 
Wyschogrod seeks to formulate a postmodern ethics by reference to the lives 
of the saints and to the philosophies of Levinas and Derrida, among others. 
To Wyschogrod, Levinasian ethics is saintly because it require s patience and 
kenosis: "A postmodern altruism must appeal to radical saintly generosity, to 
a benevolence that will not be brought to a close. Such saintliness is not a 
nostalgic return to premodern hagiography but a postmodern expression of 
excessive desire, a desire on behalf of the Other that seeks the cessation of 
another's suffering and the birth of another's joy" (xxiv). Fiction has a 
central place in Wyschogrod's study (not least hagiographies, of course). 
There are fairly elaborate readings of James's Wings of the Dove and Genet's 
Our Lady of the Flowers. Besides Genet, late modernist and postmodernist 
literature is touched upon more briefly, yet effectively: there are illustrative 
references to Beckett, Burroughs, Calvino, Duras and Potter. I t is interesting 
to note that Wyschogrod, a philosopher proceeding from the notion of a 
postmodern spirituality and a postmodern ethics, finds illustrations in 
postmodernist fiction, whereas most literary critics, proceeding from 
postmodernist fiction, are unable to extract f rom it any spiritual or ethical 
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Reclamation work: Aspects of the sentimentum in the critical discourse 
on Swift 
Now, having seen the resistance, but also the openness, to aspects of what I 
mean by the sentimentum in the discourse on postmodernism and on 
postmodernist fiction, the reader may of course wonder whether the specific 
critical reception of Swift has hitherto been exceptionally attuned to the 
display in Swift of those aspects. The answer is negative. The unease in the 
discourse on postmodernist fiction regarding aspects of the sentimentum is 
also apparent in the specific discourse on the fiction of Graham Swift. The 
unease is often due to the clash between the values currently viable in 
academia and those adopted by Swift in his novels. For most critics writing 
" Patricia Waugh's The Harvest of the Sixties is an exception to some extent: in a chapter 
entitled "Keeping Our Metaphysics Warm: Sacred Impulses in a Secular Age", Waugh discusses 
the fate of spiritual issues in British literature since the sixties, with reference to the revisions of 
religious notions brought on by psychoanalysis, existentialism and deconstruction. However, 
Waugh's discussion does not engage in any sustained fashion with the interrelations of 
postmodern spirituality and postmodernist aesthetics. 
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about Swift, the sentimental moments in his fiction are also problematic to 
reconcile with his own alleged postmodernist sense of style. For instance, 
Alison Lee poses the image of a clear split without contact points, a dual 
personality text, as she notes the particular double bind of Swift's texts when 
discussing Water land: "Unlike many metafictional texts . . . Waterland does 
not at first appear to foreground its structure. It presents itself as what Roland 
Barthes calls in S/Z, a lisible (readable) text rather than a scriptible (writable) 
text. . . . The story is so engaging and the manipulation of affect so intense 
that it can certainly be read (if naively) on this level" (42). One of Lee's 
presuppositions here seems to be that if a text intensely manipulates the 
reader's affect, the reader will somehow be "naivized" and lose his/her sense 
of narratological distinction. My suggestion would rather be that, as the 
reader juggles the sense of awe and the intense state of affect (indeed, the 
interest in this "engaging story"), on the one hand, and the sense of 
postmodern play and the "baring of the device", on the other, a certain 
sublime sense (or sense of the sublime) is attained that otherwise—with a less 
prominent lisible element, with less manipulation of affect—would not have 
been possible. 
In an argument that bears similarity to Lee's, Peter Widdowson 
observes the "tension" in Out of This World between nihilism and romantic 
make-believe. Widdowson quotes some particularly sentimental passages and 
stops to wonder: "Is this just a slip in stylistic decorum on the part of a most 
poised writer, or is the mawkish and meretricious language of sentiment here 
a sign of authorial disavowal?" (16). Having difficulty reconciling the 
nihilistic and the romantic, or sentimental, in the novel, Widdowson is moved 
to doubt Swift's integrity and control as a writer: "[Wjhether the novelist or 
novel is conscious of this self-deconstructing sub-text I do not know" (15). 
This doubt is particularly interesting as, a few pages earlier, Widdowson has 
referred to Swift as "the most self-conscious and sophisticated writer of what 
I may, perhaps, be now forgiven for calling 'fictory'" (11 ; emphases mine). If 
Widdowson had wanted to avoid contradicting himself, he might simply have 
accused Swift of surreptitiously smuggling sentimentality into his simulacral 
wasteland. The true problem, though, with Widdowson's question is that he 
does not clarify exactly what the "authorial disavowal" would be of, that is, 
what it i s that Swift would seek to disavow by means of "the mawkish and 
meretricious language of sentiment": would it be Harry, the narrator, made 
suspect through his sentimental discourse; or would it be precisely the world-
weary, nihilistic world-view of the novel, checked by the discourse of 
infatuation and make-believe? My answer would be that neither is the case; 
rather, Swift is simultaneously positing a scarred, traumatized world and a 
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charmed, romanticized world.20 There is nothing very unusual or radical 
about this movement—most people, of the Western world at least, I would 
hazard, perform it everyday; it is how they survive. 
The everyday activities of Westerners notwithstanding, in reviews, too, 
Swift's fictions have met with the unease of critics faced with the language of 
sentiment and with the suspension of received beliefs. Ben Okri, for instance, 
wrote in his review of Learning to Swim (in New Statesman) that the stories 
collected in the volume were "full of perverse sentimentality" (Okri, Online). 
That the sentimentality is deemed perverse is not surprising, considering 
Okri's complete lack of sympathy for the characters in the stories: "One 
unmistakable thing is that they [the stories] are about moral cowards and 
spineless individuals collapsing within the insidious pressures of evaded 
responsibilities, evaded vision". However, Okri does not ultimately assume 
critical responsibility, which he would by explaining or qualifying his notion 
of "perverse sentimentality". One can deduce from his assessment of the 
characters in Learning to Swim, and from the tenor of his own novels, 
though, that Okri does not appreciate the role and function of the anti-hero. 
Indeed, the lack of such an appreciation would make the reading of any of 
Swift's works quite unbearable. 
However, reviews traditionally have a register different to that of 
scholarly papers, which makes reviews more apt to accommodate at least the 
affective aspects of the sentimentum. Precisely because the review admits 
such overt displays of subjective evaluation as those of Okri quoted above, 
the review is also more hospitable to emotion per se. So, we find Linda Gray 
Sexton writing in her review of Out of This World (in The New York Times 
Book Review) that 
[t]o write with passion—but without pa thos—about people wh o 
mourn is a formidable task. To write simultaneously about 
individuals who, tran scending the bur den of the pas t, reconnect 
with others and resurrect their own lost selves represents another 
magnitude of difficulty entir ely. Such an undertaking requ ires 
talent and courage, and the British novelist Graham Swift 
demonstrates an ample supply of both in his fifth [ sic] n ovel, Out 
of This World, an evocative portrait of a family once fragmented 
and now in the process of healing. (Sexton, Online) 
I wish to stay with Sexton's review, as it is most exemplary in its 
20 As Pamela Cooper points out, "Swift's fiction works between possibilities, within and against 
tensions, maintaining a poised and thoroughgoing oscillation of opposites. Despair and hope are 
both parts of his work, as they are of the work of the tragedians he recalls; to emphasize only one 
is to distort the whole" (66). 
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acknowledgement of the affirmatively sentimental side of the sentimentum. 
Reading on through the review, we find the following assessments: Sophie, 
one of the narrators and main characters, is "wry, vulnerable, sensitive, . . . 
characterized without cliché"; Out of This World is "about the aftermath of 
personal struggles and epiphanies: the ravages of love gone awry, the white 
silence of estrangement, the risk involved in daring to care for someone in a 
precarious world". To me, this appraisal succinctly formulates the impact of 
the novel. Bearing testimony to the novel, Sexton practices what Ihab Hassan 
has occasionally striven for and called "criticism as a kind of mimesis, 
empathie paraphrase" (Rumors of Change 1). Such empathie paraphrases, I 
hasten to add, should of course not entail the eclipse of critical distance, but 
should nonetheless be attempted and set as the point of departure for any 
critical endeavour.21 T make that attempt in my readings of Swift in this study, 
with the result that the tenor of my discourse congenially and somewhat 
provocatively becomes more affirmative and indeed sentimental as Swift's 
novels become so. 
In previous scholarly criticism on Swift, however, there are only glints 
of an affirmative appraisal of aspects of the sentimentum such as that found 
in Sexton. The scholarly affirmation of the sentimentum is bare ly observable 
in en passant remarks. For instance, David Leon Higdon notes, in his 
discussion of the quality and function of novelistic endings in Swift, that in 
Out of This World, 
[t]he reader . . . never witnesses this reunion [of Harry and 
Sophie], but rather leaves Sophie suspended somewhere above 
the Atlantic as Harry recalls an incident from the autumn of 1928 
when his father took him on an airplane flight from London to 
Paris and back for an Armistice Day celebration, "a piece of 
public play-acting but a genuine, faltering attempt at father-
liness" . . . Once again, Swift makes a heavy symbolic 
investment in a scene only tangentially related to the main 
action, . . . but how appropriate a scene it is. The reunion of 
21 Not all reviewers are willing to face the otherness of a narrative, to perform a 
phenomenological turn of sorts by bracketing prejudices and expectations and meeting the 
characters of the story with radical respect. We may turn to J.L. Carr's review of Out of This 
World (in The Spectator) for a specimen of the unempathic critic who shuns alterity. The mode 
of Carr's review is one of irony and sarcasm: "Harry (Winchester, Oxford, ex-wartime 
intelligence who—God help him—took a RAF camera course) immediately drives you into a 
corner and obsessively goes on at you. Sophie just grumbles away at her New York psychiatrist" 
(Carr, Online). This is not simply a crude assessment, but is entirely incommensurable with the 
actual novel. And while Carr may be more entitled to the following personal r esponse to the 
novel, it hardly bears witness to an ethical and affective imagination: "Now and then, as the pair 
tried to unload their little burdens of guilt upon me, I resentfully felt sorry for myself'. 
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Sophie and Harry is an armistice, an end to their ten years' 
hostilities, and it is framed by the loving action of one father, 
foregrounding his child, to affirm his child's importance, worth, 
and independence. We need not see the actual reunion, because 
it has been played before us almost parabolically. ("Double 
Closures" 94-95) 
This passage, at least implicitly, acknowledges the redeeming force of 
nostalgia and of sentimental reunion. The phrase it quotes from the novel is 
as obvious an example as any of the novel's juxtaposition of cynicism and 
sentimentality: "play-acting", but "genuine"; hence, "faltering". Higdon even 
hazards emotion in the form of enthusiasm: "how appropriate a scene it i s" 
(the exclamation mark is not printed, but audible). 
A more thorough focus on aspects of the sentimentum, and a sign of 
change perhaps as pertains to the accommodation of sentimental aspects of 
postmodernist narratives, is found in Adrian Poole's essay "Graham Swift 
and the Mourning After". Poole argues that Swift "creates complex fables of 
bereavement in which mourning takes forms that are spirited, heartening and 
sociable" (150). He goes on to suggest that "[m]ourning is a condition and an 
action that we suffer alone and share together", which "suggests a special 
kinship with telling stories, or rather with the modern form of story-telling in 
which the sense of solitude and community is most mysteriously mixed" 
(152). Thus, "[njovels reproduce the conditions of modern mourning in the 
West in ways that distinguish them from other forms of story-telling. Theatre, 
film, television and newsprint gather more closely together in time their 
tellers and listeners and viewers. They do not permit or promote the special 
kind of gregarious solitude created by novels. They require spectacle, 
revelation, limelight" (152). Poole, then, reverses the claim of Hans Bertens 
that it is necessary for postmodernist fiction to mirror the frenzy of the media 
in their portrayal and expression of emotion. Rather, Poole observes, 
postmodernist fiction expresses mourning (and, I would add, other modes of 
affect) in a form of ethico-epistemological complication: 
[T]here is more to be mourned than an isolable figure. There is a 
residue that can never be recovered because that figure once 
filled a time and space from which it cannot be separated. Hence 
the double sense the reader gets at the end of Waterland and Last 
Orders, that we are left both with a knowable pattern, an action 
completed, a coherence achieved, and with everything that such 
knowledge and completion and coherence must omit and can 
never recover, all the memories, desires and stories. (164) 
Further connections between thematics and aesthetics are made by Poole as 
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he notes that "[tjhere is also a sense in which Swift's novels could be said to 
mourn some of their own literary antecedents. . . . Swift's novels obviously 
look back, through all so rts of modernist and postmodernist lenses, to some 
great nineteenth-century predecessors, from whom one would single out in 
particular George Eliot and Thomas Hardy" (164-65). However, Poole notes, 
"there are several ways in which Swift's fiction is bound to measure its own 
distance from such nineteenth-century predecessors. Where they could still 
mourn the passing of certain religious, mythical and metaphysical 
justifications . . . Swift's fiction is left to mourn the impossibility of such 
mourning" (165). In what amounts to yet one paraphrase of part of my thesis, 
Poole concludes that our time and our condition require "forms of story­
telling correspondingly more shattered and more self-distrustful, within 
which there may survive a cautious but obstinate li ttle belief, in the need at 
least to go on telling stories" (165; emphasis mine). 
In another recent article, "Melancholic Modernity and Contemporary 
Grief: The Novels of Graham Swift", Wendy Wheeler concurs with Poole, as 
she writes that "Swift's work offers an exemplary case of the artist who 
attempts to come to terms with, and to represent, both the possibility and the 
difficulty of really mourning modernity's losses" (64). These losses, Wheeler 
argues, "might be seen as the loss of traditional forms of knowledge with the 
advent of the absolutely new, and the loss of the solaces of a personally 
revealed God" (65). In re sponse to these losses, Wheeler suggests, "Swift's 
novels explore the failure of romantic conceptions of meaning-
fulness—whether in Hegel's story of history as the gradual unfolding of 
spiritual knowledge towards the perfect and mutually recognising 
community, or in romantic art's conception of aesthetic knowledge as 
offering a moment of healing transcendence in the mystery of symbolic 
unity" (65). 
As Wheeler's article is in congruence with many of my ideas about 
Swift's work and about postmodernism, I would like to dwell on it for a 
while, thus pointing forward to my argument in the chapters that follow. 
Wheeler's argument bases itself on Freud's conceptions of mourning and 
melancholia, in which mourning is a response to loss that entails gradually 
letting go of the past and of the lost object and forming a new future, and 
melancholia is a response to loss that consists in not letting go and in 
internalizing the lost object, thus freezing time and precluding healthy 
development. On a cultural level, as Wheeler points out, melancholia has 
been identified as the mode of modernity and modernism. What Wheeler 
wishes to show, however, is that "[t]he task which Swift sets himself is that 
of discovering how the self-destructive melancholias of modernity can be 
turned into the healthy mournings of something that we might call 
28 
Introduction 
/ws/modernity" (65). Here Wheeler comes upon a view of postmodernity that 
is very much the one I wi ll present in the next chapter, as she observes that 
"what we call the postmodern seems to consist in the struggle between 
melancholia and mourning—between nostalgic turns to the past, and a 
masochistic sense of social fragmentations, on the one hand, and the attempt 
to imagine differently reconstituted communities and selves on the other", 
and that thus "we might say that the outcome of postmodernity, seen as the 
attempt to live with loss and uncertainty as a permanent condition, might be 
the discovery or invention of ways of being in the world which move beyond 
the harsh individualism of utilitarian modernity, and towards a different way 
of accounting for and valuing human needs" (65). At this point, Wheeler gets 
back to Swift's work and states that "[i]t is this problem, the problem of 
inventing an aesthetic form capable of telling us something about the 
invention of new cultural, social and political forms—a 'new modernity' or 
'second Enlightenment'—which drives Swift's work" (65). This strikes me 
as an enthusiastic overstatement—I could think of other problems that drive 
Swift's work—but it is indeed an important point and one that Wheeler 
makes very effectively. I am in full agreement with Wheeler's view that 
Swift is concerned with "the aesthetic imagining of cultural mourning as a 
form of erotic (that is to say lifeful and loving) and, in the end, communal, 
not individualistic, labour in the world" (65-66). And like myself, Wheeler 
argues that "Swift only finally achieves this full communality of working 
voices in his latest novel Last Orders" (66). Since Wheeler's argument 
moves through brief readings of The Sweet Shop Owner, Waterland, Ever 
After and Last Orders, I will return to it in my own readings of those novels. 
For now, I will content myself with noting its acknowledgement of themes of 
mourning, suffering and death, as well as of communion, redemption and 
love, in Swift's work. 
Most often, though, scholarly critics do not even touch upon the issue 
of the sentimental, emotional, spiritual and ethical as regards Swift, or, 
indeed, as regards postmodernist fiction in general. The general tenor of 
studies in the fictions of postmodernist writers of Swift's generation is 
narratological or psychosexual, with an interest in formal aspects of 
historiographie metafiction, in desire, in "the grotesque", in identity 
formation and in identity politics. This is all very well, and those may all be 
issues of an extreme urgency, but I do feel—yes, feel—that scholarly 
criticism may learn something from the more emotionally receptive and 
charged language of review criticism, and that a truly ethical criti­
cism—ethical because it s eeks to accommodate alterity—would have to be, 
to paraphrase Andrew Gibson, an ethical criticism of affectivity, of 
sensibility and of receptivity. 
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Tn other words, this type of criticism would involve a hermeneutics of 
vulnerability to match an aesthetics of vulnerability that Swift has himself 
formulated: 
I thin k there is an awful lot of writing which in its cleverness, in 
its insistence on formal virtuosity is only defensive and hiding 
the writer. . . . There is a lot of attention given to form and style, 
a lot of heavy self-consciousness about style . . . which again 1 
think is defensive and protective. It's like somebody putting on a 
suit of armor to keep in the things that matter rather than to show 
them. And then there is the kind of writer who tends not to do 
that, and how you don't do that, I do n't really know, but I hope I 
am one of those people who doesn't defend. Vulnera­
bility—that's the thing. ... I am desperate to avoid a sense of the 
power derived from form. I don't want to say "Look at me being 
clever!" instead of "Look at me as someone like you!" 
("Interview" 229) 
In what follows, then, I seek to formulate a sense of both the aesthetics and 
the hermeneutics of vulnerability, as well as an elaboration of my sense of the 
sentimentum. Since I am proposing that certain elements that have been 
deemed foreign to postmodernism and postmodernist fiction may in fact be 
effortlessly symbiotic with it, I begin the next chapter by briefly sketching 
my understanding of what "postmodernism" signifies. After my general 
sketch of postmodernism, I discuss the more specific issue of "postmodern 
realism", which is of some importance to my notion of the sentimentum. 
Thus, I close in on the subsequent, more detailed discussion of the 
sentimentum. Throughout my elaboration of the various aspects of the 
sentimentum, I relate those aspects to Swift's fictions. 
Subsequently, in chapters two through four, I present my readings of 
Swift's six novels to date, showing how each of them may be seen to engage 
the sentimentum at the same time as I show a gradual development 
throughout Swift's oeuvre toward something resembling an affirmation of 
sentimentality; an aesthetics of vulnerability. 
In the conclusion that rounds off the argument, I look briefly at a fe w 
novels by Julian Barnes, Penelope Lively and Jeanette Winterson, to offer 
some further, and different, examples of how postmodernist fictions may 
engage the sentimentum. Subsequently, I engage with issues of gender(ing), 
but also of class and cultural identity, which are more or less bracketed in my 
readings of Swift, Barnes, Lively and Winterson. Finally, I s uggest a few 
more British, but also postcolonial and American, novels that may fruitfully 
be read in terms of the sentimentum. Having read Swift, I propose, we are 
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moved to re-read postmodernist fiction. Yet, my reading of Swift presented 
here is itself a re-reading, informed by a reconsideration of the social, 
philosophical and aesthetic, as well as the ethical and affective, dimensions 
of postmodernism—a reconsideration that may be glimpsed in the preceding 
pages, but which I hope will come into focus in the pages that now follow. 
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Postmodernism and the Sentimentum 
History, I take it, moves in measures both 
continuous and discontinuous. Thus the 
prevalence of postmodernism today, if 
indeed it prevails, does not suggest that 
ideas or institutions of the past cease to 
shape the present. 
—Ihab Hassan 
[T]he past, since it cannot really be 
destroyed, because its destruction leads to 
silence, must be revisited: but with irony, 
not innocently. 
—Umberto Eco 
As I said at the end of the introduction, I am proposing that certain elements 
that have been deemed foreign to postmodernism, such as an ethical 
consciousness, expressions of affect and spiritual concerns, may in fact be 
quite effortlessly symbiotic with it. This proposition rests on a certain notion 
of postmodernism, which was implied throughout the introduction but which 
it is now high time to spell out. This spelling out proceeds through the three 
sections of this chapter: a general sketch of what I take to characterize 
postmodern society, postmodern philosophy and postmodernist aesthetics; a 
brief discussion of the fate of realism in postmodernism; and finally an 
elaboration of the sentimentum as a postmodern concept. My sense of 
postmodernism subsequently emerges in finer detail in my readings of 
Swift's novels, and in the readings of novels by Barnes, Lively and 
Winterson that round off this study. 
Postmodernisms: society, philosophy, aesthetics 
The first thing to note about the term "postmodernism" is that, unqualified, it 
signifies both that which has somehow gone beyond the modern—that is, 
socio-economic, political, scientific and philosophical modernity ("post­
modern/ism")—and that which has somehow gone beyond cultural 
modernism ("post/modernism")—that is, the revolution in the arts in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. While this ambiguity may lead to agonizing 
debates, it also reflects the fact that postmodernist cultural practices respond 
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to postmodern society and are, to varying extents, awake to postmodern 
philosophies and postmodern politics. Still, I suggest that we try, for reasons 
of clarity and to the extent that it is possible, to distinguish between aspects 
of society and philosophy, using for those the words "postmodern" and 
"postmodernity", and aspects of artistic production, using for those the words 
"postmodernist" and "postmodernism". I will try to stick with this distinction 
in what follows. 
The second thing to note about the term "postmodernism" is that, no 
matter what definition one attaches to it, it denotes a critical construct rather 
than a self-pronounced cultural ethos that precedes our scholarly ab­
stractions. As Brian McHale points out, 
the referent of "postmodernism", the thing to which the term 
claims to refer, does not exist. . . precisely in the way that "the 
Renaissance" or "romanticism" do not exist. There is no 
postmodernism "out there" in the world any more than there ever 
was a Renaissance or romanticism "out there". These are all 
literary-historical fi ctions, discursive art ifacts constructed either 
by contemporary readers and writers or retrospectively by 
literary historians. And since they are discursive constructs 
rather than real-world objects, it is possible to construct them in 
a variety of ways .... (Postmodernist Fiction 4) 
Still, as McHale also notes, "[j]ust because there are many possible 
constructions of postmodernism . . . this does not mean that all constructs are 
equally interesting or valuable, or that we are unable to choose among them" 
(4). For instance, while there is nothing inherently wrong about Jean-François 
Lyotard's use of the term to denote an unceasing avant-garde programme that 
seeks to go beyond modernism by renewing and radicalizing modernist 
impulses, I think it is more useful to reserve the term for aesthetic practices 
that seek to reconcile modernism with tradition and to reconcile experimental 
with conventional forms.2 However, "modernism" itself must be viewed as 
equally constructed and continually vexed, a fact that more recent studies of 
the concept—particularly Astradur Eysteinsson's The Concept of Modern-
1 Architecture is an exception in this regard. For instance, Charles Jencks's polemical The 
Language of Post-Modem Architecture is an explicit postmodernist manifesto, in which Jencks 
suggests that "the fact that many so-called Modern architects still go around practising a trade as 
if it were alive can be taken as one of the great curiosities of our age" (23). Conversely, as Jencks 
observes in What is Post-Modernism?, there has been an outspokenly modernist crusade against 
postmodernist architecture (see What is Post-Modernism? 27-28). 
2 Indeed, Lyotard has himself indicated that the term does not name his suggested project in the 
most effective possible way—in T he Inhuman, he suggests that we speak instead of "rewriting 
modernity" (24-35). 
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ism—bear witness to.3 This realization of the tentative nature of our critical 
conceptions should also keep us from describing the relation between 
postmodernism and modernism, or between postmodernity and modernity, in 
tenns of a radical break. Continuities and overlappings need to be stressed; 
the more rigid a distinction we set up between modernism and post­
modernism, or between modernity and postmodernity, the more we will find 
ourselves sacrificing exceptions and particularities to generalizations and 
abstractions.4 Indeed, we should note the caution that Ihab Hassan places 
after his much-debated and oft-quoted table of binary oppositions between 
modernism and postmodernism in "Toward a Concept of Postmodernism": 
"Yet the dichotomies this table represents remain insecure, equivocal. For 
differences shift, defer, even collapse; concepts in any one vertical column 
are not all equivalent; and inversions and exceptions, in both modernism and 
postmodernism, abound" (92).^ This caution must be kept in mind, whether 
we are discussing postmodernity or postmodernism. 
My focus in this study is of course on the latter. However, as I stated 
above, postmodernist art cannot be separated from postmodernity or from 
postmodern philosophies. Moreover, theories of postmodernity and 
postmodern philosophies have a direct bearing on my formulation of the 
sentimentum. Before turning to the more specific issue of postmodernist 
literature, I would therefore like to briefly discuss what Lyotard has termed 
"the postmodern condition". In order to define the postmodern condition, we 
need a working notion of the "modern condition", or modernity. I will 
establish such a working notion by means of a narrative the neat internal 
consistency and linearity of which somewhat belies the insights of 
postmodernism—at the same time as this self-conscious remark heeds 
precisely those insights.6 In other words, I do not wish to suggest that the 
3 Eysteinsson's study indeed examines constructions of postmodernism as well, with the goal of 
teasing out the notions of modernism those constructions rest on. There is also a full-length study 
of the concept of postmodernism the critical stance of which is similar to Eysteinsson's: Hans 
Bertens's The Idea of the Postmodern. 
4 Perhaps no critic has argued more forcefully against the notion of a postmodernist break than 
Patricia Waugh, whose Practicing Postmodernism/Reading Modernism sets postmodernism up 
as the apotheosis of an aestheticizing impulse that may be traced back through modernism to 
romanticism. As Waugh is quick to point out, her "aim in arguing against a radical break theory 
of the relation of Postmodernism to earlier aesthetic practice and the ory i s not to fall into the 
opposite error of a naive evolutionism, but to consider continuities and discontinuities and the 
possibility of perceiving new relationships" (4). 
5 Hassan's list of binaries include such oppositional pairs as form/antiform, purpose/play, 
hierarchy/anarchy, totalization/deconstruction, presence/absence, hypotaxis/parataxis and de-
terminacy/indeterminacy ("Toward" 91-92), the first term of each pair being mo dernist and the 
second being postmodernist. 
6 For more thorough accounts of both the historical period of modernity and the mer its of the 
concept of modernity, I refer the reader to the four volume Modernity: Critical Concepts, edited 
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characteristics of modernity that I enumerate below constitute a hegemonic 
structure that leaves no room for voices of dissent—on the contrary, 
modernity entails precisely the (relative) emancipation of thought and 
discourse.7 The characteristics attributed to modernity below are, rather, 
those that have now, especially from the vantage point of so-called 
postmodern critiques, emerged as problematic. Indeed, as Hans Bertens 
points out, even as pronounced a defender of the modern project as Jürgen 
Habermas would grant that "under the regime of 'capitalist modernization' 
the empirical-theoretical, or cognitive-instrumental, rationality complex has 
so clearly come to dominate and marginalize other modes of knowing. It has, 
moreover, more and more developed into a mercenary means-end 
rationalism. It is this rationalism, Habermas agrees, that fully deserves the 
poststructuralist charges" (Bertens, Idea 116). In Habermas's view, though, 
"to equate modernity with such a narrow means-end rationalism is to 
seriously misread its project" (116). At the same time, one might argue that 
the continuation of modernity in the project of communicative reason that 
Habermas envisions ultimately falls back on that very means-end rationality, 
which, pace Habermas, thinkers such as Zygmunt Bauman insist is the sine 
qua non of modernity. 
However, that means-end rationality is not the only characteristic of 
modernity as a historical period or as a modus operandum. Its beginnings 
usually traced back to the Renaissance, modernity is ultimately mobilized by 
the more idealist and visionary Enlightenment belief in the emancipatory and 
progressive powers of reason, rationality and technology, in absolute 
objectivity and in the transparency of reality to scientific and artistic 
representations.8 Hence, modernity begets positivism in science and 
naturalism in literature, and hence its socio-economic legacy is one of 
industrialization, urban planning and social engineering. Ushering in an age 
of secularization and individualism, modernity also breaks up traditional 
by Malcolm Waters, as well as to Matei Calinescu's Five Faces of Modernity and Zygmunt 
Bauman's Modernity and the Holocaust, Modernity and Ambivalence and Intimations of 
Postmodernity; these works form the basis of my brief account here. 
7 Bauman would seem to hold a bleaker view of the possibilities of dissent in modernity, as he 
argues that "whoever questioned the modern wedlock between absolute truth and absolute power 
could only speak in the name of unreason and chaos. Dissent had been discredited and 
delegitimized even before i t was spoken—by the very absoluteness of the dominant syndrome, 
the universalism of its proclaimed ambitions and the completeness of its domination" 
(Intimations xiv). In my view, though, this assessment sacrifices nuance for the benefit of 
rhetorical effect. 
8 These beliefs are what Lyotard refers to as the "'metanarratives' . . . that have marked 
modernity: the progressive emancipation of reason and freedom, the progressive or catastrophic 
emancipation of labour (source of alienated value in capitalism), the enrichment of all h umanity 
through the progress of capitalist technoscience" (The Postmodern Explained 17). 
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social orders, thus enabling an unprecedented social and geographical 
mobility, which in turn facilitates the harnessing of an increasingly affluent 
and increasingly large middle-class to a consumer culture that promises the 
fulfillment of all desires. Blind to its own specificity as a Western project 
situated in particular historical and cultural circumstances, modernity 
furthermore accords itself universal validity, in keeping with Hegel's in­
fluential theses on history and with the vulgarizations of evolutionary theory 
in "social Darwinism", thus legitimizing Western imperialism and co­
lonialism. 
However, through two world wars and with the advent of a cold war, 
with nuclear anxiety and increasing urban alienation, with rampant 
instramentalism and optimization, and with spiritual starvation, the whole 
modern edifice begins to crumble. As the horrors of the Holocaust, of 
Stalinism and of colonialism become apparent, all modern Western states and 
ideologies become suspect. At the same time, philosophers, theorists of 
science and historiographers advance critiques of notions of objectivity and 
transparency, heralding the eclipse of positivism. In addition to this, as Jean 
Baudrillard is so fond of noting, by a peculiar reversal the modern mapping 
of reality turns into a realization of the map: scientific models and media 
narratives begin to precede and influence what was conceived of as an 
independent and impeccable reality.9 Modernity bites its own tail, as it were. 
Thus, the West enters the postmodern condition, which does not so 
much entail the end of all that modernity stands for as a critical and sceptical 
attitude to many of its outspoken tenets, underlying assumptions and socio-
cultural effects.10 This attitude is, above all, the result of the failure of 
modernity to realize its ideals of undisrupted progress and emancipation, 
whether those ideals have a liberalist or socialist bent. Lyotard chooses the 
name Auschwitz for this failure, but there are other equally fitting names: 
Gulag, Hiroshima, or, more recently, Bosnia." In the words of Charles 
9 This state of affairs is what Baudrillard refers to as "hyperreality" or "the third order of 
simulacra". Baudrillard's theory of hyperreality was first presented in Symbolic Exchange and 
Death and animates all his subsequent works, including his latest, Impossible Exchange. 
10 Craig Calhoun's "Postmodernism as Pseudohistory" offers a nuanced discussion of how new 
the aspects of our society labelled "postmodern" really are. Calhoun argues that "[tjhough 
changes are real and major, they do not yet amount to an epochal break" (188). However, this 
seems to me to miss one of the points of postmodernism, that is, the end of the desire for, or of 
the possibility of, the epochal break. In the words of Malcolm Bradbury, "[b]y a peculiar 
paradox, we live 'after' the modern, in what we call 'postmodern' times, very much in its 
shadow but without a clear and strong vision of what now lies beyond" (Modem British Novel 
450). 
" Lyotard recognizes this multiplicity of failures as he writes that "the project of modernity (the 
realization of universality) has not been forsaken or forgotten but destroyed, 'liquidated'. There 
are several modes of destruction, several names that are symbols for them. 'Auschwitz' can be 
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Jencks, "Auschwitz refutes the idea of universal history and progress, just as 
the Salman Rushdie affair refutes the idea of universal Islam; and the 
Christian inaction in Bosnia refutes its own notion of the universal 
brotherhood of mankind. Who can believe that the State, or humanity in 
general, or any historic religion is a worthy focus for belief?" (70). 
Consequently, a waning of the belief in linear progress and ultimate 
emancipation, paired with a mistrust of claims to universality, objectivity and 
transparency, characterizes postmodernity. As Bauman, who has himself 
written extensively on the deep complicity between modernity and the 
Holocaust, puts it, 
[t]he postmodern mind does not expect any more to find the all-
embracing, total and ultimate formula of life without ambiguity, 
risk, danger and error, and is deeply suspicious of any voice that 
promises otherwise. . . . The postmodern mind is reconciled to 
the idea that the messiness of the human predicament is here to 
stay. This is, In the broadest of outlines, what can be called 
postmodern wisdom. (Postmodern Ethics 245) 
Accordingly, outspoken postmodernists such as Lyotard, Bauman and 
Hassan set pluralism and irresolution against totalizing and universalizing 
claims and final solutions. However, there are also a number of thinkers who 
have been notably reluctant to claim the word "postmodern" for themselves 
whose ideas fit the postmodern programme: Foucault, with his sceptical 
investigations of reason and power, Derrida, with his demonstrations of the 
openendedness of all discourse, Baudrillard, with his fatal strategies for 
challenging a hegemony of rationality and objectivity, and Deleuze and 
Guattari, with their championing of rhizomes, or paratactical structures, over 
and against roots and trees, or hypotactical structures. 
The postmodern programme is not, then, as it has often been portrayed, 
simply a matter of negative theology, ironic nihilism and immobilizing 
uncertainty translating into a laisser-faire stoicism. Indeed, in the last ten 
years or so, the creative, constructive potential of postmodern thinking has 
become more generally visible, due to, for instance, Derrida's shift toward 
political and ethical issues in books such as Spectres of Marx and Of 
Hospitality, Bauman's formulation of a postmodern ethics following the post-
phenomenology of Levinas, and Lyotard's restrained, earnest search for 
meaning in our condition in his last book, Postmodern Fables, which he 
prefaces with the words: "Futility suits the postmodern, for words as well as 
taken as a paradigmatic name for the tr agic 'incompletion' of modernity" (The Postmodern 
Explained 18). 
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things. But that doesn't keep us from asking questions: how to live, and 
why? . . . You're not done living because you chalk it up to artifice" (vii). 
Thus, a postmodern frame of mind is emerging that is interested in 
salvaging, or rather constructing a new sense of, the social, the communal 
and the intersubjective; but in doing so, it seeks, as Levinas's ethics does, to 
reach out into infinity rather than to establish a monolithic totality.12 It also 
acknowledges that it is postmodern precisely because it has come through 
and out of the modern; in other words, it cannot stage a return but must work 
on the situation at hand. As Jencks observes, "[t]he three Ms are one-way 
doors: once you have gone through technical modernisation, social modernity 
and Cultural Modernism there is no going back. . . .You cannot unlearn 
Newton, Darwin and Freud any more than you can repeal the global market­
place, Nietzsche and Ford" (12). Working from, but also on, modernity, 
postmodern thinking, or "postmodernism", as Jean-Pierre Mileur puts it, 
"registers in an ironic, self-reflexive fashion ... the paradoxical nature of 
modernity. . . . [I]t registers the fact that the modernist projects of, for 
example, bringing about the end of metaphysics or romanticism, or of 
stabilizing and rationalizing the play of revisionism, cannot be assayed 
without being reappropriated to metaphysics, romanticism, or revisionism" 
(200). This notion is of some importance to my project, and I keep it in mind, 
and hope the reader keeps it in mind, throughout this study. Postmodernism, I 
maintain, does not entail the uncomplicated and wholesale renunciation of 
metaphysics, of romanticism, of humanism or of modernism itself. Such a 
renunciation would in f act amount to the most extreme form of modernism. 
Rather, what, in my view, merits the name "postmodernism" is a perpetual 
vacillation between, or dialogue of, humanist and post-humanist modes of 
knowing, being and expression. A confrontation of modernism, humanism 
and, indeed, sentimentality with what lies beyond, beside or beneath them, a 
deconstruction rather than a destruction, or more to the point a 
de/reconstruction, a sustained disruption from within, i s what ensues in the 
wake of the critical investigations of Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, 
Deleuze and Guattari. In other words, with one eye on the horizon, expecting 
that which is ye t to come and which by definition one cannot know, and the 
other eye on one's cultural heritage, lest it s tab one in the back, as a post­
modernist one chooses neither futurist oblivion nor preservationist nostalgia. 
In the words of Hassan, 
\f]or the time being, we can not, mus t not, choose between the 
12 Indeed, Hassan noted as early as 1987 that "[t]he time has come ... for provisional 
reconstructions, pragmatic remythifications. Even in France, the deconstructive mood has 
turned" ("Making Sense" 204). 
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One and the Many, Humanism and Deconstraction, Community 
and Dissemination. We can only reopen such terms to constant 
negotiations, perpetual transactions of desire, freedom, and 
justice, mediated by authorities we need as much to reestablish 
as to reinvent. Meanwhile, heterodox, heteromorph, heteroclite, 
and indeterminate withal, we live in one human universe and 
astonish each other with our assents. (Postmodern Turn xvii) 
Postmodernist literature, for all its troubled relation to re-
presentationalism and straightforward realism, reflects this creed of 
indeterminacy and may even reflect the day-to-day realities (the plural needs 
to be emphasized here) of the postmodern world. But what may ask whether 
there is room for sentimentality in that world and whether there is room for 
sentimentality in postmodernist fiction. For most people, including literary 
scholars (as we saw in the introduction), postmodernism in the arts still 
signifies precisely absence of emotion, incessant irony and superficial 
play—aspects that would be considered at odds with any kind of senti­
mentality. There is more to postmodernism, however, than the pop-cultural 
phantasmagorias of Pynchon and the blatant hyperrealism of Warhol. Such 
aesthetics of overt play and pop collage may be the origins of 
postmodernism, but over thirty odd years it has matured into an ever subtler, 
ever more varied and plural, ever more all-encompassing cultural ethos that 
defies accusations of superficiality, brutal irony and complicity with cor­
porate languages and unreflective pop images. In other words, we have 
moved from a culture in which a somewhat monolithic conception of 
postmodernism might have worked to a culture in which we would be better 
off speaking of postmodernisms. 
Indeed, the case is the same when it comes to modernism, the 
movement we most immediately define postmodernism in relation to. As 
Malcolm Bradbury points out, 
[w]hat we have behind us are many Modernisms, and according 
to the location we stand in ... we will see its story and meaning 
as being very different. . . . Modernism was a pattern of inter­
national and polyglot transactions and, often, misapprehensions, 
deriving from the remarkable internationalism of the period and 
the émigré and expatriate movement of many of its participants. 
As it was polyglot, it was also polygeneric and eclectic, 
assimilating irreconcilables and incorporating these gradually 
within its own aesthetic self-definition. ("Modernisms/Post­
modernisms" 317) 
Still, we may adopt a panoramic view that enables us to see what unites the 
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different schools and individual artists of modernism and also what ties them 
to modernity: their emphasis on newness, on continual experimentation, on 
the inherent value of pushing forward and on the bankruptcy of past modes of 
artistic expression as well as the vulgarity of contemporary popular forms of 
expression. Thus, their creative output constitutes the artistic fruition of the 
ideals of progress and invention that animate modernity. At the same time, 
modernism carries within it the seeds of disenchantment with that very 
modernity: with its urbanization, its alienation, its petit-bourgeois values, its 
secularization, and its capacity for mass-destruction as witnessed by the First 
World War. True, some modernisms, most notably futurism, sing the glory of 
modern technological society and reject the past utterly, but most of them, 
such as the poetic modernism of Yeats and Eliot, approach the lament and the 
apocalyptic.13 
Ironically, though, modern society moves on through a second world 
war and a cold war without meeting with a cataclysmic end and leaves mod­
ernism, or at least what we know as High Modernism, behind. Modernism 
itself, the jubilation of the new, leads finally to exhaustion.14 At this point, 
stutters, near-silences and (anti)dramas of inertia set in, such as the endgames 
of Beckett, but there also appears a new playfulness that results in blendings 
of popular genres with epistemological and ontological explorations, such as 
the labyrinthine pastiches of Borges. The former we may, following Charles 
Jencks, call late modernist, the latter may be considered the threshold of 
postmodernism.15 
13 As Charles Taylor points out, "we find the modernist writers and artists in protest against a 
world dominated by technology, standardization, the decay of community, mass society, and 
vulgarization. There was, indeed, a minority, like the futurists, which took a positive stance 
towards technology and wanted to celebrate its creative potentialities; but they too were appalled 
at the passivity and ugliness which they saw as the actual consequences of mass industrial 
society" (456; emphasis mine). 
14 Cf. John Barth, "The Literature of Exhaustion". I may also refer here to Umberto Eco's brief 
history of the avant-garde in his Postscript to The Name of the Rose: "The avant-garde destroys, 
defaces the past. . . Then the avant-garde goes further, destroys the figure, cancels it, arrives at 
the abstract, the informal, the white canvas, the slashed canvas, the charred canvas. In 
architecture and the visual arts, it will be the curtain wall, the building as stele, pure 
parallelipiped, minimal art; in literature, the destruction of the flow of discourse, the Burroughs­
like collage, silence, the white page . . . But the moment comes when the avant-garde (the 
modern) can go no further" (66-67). 
15 See Jencks's What is Post-Modernism?, especially 43-49. Jencks proposes that we "redefine as 
mostly 'Late' what Davis, Goldberger, Foster, Jameson, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Krauss, Hassan 
and so many others often define as 'Post'. It is mostly 'Late' because it is still committed to the 
tradition of the new and does not have a complex relation to the past, or pluralism, or the 
transformation of Western culture, or a concern with meaning, continuity and symbolism" (46). I 
find Jencks's argument largely convincing, although it is not wholly fair to those critics and 
theorists which he refers to disapprovingly. Jencks's argument also owes much to his field of 
speciality, architecture, and it is not a ll that clear how postmodernist architectural aesthetics 
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Postmodernism, then, is constituted by a recharging of artistic bat­
teries, this time without the pretences of newness and the disdain for past 
and/or popular forms. There is replenishment; a n ew kind of bastard hope, a 
credo quia absurdum. '' Once again, though, just as there are modernisms, 
there are postmodernisms, diachronically and synchronically distributed. Or, 
to be more precise, there are a number of aesthetic practices that may be 
thought of as postmodernist. In literature, for instance, the relentless, overt 
metafiction of the sixties and seventies, such as John Barth's Lost in the 
Funhouse and Italo Calvino's If on a Winter's Night a Traveller, gives way to 
the more subtle historiographie metafiction of the eighties and nineties, such 
as Graham Swift's Waterland and Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose. The 
latter, somewhat reconstructive postmodernism is a necessary development 
of the former, more deconstructive postmodernism; as Leslie Fiedler noted in 
1982, "such terminal fiction could not be written over and over without 
becoming an intolerable bore to its writers as well as its readers" ("Deaths 
and Rebirths" 229). Yet, these two stages of postmodernist fiction share a 
metafictional impulse and a sense that the elitism and the avant-gardism of 
modernism are no longer v iable.17 Indeed, as with the various modernisms, 
we can discern a few basic traits that all literary postmodernisms share to 
varying degrees, and that reflect the postmodern critiques of universalism, of 
objectivism and of the belief in transparency. For instance, whereas the 
modernists sought new ways of representing the world, ways which they 
deemed more accurate than those of conventional realism, postmodernists 
stress the conventionality and provisionality of all modes of representation, 
consequently either revisiting representative modes deemed obsolete by the 
modernists or leaving representationalism behind to construct new worlds 
with unique properties, thus tending toward the popular genre of science 
fiction.18 Moreover, as postmodernists can neither grant privilege to 
modernist techniques nor discard them, they typically blend modernist and 
pre-modernist forms, as well as elite and popular forms. Thus, postmodernist 
translate into a postmodernist poetics. However, a fine attempt at such a translation is made by 
Linda Hutch eon in A Po etics of Postmodernism, which modifies Jencks's model by articulating 
it with the poststructuralist theories that Jencks is somewhat dismissive of. 
16 Cf. John Barth, "The Literature of Replenishment". 
17 As Fiedler argues, "[t]hough a novelist like John Barth is clearly indebted to the example of 
James Joyce, he uses Joycean techniques terminally; that is to say, though a work l ike Giles Goat 
Boy may seem at first glance merely one more late Modernist Art Novel, it is in fact an anti-Art 
Novel, a kind of autodestruct device. Read properly, it se rves to undercut the posture of the 
novelist as elitist 'artist', as well as the reader's sense of himself as a self-congratulatory 
connoisseur of what is unavailable to the popular audience; so that finally it blows up the very 
notion of avant-garde experimental fiction" ("Deaths and Rebirths" 228). 
IS This view of postmodernist fiction has been elaborated by Brian McHale in Postmodernist 
Fiction and Constructing Postmodernism. 
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fiction may also blend historical and contemporary popular languages of 
sentimentality with a modernist sense of self-consciousness and irony, 
importantly without letting the former succumb to the latter, playing a game 
of both-and rather than either-or. 
In other words, what generally characterizes postmodernism is "double 
coding", a term championed by Jencks and adopted by Linda Hutcheon in A 
Poetics of Postmodernism and The Politics of Postmodernism. Jencks 
explains double coding by reference to his field of speciality, architecture: 
[D]ouble coding—the combination of modern techniques with 
something else (usually traditional building) in order for 
architecture to communicate with the public and a concerned 
minority, usually other architects. The point of this double 
coding [is] itself double. Modern architecture had failed to 
remain credible partly because it did not communicate 
effectively with its users . . . and partly because it did no t make 
effective links with the city and history. (What is Post-
Modernism? 29) 
Jencks clarifies what double coding would mean more generally—that is, for 
instance, in literature—by saying that "[t]o simplify, double coding means 
elite/popular, accommodating/subversive and new/old. ... In a word . . . 
double coding confirms and subverts simultaneously" (30). This doubleness 
is what Hutcheon builds her poetics of postmodernism on: postmodernist art, 
in Hutcheon's view, is "both intensely self-reflexive and parodie, yet it a lso 
attempts to root itself in that which both reflexivity and parody appear to 
short-circuit: the historical world" (Poetics x). As Hutcheon puts it, "[t]here 
is no dialectic in the postmodern" (x), but rather a will to be suspended in 
contradiction: "Wilfully contradictory, then, postmodern culture uses and 
abuses the conventions of discourse. It knows it cannot escape implication in 
the economic (late capitalist) and ideological (liberal humanist) dominants of 
its time. . . . All it can do is question from within" (xiii). Another set of 
discourses and practices that postmodernism proceeds from within is indeed 
modernism itself: postmodernism remains with the self-reflexivity, irony and 
re-examination of representation that were established by modernist artists. 
At the same time, through the practice of double coding, postmodernism 
breaks with the elitism and inaccessibility of High Modernism, and with the 
Adorno-Horkheimerian dichotomy of an accomplished, refining high art and 
a decadent, demoralizing mass culture. Postmodernism thus also reawakens, 
in order to problematize, the contextualization and referentiality that 
especially modernist architecture and painting generally discarded in favour 
of autonomy and abstraction. 
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Postmodern realism 
Jencks's and Hutcheon's notions of what constitutes postmodernist aesthetics 
leads, in my view, to an appreciation of what Amy J. Elias has called 
"postmodern realism". Notably, Elias poses the issue of postmodern realism 
as a problem: her article is called "Meta-mimesis? The Problem of British 
Postmodern Realism". Elias argues that the 
opposition between British "Realism" and "experiment" (or 
postmodernism) seems secure until one considers such novels as 
Graham Swift's Waterland, Bruce Chatwin's Utz, Nigel 
Williams' Star Turn, David Lodge's Small World, Martin 
Amis's Money, or Julian Barnes's Flaubert's Parrot. These 
works seem different from "straight" Realism—harder, more 
metafictional, postmodern. (9) 
Significantly, Elias turns to the example of Swift as she proposes that 
"[n]ovels such as Waterland might in fact call into question the binary 
thinking (antithetical to a postmodern mindset) that separates Realism from 
postmodernism, experiment from tradition" (10). Pointing to the notion of 
realism as an ongoing project changing over time, a notion found for instance 
in George Levine, Elias invites us to consider "whether this new postmodern 
Realism upholds a mimetic aesthetic goal while paradoxically recognizing 
the demise of the Real" (10). 
Similar ideas are expressed by Catherine Bernard in her article 
"Dismembering/Remembering Mimesis: Martin Amis, Graham Swift". As 
we can tell from the title, Bernard also views mimesis as a troubled concept, 
and also focuses on Swift's fiction. Bernard argues that Amis's and Swift's 
novels, whereas they "foreground the necessary reassessment of the 
epistemological link between the world and words . . . are not detached 
acknowledgements of the evasiveness and provisionality of reality and of the 
conventional and culturally determined modes of interpretation which con­
dition our very apprehension and experience of things" (122). Rather, those 
novels "subvert literary conventions from within, by using and abusing their 
logic, an excess of coherence generating eventually incoherence and a 
rhetoric of excess" (123). 
These views of Elias's and Bernard's are congenial to those of 
Hutcheon, to whom they both refer.19 As Hutcheon suggests, 
19 Significantly, Wendy Wheeler also uses the phrase "postmodern realism" in her discussion of 
Last Orders (77). 
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what we might find [in postmodernism] is less a destruction than 
a productive problematization of the entire notion of the relation 
of language to reality—fictive or historical. Historiographie 
metafiction both underlines its existence as discourse and yet 
still posits a relation of reference (however problematic) to the 
historical world. (141) 
Postmodernism, in this view, is as interested in the promises and possibilities 
of old forms as in the deconstruction of those forms and their re-combination 
into new forms. This view of postmodernism would seem to be in line with 
Lyotard's notion of postmodernism as constant re-examination, although 
Lyotard may certainly be read as advocating a more decisive departure from 
realist aesthetics in favour of what is essentially a modernist avant-gardist 
project.20 Setting a radical process of re-examination against a laisser-faire 
economy of received values, Lyotard concludes that "[tjhose who refuse to 
reexamine the rules of art pursue successful careers in mass conformism by 
communicating, by means of the 'correct rules', the endemic desire for 
reality with objects and situations capable of gratifying it" (The Postmodern 
Condition 75). However, it would be all too easy to say that the so-called 
"reexamination of the rules of art" has itself fostered a mass conformism 
governed by its own "correct rules" for several decades now. In the words of 
Hassan, "[tjhought blends into hype; words writhe; stereotypes become as 
transparent as the stereotypes they once repugned" ("Negative" 306). The 
endemic desire for that reality which Lyotard seems to throw out with 
modernity's bathwater, and without defining it at any length,21 may thus itself 
turn into the province of the avant-garde, or of the re-examination and 
renegotiation of art. 
Indeed, the title of a recent study by Hal Foster would seem to support 
this view of the coming of a realist avant-garde: The Return of the Real: The 
Avant-Garde at the End of the Century. In this study of contemporary art, 
Foster cites a notion of Craig Owens's which I find generally accurate, and 
which wholly corresponds to Hutcheon's notion of postmodernist art: 
"Modernist theory presupposes that mimesis, the adequation of image to 
20 To Lyotard, "postmodernism" signifies a continuous renewal within the perimeters of 
modernism: "A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Thus understood, 
postmodernism is not modernism at its end, but in a nascent state, and this state is r ecurrent" 
(The Postmodern Explained 13). 
21 This is what Lyotard has to say about this intricate issue: "Realism, whose only definition is 
that it intends to avoid the question of reality implicated in that of art, always stands somewhere 
between academicism and kitsch" (The Postmodern Condition 75). Taking recourse to a rhetoric 
of categorical statements ("whose only definition is", "always stands") and of implied negative 
connotations ("academicism", "kitsch"), Lyotard does all he can to express his aversion, but not 
very much to describe its object. 
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referent, can be bracketed or suspended, and that the art object itself can be 
substituted (metaphorically) for its referent. . . . [T]his fiction has become 
increasingly difficult to maintain. Postmodernism neither brackets nor 
suspends the referent but works to problematize the activity of reference" 
(qtd. in Foster 88). This "realist" turn must not be understood in terms of 
nostalgia or simple retrospection, though. As John Barth puts it, "1 deplore 
the artistic and critical cast of mind that repudiates the whole modernist 
enterprise as an aberration and sets to work as if it hadn't happened; that 
rushes back into the arms of nineteenth-century middle-class realism as if the 
first half of the twentieth century hadn't happened" ("Replenishment" 202). 
To Barth, "[a] worthy program for postmodernist fiction ... is the synthesis 
or transcension of these antitheses, which may be summed up as 
premodernist and modernist modes of writing" (203). Both more general and 
more theoretical, Pierre Bourdieu points out that 
because the whole series of pertinent changes [in the field of 
cultural production] is p resent, practically, in the latest (just as 
the six figures already dialled on a telephone are present in the 
seventh), a work or an aesthetic movement is irreducible to any 
other situated elsewhere in the series; and returns to past 
styles . . . are never "the same thing", since they are separated 
from what they return to by negative reference to something 
which was itself the negation of it (or the negation of its 
negation, etc.). (60) 
That is, the whole history of the field up to any given point is immanent to 
the functioning of the field at that point, and therefore producers must 
possess that history to meet the demands of the field with any success. This 
has never been more evident than in postmodernism, especially as Jencks and 
Hutcheon recognize it: a reworking of the past, a working-through of the 
past, a kind of internal affairs investigation of culture by culture after it 
exhausted itself and—almost—died. Thus, a truly postmodernist art, and a 
truly postmodernist criticism, would not follow the logic of the avant-garde 
in the strict sense, which is based on modern notions of time and progress 
and on the belief in the inherent value of the new, but would, following the 
logic of vertical time (as in Dante's lnferno\ no further comparisons in­
tended), give equal attention to the past and the now; indeed, to the reality of 
the past and the now, knowing that that reality is always part product of our 
desires, part geared toward demeaning them. 
Regardless of where we may find "reality", and how we would like to 
find it, it has faded from view in most of the discourses on/of postmodernism. 
It is the impact of those discourses that Martha Nussbaum must have in mind 
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when she notes in Love's Knowledge that for quite some time it has been 
"assumed that any work that attempts to ask of a literary text questions about 
how we might l ive, treating the work as addressed to the reader's practical 
interests and needs, and as being in some sense about our lives, must be 
hopelessly naive, reactionary, and insensitive to the complexities of literary 
form and intertextual referentiality" (21). Taken as an assessment of the 
general sway of literary studies, Nussbaum's statement does not at this point 
in time ring quite true, but it is still a fairly accurate reflection of the state of 
studies of postmodernism. However, Nussbaum's work does not, to my mind, 
constitute a tenable corrective to the alleged ills of literary studies in general 
or of studies of postmodernism in particular.22 Andrew Gibson, on the other 
hand, points to more viable critical perspectives on the representational 
impulse, as he observes that "[representational assumptions have continued 
more or less subtly to pervade most work in the fields of literary and cultural 
studies" {Towards 70). He persuasively argues that mimesis has faired quite 
well in postmodernism, with "feminist and postcolonial valuations of 
representation", with Hutcheon's view of historiographie metafiction, and 
with Jameson's shift from "'textualist' ideology to . . . comparative 'real­
ism"'. He concludes that in postmodern criticism "[Representation thus re­
appears in a double figure, in the imitation of imitation, the simulation of 
imitative form" (70-71). 
Furthermore, if there is still a widespread disregard for the mimetic 
impulse in certain camps, Christopher Butler mounts a perceptive critique of 
that disregard, referring to "what Hutcheon calls the 'de-doxifying' impulse 
in postmodernist literary theory": 
This "de-doxifying" attack worked with the n otion of stereotype 
and the ideological conformity it encouraged, in such a way as to 
221 find it hard to come to terms with the fact that Love's Knowledge is hardly animated at all by 
the elaborations and modifications of existentialism, phenomenology and poststructuralism in the 
last few decades. For instance, Kierkegaard and Levinas are not engaged at all, the only view of 
Heidegger we get is the dismissive comment "She probably r eads Heidegger too, heaven help 
her" (321), and Derrida is expended with in a quite summary fashion (see 171), whereas the one 
recent book that resembles Nussbaum's own the most, namely Wayne C. Booth's The Company 
We Keep, is discussed somewhat hagiographically for fifteen pages (230-44). In sho rt, a book on 
ethics and literature published in 1990 that does not engage with postmodern issues at all, b ut 
dwells extensively on Aristotle, amounts to a curious display of nostalgia. See Gibson, 
Postmodernity 8-12, for a critique of Nussbaum along similar lines. Cf. chapter two of 
Eaglestone's Ethical Criticism. See also Schräg, 141-43, for a succinct critique of Aristotle's 
ethics. Contrary to Nussbaum's view Schräg argues that "the ethical a nd moral theories of both 
Aristotle and Kant, and the teleological and deontological traditions of ethical theory 
construction more generally, come up short in guiding one through the stages of life's way" 
(143). 
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further undermine our confidence in mimesis. It became 
common to assert that the work of art does not depict l ife; but 
life as it is represented by ideology. This is a common slogan 
(which presupposes the very difference, between knowledge of 
life, and of life as represented by ideology, which it wishes to 
deny). But even were it to be true, it would be trivially so—for 
even if all representations are affected by ideology, we would 
still n eed to appeal to other standards, like those of rationality, in 
order to ask which representations were more accurate, better 
supported by the relevant evidence, better open to testing by an 
attempted falsification, and so on. Such detailed considerations 
are all too easily avoided by a general distrust (of "bourgeois" 
thinking), which has encouraged postmodern artists to defend 
against detailed mimetic considerations. (78) 
Indeed, as Andrzej Gasiorek points out, "[o]ne need not subscribe to a belief 
in the isomorphism of sign and referent to be a realist" (187). Gasiorek 
furthermore shows that if we look at postmodernist fiction such as that of 
Swift, Barnes and Rushdie, we will find that what is taking place in 
postmodernism is not necessarily a re jection of realism, but a diversification 
and multiplication of realism into realisms. 
The reason why 1 am discussing the issue of realism at some length is 
that I see some degree of realism as integral to both the full expression and 
the appreciation of the sentimentum. I think that if literature is to illustrate the 
incommensurability of the other and the limitations of, and violations by, 
representation, it is best served by staying with realism and interrogating and 
interrupting it from within. Once again, this is not to suggest a notion of 
authenticity or one-to-one correspondence, or a preclusion of "ex-centric" 
modes of representation, but to suggest a respect for and an approximation of 
common experience and the forms of representation sanctioned by the vast 
majority of cultural consumers (at least in the West, the cultural history of 
which is my concern here)—what in by now classical terminology goes 
under the name of vraisemblance,23 Tn other words, if postmodernism is 
about simultaneously inscribing and subverting, it will have to take vrai­
semblance as its point of departure if it wants to critique those notions with 
any wide success. 
Indeed, Graham Swift's novels would seem to follow this post-
23 In Structuralist Poetics, Jonathan Culler explains the concept of vraisemblance by referring to 
Tzvetan Todorov: "Todorov offered three definitions: first, 'the vraisemblable is the relation of a 
particular text to another general and diffuse text which might be called "public opinion'". 
Second, the vraisemblable is whatever tradition makes suitable or expected in a particular 
genre . . . And finally, 'one can speak of the vraisemblance of a work in so far as it attempts to 
make us believe that it conforms to reality and not to its own laws .. (138-39). 
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modernist programme. As John Banville has suggested, they stress the 
importance of ordinary days. There is no child without a brain (as in Jenny 
Diski's Like Mother), no mystic island and imaginary characters taking real 
shape (as in J.M. Coetzee's Foe), no characters called Oedipa Mass, Dr 
Hilarius or Pierce Inverarity (as in Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49), 
no Palace of the Peacock (as in Wilson Harris's novel of the same name), and 
none of the flirting with science fiction and cyberpunk which Brian McHale 
characterizes as typically postmodernist in his Constructing Postmodernism. 
The setting of Swift's fictions is usually London, sometimes America or 
southern Europe, that is, geographically and culturally recognizable places, 
and the characters fit the categories of "the man in the street" or "the girl next 
door". Still, Swift's novels often have a mythical and magical tinge, but of a 
kind that we may all perceive in more or less ordinary days. Swift's novels 
betray their anti-representationalist stance more subtly, through what we saw 
Catherine Bernard call a "rhetoric of excess", through a self-conscious play 
with literary conventions and through a melodramatic mode of excess.25 This 
is why Swift's fictions lend themselves particularly well to my discussion. 
T should note here too that my appreciation of postmodern realism 
influences my mode of reading literary texts in this study. While I read 
characters and situations in those texts as, on one level, precisely fictional, 
with all the textual contingency and critical distance that comes with such a 
reading, I also find it inescapable to relate to fictional characters and 
situations, on another level, as one would to actual, living persons to whom 
one attributes volition and emotional capability. Actual, living persons, after 
all, also to a large extent present themselves through narrative or other 
signifying practices. In other words, 1 opt for a mode of reading that 
accommodates, to some extent, my sentimentality and my vulnerability: I a m 
touched by the destinies of fictional characters. My readings thus break with 
the outspoken modernist mode of reading from Flaubert through James to 
Eliot, which found its extremification in Ortega y Gasset's The De-
humanization of Art: "Not only is grieving and rejoicing at such human 
destinies as a work of art presents or narrates a very different thing from true 
artistic pleasure, but preoccupation with the human content of the work is in 
principle incompatible with aesthetic enjoyment proper" (9).26 To Ortega y 
Gasset, "an object of art is artistic only in so far as it is not real" (10). In a 
24 In his review of Last Orders in the New York Review of Books, Banville wrote that Swift " is, 
as John Dewey beautifully said of Emerson, 'the sage of ordinary days'" (Banville, Online). 
251 am leaning here on Peter Brooks's The Melodramatic Imagination, which I return to below. 
26 We may note the affinity between this view of Ortega's and the view of Kant's quoted in the 
epigraph of this study. For a brief survey o f Ortega's, as well as Flaubert's and James's, notions 
of how art and literature should be constructed and construed, as well as a discussion and critique 
of such notions, see Wayne C. Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction, chapter five. 
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certain sense, this is a perfectly tenable, not to say trivial, view. In another 
sense, though, which would seem to be Ortega's, it is a view that holds that 
true artistry means losing sight entirely of human reality with its smells, its 
tastes, its passions, its contingencies. To which I would reply, if allowed a 
moment of polemicism, that anyone can write an entire novel without using 
any personal pronouns, but only a few can write Bleak House, The Sound and 
the Fury or Midnight's Children. 
However, I wish to stress that neither do I subscribe to a mode of 
modern criticism in the vein of Leavis, which rests on the assumption "that a 
novel's ethical power is inseparable from a kind of mimetic adequacy" 
(Gibson, Postmodernity 56). Such criticism, as Andrew Gibson observes, 
would locate an ethical failure in a novel at the point where the novel reveals 
its inability to reveal, where the novel acknowledges the limits of 
representation, and would implicitly or explicitly state that "[c]ertainty in and 
of representation is the sine qua non of ethics in narrative" (56). By 
discussing Swift's novels under the heading of "postmodern realism", I am 
calling attention precisely to the ways in which those novels set up the 
conventions of realism in order to destabilize them, to re-examine them and 
to call attention to the unrepresentable; but also to the ways in which those 
novels identify the aporias of not only representationalism, but of anti-
representationalism as well. As Gibson himself points out in his critique of 
representationalism, "we cannot simply move beyond an ethics tied to the 
mimetic premise, decisively, all at once. For the mimetic premise is so much 
part of our inheritance that an ethics of fiction that sought comprehensively to 
set it as ide would find it i mmediately reappearing, if only as the necessary 
point of reference for the new departure" (55). 
Enter the sentimentum 
With those things said about postmodernism and realism, it is time to move 
on to the more elaborate explanation of the terms of the sentimentum. I m ove 
on by reiterating: not only do I find Jameson's notion of the waning of affect 
in postmodernism problematic, but I also claim that affect, at least in the 
mode of sentimentality and sensibility, is inseparable from ethics and 
spirituality, which in their turn are inseparable; in the words of Levinas, 
"[e]thics is the spiritual optics" (Totality 78). Indeed, in their eighteenth 
century genesis, sentimentality and sensibility were not just about letting 
feelings loose, but about being virtuous and doing good, about caring for the 
other and, ultimately, about being a good Christian. Even a secularized 
sentimentality cannot free itself of the traces of a more arcane spirituality; as 
Peter Brooks notes in his study of melodrama, a genre which shares 
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conventions and tenets with sentimental literature, "[t]he melodramatic mode 
in large measure exists to locate and to articulate the moral occult" (5). What 
Brooks calls the moral occult "is not a metaphysical system; it i s rather the 
repository of the fragmentary and desacralized remnants of sacred myth. It 
bears comparison to unconscious mind, for it is a sphere of being where our 
most basic desires and interdictions lie, a realm which in quotidian existence 
may appear closed off from us, but which we must accede to since it is the 
realm of meaning and value" (5). 
Needless to say, an ocean of differences divides our current, post­
modern scene from the culture of feeling. Yet, the configuration of ethics, 
spirituality and affect just described is, mutatis mutandis, still in place. 
Today, in Levinas, we find an ethics of affect which is also a religion, the 
coming of God to one's mind, and Levinasian ethics may be said to constitute 
a contemporary mode of sentimentality, with its emphasis on sensibility, on 
baring oneself to the other and on receiving the other in its bareness, on 
wounds, on affectivity; Levinas's ethics could even be described as a kind of 
melodrama in which the struggle between "good" and "evil" has been 
replaced by the struggle between what Levinas terms "the saying" and "the 
said".27 However, Levinas's sentimentality, or any postmodern senti­
mentality, does not quite have the characteristics of what has become 
commonly identified as sentimentality, nor is it found in the same sort of 
philosophical and aesthetic configuration as traditional sentimentality. My 
discussion thus requires a tentative conception of the postmodern 
configuration of affect, ethics and spirituality, and a shorthand phrase to 
denote that conception and, more specifically, the transformation of 
sentimentality within it. My reasons for choosing the phrase "the sen-
timentum" are as follows: sentimentum is a Latin word, seldom used 
nowadays and hence relatively free of obvious etymological/semantic or 
discursive baggage;28 introducing it as a neologism in English, I wish to 
27 My bringing together of Brooks's "moral occult", a site of Manichean struggle, and a 
postmodern, Levinasian, ethics of process and becoming surely needs a word of explanation. 1 
believe that both these impulses, the Manichean and the "ethical", dwell in us; history, however, 
shows the former to get the upper hand most of the time. Levinas's is an attempt, fragile, to make 
us aware of and make us amplify the latter. What is more, one may argue that Levinasian ethics 
too is constituted by a dualism, that between "the saying" and "the said", with Levinas 
vociferously championing the former and unforgivingly lambasting the latter. Embedded in 
Levinas's great sense of subtlety, nuance and balance lie the seeds of a moralism, and perhaps in 
all philosophy lie the traces of demonology; in h is quest for reason Descartes was driven by his 
evil demon into the aporia that produced the ruse of the cogito, and in his quest for ethics 
Levinas fled the petrifying stare of the Medusa (the gaze of the other that Sartre cannot 
circumvent in his ontology) to find the sanctuary of a pair of eyes that called him to constant 
action. 
28 Sentimentum is etymologically connected to sentio, sentire, sensi, sensunr. "notice", 
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suggest a reference to the modern connotations of "sentiment" and 
"sentimentality" while indicating a difference. This need for indicating a 
difference is the reason why I have chosen not to simply use the phrase 
"postmodern sentimentality"—that phrase would convey too narrow 
connotations and would also risk conveying the sense of a simple 
reinscription of the terms of classical sentimentality into a postmodernist 
aesthetic of irony, pastiche and play. Finally, the definite article of the phrase 
serves to indicate that it is a specific, albeit multifaceted and plastic, 
configuration that is denoted. In this way, the term will hopefully escape the 
kind of free play that "sentimentality" has entered into. 
However, before I elaborate further on the specific concept of the 
sentimentum, an exposition of the shifting meaning and value of 
sentimentality should be in place. Fred Kaplan offers a lucid history of the 
term and its cognates: 
The term sentiment came into English as early as the fourteenth 
century and meant (in chronological sequence) "one's own 
feelings", "physical feeling", "mental attitude (of approval or 
disapproval)", "an emotion", "a thought or reflection coloured 
by or proceeding from emotion", "an emotional thought 
expressed in literature or art", and "a striking or agreeable 
thought or wish". The words sentimental and sentimentality were 
coined in the middle to late eighteenth century to indicate 
something "characterized by sentiment" and "the quality of 
being sentimental", respectively. (17) 
Importantly, it is the term "sentimentalism", rather than "sentimentality", that 
was initially used pejoratively: "With slowly gathering force, sentimentalism 
came to denote late in the nineteenth century the misuse of sentiment, 'the 
disposition to attribute undue importance to sentimental considerations, to be 
governed by sentiment in opposition to reason; the tendency to excessive 
indulgence in or insincere display of sentiment'" (17). 
This fall from grace of sentimentality, or of sentimentalism, is apparent 
in an essay by G.K. Chesterton called "On Sentiment", in which Chesterton 
is critical of the sweeping renunciation of sentimentality that he perceives as 
typical of his time: "In reading some recent discussions about Victorian 
fiction I have come upon a curious fallacy about what is called sentiment. It 
is generally called sentimentalism or sentimentality. The term, in any case, is 
always applied in a bad sense" (278). Having made this observation, 
Chesterton proceeds to pick apart the assumptions underlying the antipathy to 
"perceive"; "feel". 
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sentimentality, arguing that "[t]here is nothing of illusion, or even 
superficiality, in recognizing the importance of the emotions . . . There is 
nothing weak about showing such feelings; there is nothing realistic about 
denying such feelings. The feelings are facts; they are even very fundamental 
facts" (278). His conclusion is that "[i]t is obvious that anti-sentimentalism is 
only a rather priggish and a rather snobbish form of sentimentalism. The 
fastidious person is really preferring feelings to facts" (279). That is, the 
fastidious anti-sentimentalist is actually putting his unreflected negative 
emotional reaction to all occurrences that would fall under the heading of 
sentimentalism before any more sustained distinctions between various 
occurrences and before any considerations of the basis and the relative merits 
of various occurrences. In Chesterton's view, "[t]he sin of sentimentalism 
only occurs when somebody indulges a feeling, sometimes even a real 
feeling, at the prejudice of something equally real, which also has its r ights" 
(279). This sin emerges "in the attempt to combine a fact and a falsehood in 
one act of mind", which Chesterton exemplifies by the motif of love in the 
midst of war: "Soldiers do go to battle and do leave girls behind; and the 
passions involved are not only romantic but real. But if we then make fancy 
pictures of war, and refuse to admit that wounds hurt, or that heroes can be 
killed, or that good causes can be defeated, then we are trying to hold two 
contrary conceptions in the mind at once" (280). 
At any rate, the devaluation of sentimentality tout court that Chesterton 
is contesting was part and parcel of the modernist movement, the emergence 
of which Chesterton could witness first hand. As Winfried Fluck points out, 
until roughly the middle of the nineteenth century, sentimentality 
did not pose a problem, but a promise: that of creating a common 
emotional and cultural bond between text and reader. 
Modernism, with its emphasis on modes of (often ironic) 
distancing and its strong interest in increasing the cognitive 
mobility of a reader conceptualized as a highly individualized 
being who stands apart from the mass, has changed all that; in 
doing this it has also relegated the sentimental in fictio n to the 
lower regions of our culture. (15) 
Similar observations are made by Jerome McGann in his study of the poetic 
styles of sensibility and sentimentality: 
[Institutional modernism . . . ordered the academic horizon of 
writing for most of the twentieth-century and spent much of its 
energy fighting against the poetic styles I will be examining. The 
central figure in that campaign was T.S. Eliot, whose defence of 
a classical tradition, as he saw it, entailed a corresponding 
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assault upon the new and decidedly anti-classical styles of poetry 
founded in the eighteenth century. 
But Eliot was not alone. The antipathy to "sentimental" 
styles went broadcast. Of the imposing modernist writers, only 
Gertrude Stein kept perfect faith with this line of work. (1) 
It is not surprising, then, that Eliot, as the high priest of modernism, sought to 
exorcise Stein, claiming that if her work was "of the future, then the future is, 
as it very likely is, of the barbarians" (qtd. in McGann 3). It would seem that 
Eliot was correct in projecting Stein into the future, a future which sees the 
resurgence of the mode of sentimentality: "Swept out of the schools, Stein 
and seven other devils went elsewhere, and perhaps 'the last state of that man 
became worse than the first'. We now call that state 'postmodernism'" 
(McGann 4). 
Indeed, in recent, postmodern, days, a number of scholars of literature 
have tried to make a case for using "sentimentality" as a neutral and even 
positive term, as well as to read modernism on terms other than its own and 
thus to find the spectre or even the living breath of sentimentality and 
sensibility not least in Eliot himself. Such is the thrust of the collection 
Sentimentality in Modern Literature and Popular Culture, edited by Winfried 
Herget, from which I cite here essays by Herget, Winfried Fluck and Dagmar 
Buchwald. Such is also the thrust of Suzanne Clark's Sentimental Modern­
ism, in which Clark reads a number of modernist women writers in con­
junction with a notion of the persistence of the sentimental tradition and of its 
positive implications for feminism. As Clark argues, "|i|n retrospect, no 
discourse is without emotional appeal and pathos, and so, in retrospect, the 
sentimentality becomes evident" (19). But I may also refer to Fred Kaplan's 
contention that whereas "[i]n modern high culture, sentimentality is often 
thought of as vaguely embarrassing or is condemned for being in bad taste or 
for being insincere", and whereas "fi]t can, of course, be all these things ... it 
need not necessarily be any of them" (3). Even in a n essay on Martin Amis 
and Ian McEwan, two authors seldom discussed in conjunction with senti­
mentality, we read that "sometimes sentimentality is the closest we can afford 
to get to compassion. And sometimes it is the only piece of wreckage left to 
cling to" (Ryan 217). 
Still, today the word "sentimental" is most often used pejoratively, and 
the notion of the sin of sentimentalism identified by Chesterton underlies that 
use; typically, the word is used about works of fiction that are excessively 
melodramatic or tear-jerking in their quest to arouse sympathy for un­
fortunate or victimized characters, or that paint too rosy a picture of the 
world. But it is also used in the sense seen above of attributing "undue 
importance" to sentiments "in opposition to reason", or indeed in opposition 
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to the decrees of Realpolitik, as in the exclamation: "You sentimental fool!" 
In both these senses, the sentimental stands in opposition to the reasonable, 
the informed, the sophisticated and indeed the nihilistic and the cynical.29 
While "the sentimentum" retains these senses of "sentimen­
tality"—importantly with a positive slant—the phrase is meant to signify a 
sentimentality that traverses a spectrum of ethico-spiritual states of being, in 
their affectivity and emotional expressions, which are ultimately governed by 
a relatively recent postmodern ethico-spiritual imagination. In the 
postmodern condition, which fosters that imagination, subjects are open to 
condition/'//,ç by all possible fragments of beliefs simultaneously; subjects 
flicker in and out of traditionally conflicting games of belief, whether they be 
archaic or modern, arcane or rationalist, religious or secular, spiritual or 
nihilistic. As Calvin O. Schräg observes in The Self after Postmodernity, 
[t]he project of sketching the portrait of the human self after 
postmodernity invites difficulties that many deem insurmount­
able. There is first the obvious truth that we are dealing not with 
a single, unitary, sharply defined portrait, but rather with a 
portrait that is itself curiously diversified. What thus appears to 
be at issue is a multiplicity of profiles and perspectives through 
which the human self moves and is able to come into view. The 
insinuation of diversity and multiplicity across the spectrum of 
human affairs is indeed something that we have learned from our 
postmodern experience and that itself needs to become a topic 
for discussion. ( I ) 
Schrag's conclusion is that "[i]f one cannot rid oneself of the vocabulary of 
self, subject, and mind, the most that can be asserted is that the self is 
multiplicity, heterogeneity, difference, and ceaseless becoming, bereft of 
origin and purpose. Such is the manifesto of postmodernity on matters of the 
human subject as self and mind" (8). In postmodernity, then, "the self lives 
291 would also here like to refer the reader to part four of Milan Kundera's novel Immortality, 
"Homo Sentimentalis", which offers a critical, but sensible, and comic, but sensitive, account of 
the emergence of feeling as a value in European culture, starting with the troubadours. 
M We find this imagination described, explored and indeed developed in Hassan, Jencks, Lyotard 
and Bauman, among others; see for instance Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion, 
which has excellent essays on a number of topics relating to spirituality and ethics. Andrew 
Wernick, one of the contributors to the volume, adds to the list I just gave, as he writes of "the 
preoccupation with the mystical, the spiritual and the religious that has surfaced within the new 
postmodernist . . . theoreticians of the secular intelligentsia. As markers, we may think of 
Derrida's Of Spirit, of the Buddhist conception of (not-)self which can be detected in the work of 
Foucault and others ... To these we may add: Lyotard and Deleuze's concern with the sublime, 
Levinas' and Irigaray's with alterity and ... the resolutely disenchanted sociologizing of 
Baudrillard" (57). 
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through a multiplicity of changing profiles and a plurality of language games 
in which it holds court" (17). The postmodern self is, in Deleuze-Guattarian 
terms, rhizomatic rather than hierarchic and dichotomous, as is the relation 
between the various terms of its being. As Jameson argues, postmodernity 
involves an "image society, in which human subjects henceforth ex­
posed ... to bombardments of up to a thousand images a day (at the same 
that their formerly private lives are thoroughly viewed and scrutinized, 
itemized, measured and enumerated, in data banks) begin to live a very 
different relationship to space and time, to existential experience as well as to 
cultural consumption" ("Transformations of the Image" 110-11). The result 
of this new relationship to space and time is what Robert Jay Lifton calls "the 
Protean self'.31 In more negative terms, this self is marked by ambivalence or 
even schizophrenia: cognitive dissonance. This dissonance seems to be what 
Bauman has in view when he suggests that postmodernity means "the speed 
which things change and the pace with which moods succeed each other so 
that they have no time to ossify into things. It means attention drawn in all 
directions at once so that it cannot stop on anything for long and nothing gets 
a really close look" (Intimations vii). In positive terms, however, the Protean 
self enables the liberation of multiplicity, difference, a rhizomatic mode of 
being: cognitive assonance. Through one's highly temporalized existence, 
one may productively encounter, in the words of Paul Ricoeur, "oneself as 
another".32 
At the same time, as Schräg argues, we are "not without some sense of 
self-identity" (17). This self-identity may of course still be a ruse. Our sense 
of self-sameness may well be an evolutionary prank, or our minds' shorthand 
for an infinitely more complex state of affairs. Nonetheless, we seem 
incapable of getting around our conceptions of our selves, and indeed in­
capable of doing without these conceptions. In this way, the destiny, if not 
telos, of postmodernism may be the one described so succinctly by Deleuze 
and Guattari: "To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the 
point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I" (A 
Thousand Plateaus 3). Postmodernism, in other words, means living in the 
"as if': as if there is an I, as if there is an other, as if anything or even 
everything matters—and minds.33 Postmodernism thus tends toward 
philosophical pragmatism. Indeed, Hassan, "the father of postmodernism", 
has recently advocated this tendency, while Emerson, "the father of 
31 In The Protean Self, Lifton, who proceeds from the evidence of his own psychiatric work, 
locates proteanism precisely in "t he multiplicity of varied, even antithetical images and ideas 
held at any one time by the self, each of which it may be more or less ready to act upon" (8). 
32 See Ricoeur's Oneself as Another. 
3j For postmodernism as "as if', see McHale, Constructing Postmodernism, e.g. 1, 9 and 218-20. 
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pragmatism", has offered what is perhaps an apt program for our condition: 
"Let us treat the men and women well; treat them as if they were real; 
perhaps they are" (81). The same attitude, I suggest, would hold for 
emotional states: let us treat them as significant, as epistemologically and 
ontologically valuable, as if they were "real". This is not to sidestep the 
whole issue of social construction, of conventionalization and of the fact that 
emotional states are intricately intertwined with discursive states: postmodern 
subjects flicker in and out of sentimentality, melodrama, romanticism, 
cynicism, nihilism and in and out of the language games associated with 
these modes of affect. 
Contrary to Jameson's belief, then, affect (and, indeed, the subject) 
does not take a path of dissolution in postmodernism, but a path of 
complexification. Keeping the flickering of this complexity in action, 
remaining in w hat Keats called "negative capability",34 never choosing, but 
forever postponing judgement and suspending both disbelief and belief, 
lodging belief in nihilism, indeterminacy in immanence, is to approach the 
sentimentum. The effect of this approach is an ironic attitude that resists any 
kind of monism—that resists the final settling for either belief or nihilism, 
sentimentality or cynicism.35 Whereas Winfried Herget says of an older mode 
of sentimentality that "[ijrony, above all, is alien to the sentimental purpose" 
(7), irony is integral to the sentimentum. However, in the sentimentum, 
sentimentality is not swallowed up by irony, but lodged in it. What is more, 
the terms may ultimately be reversed, irony may be said to be lodged in 
sentimentality. As Mileur bids, "let us consider for a moment that what hides 
in the language of irony is sentiment and that the history of irony is the 
histoiy of the sentimental, masked" (205). Admittedly, this is not an unusual 
consideration. However, Mileur gets more radical as he turns to "exploring 
the notion that the sentimental is the type of which irony is a more 
specialized instance" (206). Astutely, Mileur points out "that the presence of 
an unreflective sense that awareness makes a difference constitutes the 
sentimental at the heart of irony" (209); that is, irony sentimentalizes 
awareness. Thus, in a deconstructive move, irony is shown to be dependent 
on sentimentality—but in a complete deconstructive neutralization, the 
opposite also holds, and thus it is not possible to finally establish one of the 
tenns as dominant. 
'
4 The phrase was coined by Keats in a letter to his brothers; see Hassan, "Negative Capability 
Reclaimed", for a recent discussion of the merits of Keats's concept. 
35 We find this attitude in the self-conscious narrators of the novels of the sentimentum that 1 
consider in this study: Tom Crick in Waterland, Harry and Sophie Beech in Out of This World, 
Bill Unwin in Ever After, Geoffrey Braithwaite in Flaubert's Parrot, Claudia Hampton in Moon 
Tiger and the unnamed narrator of Written on the Body. Mutatis mutandis, I would say that we 
find it i n Last Orders as well. 
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Because of this indeterminacy and vacillation, and because of the 
governing by an ethico-spiritual imagination, the sentiments of the 
postmodern self transcend the self-indulgence and solipsism of the modern 
ego and reach an intersubjective sphere of engagement with the other. The 
sentiments, and the sentimentality, in question are not those of the virtuous 
ego, victim of, or deliverer from, vice, but of the vulnerable self called into 
question and called to responsibility. As Levinas puts it, "[t]he subjectivity of 
a subject is vulnerability, exposure to affection, sensibility, a passivity more 
passive still than any passivity ... an exposedness always to be exposed the 
more" (Otherwise 50). The ethico-spirituality involved in the sentimentum is 
thus one of uncertainty and irresolution, and not one of eschatologically 
sustained certainty; as the British dramatist, Dennis Potter, put it in his last, 
televised interview: "Religion has always been to me the wound—not the 
bandage".36 Or, as Hassan puts it, somewhat differently, what we might 
perhaps more plausibly aim for now is "a deeper agnosticism verging on the 
sacred" ("Forum" 1139). In this agnosticism, God becomes a figure for the 
intimation of a willingness to surrender one's self-interest, rather than a 
figure for a priori strictures. Postmodernist aesthetics uphold this ethico-
spiritual imagination by drawing attention to the impingement of the other on 
the work of fiction itself (through intertextual and metafictional devices) and 
on the narrator's interpretation (through multiple, parallel narratives of "the 
same"). These inscriptions of difference and otherness attest to a belief that 
one, any one, is not sufficient and that the limits of knowledge need not, 
should not, must not, produce solipsism.37 The sentimentum, then, is 
constituted by both communal and differential impulses. 
With those qualifications in mind, let me pursue in more depth the 
various terms used in the brief explanation of the sentimentum just given. By 
a postmodern ethico-spiritual imagination, I mean an imagination which 
rejects the modern mind-matter dualism, and which recognizes the other as 
finally ungraspable, but also intimately connected, to the self; this holds for 
the other whether it be other people, other species, or that general entity 
called "Nature".38 The big equalizer, death, is also the big other, in its final 
36 Of course, spirituality and religion are not quite synonymous; as Derrida points out, 
"[distinctions are required: faith has not always been and will not always be identifiable with 
religion, nor, another point, with theology. All sacredness and all h oliness are not necessarily, in 
the strict sense of the term, if there is one, religious" ("Faith and Knowledge" 8-9). 
37 
"What alternative to faith, to the blindness and passion of faith, can there be . . . once one 
confesses the limits of knowledge?", John Caputo asks in The Prayers and Tears of Jacques 
Derrida (309). 
38 Derrida offers a corrective t o Levinas, for whom the other is typically the other man and, 
above all, the supreme Other (that is, God), as he explains that "[w]hen I say in French tout autre 
est tout autre . . . [i]t means simply that every other, without and before any determination, any 
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manifestation of infinity, as the moment of the final gaze of the other. The 
recognition of these others prompts an ethics of alterity. The true ethical 
moment lies in the scandal of unconditional love, that paradoxically 
unreciprocal reciprocity. In their actuality these relations of same and other 
are woven into a tapestry of sentiments and sentimentality: longing, 
suffering, love, bliss. The longing and suffering in question are not a result of 
the failure of the ego's project so much as of the failure of intersubjective 
connection; a connection which, when it succeeds, is the pinnacle of love and 
may approach bliss. 
Indeed, "love" seems to be hyperordinate here, or, rather, to be a 
signifier capable of encompassing most of what is involved in the 
sentimentum; that is, if we take "love" in the broader sense of agape (not 
necessarily opposed or hyperordinate to but co-ordinated with eros). Tove 
encompasses the relation to and the responsibility for the other, as well as the 
longing, the suffering and the bliss involved in that relation; and, ultimately, 
love both avers and is averse to death. Julia Kristeva brings these aspects of 
love into her opening paragraph of Tales of Love, first observing on a 
personal note how her love memories "relate to an exaltation beyond 
eroticism that is as much inordinate happiness as it is pure suffering" and 
then asking in relation to her approach: "[W]hat is psychoanalysis if not an 
infinite quest for rebirths through the experience of love, which is begun 
again only to be displaced, renewed, and, if not abreacted, at least collected 
and set up at the heart of the analysand's ulterior life as an auspicious 
condition for his perpetual renewal, his non-death?" (1). As Jean-Luc Marion 
suggests in his "theo-logical" work God Without Being, love may also be the 
paradoxical being of a God without being, a God who, rather than having to 
be, makes itself known through the gift of love, agape, charity.39 "[W]hat if', 
Marion asks, "to envisage [God], we did not have to wait for him within the 
horizon of Being, but rather transgress ourselves in risking to love 
love—bare, raw" (3). 
Love, to put it differently, is the point at which the same recognizes 
itself, and in recognizing itself, fully, also recognizes its intricate, indeed 
painful, relation to the other: "As if, Kristeva suggests in Tales of Love, "at 
the very moment when the individual discovered himself to be intensely true, 
powerfully subjective, but violently ethical because he would be generously 
specification, man or woman, man or God, man or animal, any other whatever is infinitely other, 
is absolutely other. That is the only condition for the experience of otherness. This sentence is 
virtually an objection to Levinas, of course, for whom le tout autre is first of all God. Every 
other is infinitely other" ("Discussion" 135). 
39 Interestingly, Marion's argument has a lot of similarities with that sketched by Levinas in the 
foreword to Of God Wim Comes to Mind. 
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ready to do anything for the other, he also discovered the confines of his 
condition and the powerlessness of his language" (3). 
With that last phrase of Kristeva's we also arrive at one of the truly 
intriguing aspects of the sentimentum: that so many of its aspects—love, 
death, bliss, suffering, etc.—threaten to stifle linguistic expression.40 "The 
ordeal of love puts the univocity of language and its referential and com­
municative power to the test", Kristeva writes (2). "While suffering is a 
universal human predicament", Harold Schweizer similarly observes, "it also 
remains the most unsharable, incommunicable mystery, the very epitome of 
secrecy and particularity" (4). In another context, Peter Brooks notes that 
melodrama, supposed to express without inhibition the most climactic 
sentiments, is often "the text of muteness": "Words, however unrepressed 
and pure, however transparent as vehicles for the expression of basic 
relations and verities, appear to be not wholly adequate to the representation 
of meanings" (56). As modern or modernist literature is seen as increasingly 
the symptom of trauma (in the face of industrialization, of urbanization, of 
accelerated capitalism, of the epistemic shock brought on by Darwin, Freud 
and Einstein and finally of the Holocaust), it is also interesting to recall 
Adorno's famous statement that after Auschwitz there can be no poetry, as 
well as Wayne C. Booth's contention that in modern literature "the author 
and the reader may meet, like Voltaire and God, but they do not speak" 
(Rhetoric 272), and Hassan's appraisal of a late modern "literature of 
silence". Regardless of whether one means by silence total silence (silence 
itself, absence of sound, absence of the will to sound), or, as Hassan does, 
either partial silence (the silence, more or less present, of withheld language) 
40 Indeed, as Kristeva and Barthes have noted, love—that is, love in the sense of agape, of 
Platonic love—not only in its specific i nstances but as a topic is threatened by silence. Eros, 
sexuality and desire have been part of critical discourse for a few decades now, and it is also 
clear that they have somehow replaced and displaced romantic and spiritual love in our culture 
and society. However, what we call Platonic, "non-erotic" love, or agape, may be as passionate, 
indeed as delirious, as erotic love; the two are of course not all that easy to separate (see Kristeva 
139-50 for an extensive discussion of Christian agape and its structures and workings). For a 
number of reasons, in modern society, such passionate, sentimental aspects of friendship are kept 
in check. (One of those reasons being that the demand for social mobility entails an emphasis on 
individualism, and hence on an individuation process, which renders even family bonds loose 
and somewhat suspect.) As Kristeva also notes, however, even in erotic relations, love, in the 
sense of a transindividual passion and not of a desire for possession, is nowadays suspect: 
"Under the crossfire of gynecological surgery rooms and television screens, we have buried love 
within shame for the benefit of pleasure, desire, if not revolution, evolution, planning, 
management" (5). Similar observations are made by Barthes in A Lover's Discourse. "The 
lover's sentiment is old-fashioned", Barthes argues, and writes further: "Everyone will 
understand that X has 'huge problems' with his sexuality; but no one will be interested in those 
Y may have with his sentimentality: love is obscene precisely in that it p uts the sentimental in 
place of the sexual" (178). 
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or the silencing of received discourse, silence indeed marks much of the 
literature of the last century—up to and including the postmodern, in the 
rejuvenating yet hazardous light of which the sentimentum basks.41 
Yet, the text of the sentimentum, akin to the sentimental text at the 
same time as it sets itself apart from the sentimental text, tries to bridge that 
silence, tries to show if not to tell, and to establish a link between same and 
other, between text (and perhaps even author) and reader. As John Wild 
writes in his introduction to Levinas's Totality and Infinity, "if com­
munication and community is to be achieved ... I must be ready to put my 
world into words, and to offer it to the other. . . . Responsible communication 
depends on an initial act of generosity" (14). In Levinasian terms, the text of 
the sentimentum establishes a site of vulnerability, of the baring of one's skin 
to the caress or wounding by the other, a site for the saying—that which 
challenges me and calls me to responsibility—rather than the said—that 
which preserves my self-sameness and complacency. But wedded with the 
emphasis on alterity in Levinas is a more traditional notion of mutuality. In 
the postmodernist text of the sentimentum, sensibility in the classical sense 
comes up against sensibility in Levinas's sense, the former being questioned 
and modified by the latter, but not sinking into oblivion: there is always a 
trace, and that trace upsets the current—the current currents—in turn. Hence, 
what Winfried Herget notes about the sentimental text is true of the text of 
the sentimentum as well: it "relates author and reader on the basis of shared 
sentiments to achieve sympathy, and to move the reader from sympathy to 
compassion" (4). Here we may bring in Swift himself, for this is what he has 
to say about the task of the author: 
I do think that what I do is deeply moral, if only for the simple 
reason that all morality, all real morality, rests on doing what a 
novelist makes a speciality of—that is, attempting to get inside 
the experience of others, and unless you do that... I would be at 
a loss to know where true moral feelings come from without 
that. So I think that whatever else novels do, and they may be 
doing many things, they do fulfill a highly moral function. It is 
not one people would identify as moral, if their notion of 
morality is something which can be reduced to rules and 
discipline, but it is nevertheless the basis of morality. 
Imagination i s the basis of morality. . . . [Writing, morality and 
empathy are related] because empathy is the beginning of 
41 See Hassan's The Literature of Silence. Cf. Roland Barthes's Writing Degree Zero and Susan 
Sontag's "The Aesthetics of Silence". See also Maurice Blancbot's The Writing of the Disaster, 
which addresses both the question of "poetry after Auschwitz" and the question of silence in 
literature. 
61 
An Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
sympathy, sympathy is the beginning of compassion, and 
compassion is where morality really accrues. ("Interview" 224-
25) 
Swift's notion of the moral function of literature here may seem to simply 
hark back to traditional humanist ideas of compassion-through-compre-
hension, but it also certainly conveys a disregard for Leavisite ideas of moral 
fixity and, importantly, has affinities with postmodern ethics in the vein of 
Levinas: morality is not "something which can be reduced to rules and 
discipline". At any rate, we may conclude from this outspoken poetics of 
Swift's and, more importantly, from Swift's literary works that the one 
hundred years of submission to the decorum of modernism may turn out to be 
a parenthesis in the history of sentimentality. 
Once again, though, the sentimentum does not entail an unproblematic 
return of a classical mode of sentimentality. For instance, whereas I think 
Herget's definition of "the sentimental text as a rhetorical construct whose 
aim it is to affect the reader, to move the reader—movere in the classical 
terminology—by means of pathos" (4) holds for the text of the sentimentum 
as well, the text of the sentimentum would distance itself from the classical 
sentimental text which "uses the story merely as a means for the occasion of 
the sentiment" and whose "situations, actions and characters, in which the 
feelings are implotted, are prone to become stereotyped" (5). The 
sentimentum rather fulfills the potential of sentimentality that Herget 
suggests: "Sentimentality goes beyond mere indulgence when it appeals to 
man's responsibility as a social being. The person responding to the 
sentimental text feels part of the pathetic community which shares suffering 
as the conditio humana; a-pathos—apathy—would set the individual apart 
from human community" (9). This is true of the text of the sentimentum too, 
which is about responsibility and suffering, the suffering of responsibility and 
the responsibility of suffering. Sentimentality is intimately linked to 
suffering. Indeed, as Marianne Noble argues, sentimentality may be linked to 
masochism: 
Sentimentalism ... is c losely linked to masochism, historically 
and structurally. Like masochism, sentimentalism can be read, 
broadly, as a quest for a state of union, or plenitude. And like 
masochism, sentimentalism describes a world in which pain is an 
avenue toward achieving that desired state of oneness. When 
providential theories of pain are read in the context of 
sentimental affirmations of sympathetic suffering, the result is an 
implicit link between pain and a mystical pleasure of 
transcendent union. (62) 
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As Noble further points out, "[s]entimentalism does not simply idealize the 
compassionate observation of another; it offers an intuitive and visceral 
understanding of the other's fear and anguish. A state of union, then, is 
achieved through suffering, which is the mechanism enabling one to 'enter 
into' another person, as it were" (65). At the same time, though, suffering 
links sentimentality to the unspeakable; we may recall Schweizer's words: 
suffering "remains the most unsharable, incommunicable mystery, the very 
epitome of secrecy and particularity" (1). 2 The text of the sentimentum, then, 
moves from the mystery of suffering, and the suffering brought on by 
mystery, through an attempt at remedy and union that never loses sight of the 
incommensurability of the other and the contingency of the self. 
The intersubjective, transcendental sentimentality thus involved in the 
sentimentum breaks with a modern, subjective sentimentality. The resistance 
to such transcendental sentimentality in modernity is explained by Dagmar 
Buchwald. In her discussion, in which she interestingly equates "senti­
mentality" with "kitsch", Buchwald states the following, referring to Ludwig 
Giesz: 
The discovery that one has been governed by a mood, assert s 
Giesz, is ans wered with an "an thropologically important feeling 
of disgrace", of "deficiency, impotence, passivity, dizziness, 
surrender". The reason for this feeling of disgrace is that "the 
possible freedom of existence always resists any surrender to any 
fixing stat e whatsoev er—and be it bliss itsel f'. (Buchwald 48-
49/3 
As an alternative to this negative existentialist conception—decidedly 
modern and individualist—Buchwald offers us Otto Friedrich Bollnow's 
contention that "out of an attitude of 'devoted absorption' might spring 'other 
and deeper' ways of cognition" in which "the boundaries between subject 
and object become blurred" (48).44 Here we must note that a generalized 
attribution of a positive value to a dissolution of the "I", a devoted ab­
sorption, may easily be a sentimental fallacy, a sentimentalizing view of a 
4
" Aga in, Chesterton, though problematizing less, predates the discussion: "The hundredth 
sunbeam is as bright as the first sunbeam. And the hundredth child murdered by King Herod is 
as pathetic as the first. King Herod may have come to the end of his pleasure; but the mother has 
not come to the end of her pain. And her pain is a plain fact of nature, absolutely radical and 
realistic; as solid as a lump of rock. It has every quality of stone; antiquity, universality, 
simplicity; permanence" (279). 
43 Buchwald's references are to Giesz's Phänomenologie des Kitsches (München: Fink, 1971), 
68-69. 
44 Buchwald's references are to Bollnow's Das Wesen der Stimmungen (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1980), 125. 
63 
An Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
movement that actually dissolves the responsibility for the other by 
producing the ruse of merging with the other. Indeed, both Derrida and 
Levinas would seem suspicious of such a movement.45 However, as Andrew 
Gibson notes, Levinas gradually moves toward an appreciation of what he 
terms "sensibility", which entails, if not a dissolution, then a suspension of 
the "I": 
As sensibility, "one is always coram, disturbed in oneself to the 
point of no longer having any intention" {OB, p. 92). This means 
that sensibility does not and cannot "congeal into a structure" 
{OB, p. 82). It is irreducible to a state and not conceivable as an 
entity. It appears as a "for the other" that is "total gratuity", a 
"breaking of interest" {OB, p. 96). . . . Levinas associates it with 
"uncovering" {CPP, p. 146), exposure to wounds, vulnerability: 
vulnerability, however, explicitly construed, not as a passive 
reception of stimuli, but as a positive "aptitude" (ibid.). 
{Postmodernity 165; emphasis in the original)46 
Sensibility is here not synonymous with rapture, but there is a movement 
toward intersubjective absorption.47 Gibson himself identifies sensibility with 
"the power to be affected" (162), and also refers us to Lyotard's interest in 
"possibilité, a disposition, even, paradoxically, a will to be moved" (161). 
Indeed, moments of possibilité, or of "devoted absorption", are found 
throughout Swift's fictions, and those moments are often, even when they are 
moments of a kind of bliss, moments of suffering. As Schweizer argues, the 
moment of suffering (just like that of bliss) dissolves boundaries: "In the 
experience of suffering the ideology of objectivity, the claims of reason and 
knowledge, are called into question. Philosophical distinctions of body and 
spirit, sensation and intellect, the universal and the particular, the physical 
and the metaphysical, no longer apply" (2). This, as I show below, is pre-
45 They are not alone in this respect. For instance, in his discussion of the Christian philosopher 
Jan Patocka in The Gift of Death, Derrida observes that Patocka "[s]omewhat in the manner of 
Levinas . . . warns against an experience of the sacred as an enthusiasm of fervor for fusion, 
cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its 
first intention, the removal of responsibility, the loss of the sense or consciousness of 
responsibility" (1). 
46 Gibson's references are to Levinas's Otherwise than Being (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981) and Collected Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993). 
47 
"Sensibility", then, does not here quite take on its traditional meanings. Still, the tenn 
inescapably carries the etymological baggage most heavily laid on it in the eighteenth century. 
Needless to say, a tracing of the full, complex genealogy of sensibility is beyond the scope of the 
present study; 1 may refer the reader, however, to three recent and excellent studies: Janet Todd's 
Sensibility, G.J. Barker-Benfield's The Culture of Sensibility and Jerome McGann's The Poetics 
of Sensibility. 
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cisely what happens at the end of Swift's Last Orders. In his fictional 
moments of devoted absorption and suffering, Swift to a large extent follows 
Bollnow in setting, as Buchwald puts it, "faith against doubt, trust against 
angst, harmony against split, absorption against dominance, shelter against 
exposure, and, as I could add as advocata diaboli, kitsch against artistic 
responsibility" (Buchwald 48). Swift differs from Bollnow, though, in 
following an ethics that prefers exposure over and against shelter. 
Moreover, in the ethical and spiritual tum of the sentimentum, and in 
the careful formal execution of this turn, Swift is precisely assuming artistic 
responsibility. While the text of the sentimentum relies on us to renegotiate 
the mode of irony and distance, it also recognizes the need in our cultural 
climate to distance itself from "the cult of feelings" and "sentimentalism". To 
advocate a yielding to affect is not, in the words of Gibson, "to argue for 
emotivism, a 'culture of feeling' or a return to impressionism. Indeed, the 
ethical dangers of any celebration of a naive, untutored responsive­
ness . . . should be self-evident" (162). With this observation, we get back to 
the notion of double coding. For even if Swift ventures at times into the 
territory of classical, subjective sentimentality, both that sentimentality and 
the more intersubjective sentimentality are kept in check by a scepticist and 
pluralist imagination that is manifested in a number of postmodernist 
techniques such as irony, relativization and overt intertextuality. As I have 
already suggested, though, in Swift the stakes involved in this double coding 
are of an immediacy far surpassing casual "Generation X" ironies. John 
Mepham puts it well: 
In an a ge of lost innocence, of incredulity, of indecidability, it is 
more, not less, important for fiction to return to the investigation 
of the contours of freedom and necessity, of integrity and 
betrayal, of commitment and recklessness, of trust and 
complacency. To say "I love you" ironically is easy. What is it to 
work, marry, have children, go to war, ironically, with no grand 
narratives in support? (154-55) 
The reasons for asking this type of question are discussed by Jürgen 
Habermas, who notes that the modern "separation and self-sufficiency, 
which, considered from the standpoint of philosophy of history, paved the 
way for emancipation from age-old dependencies, were experienced at the 
same time as abstraction, as alienation from the totality of an ethical context 
of life" (51). Here we begin to perceive also a loss of belief in the linear 
progress of history in general. Ironically, the very knowledge of what has 
gone before immobilizes and threatens any possible progress: "Modern 
consciousness, overburdened with historical knowledge, has lost 'the plastic 
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power of life' that makes human beings able, with their gaze toward the 
future, to 'interpret the past from the standpoint of the highest strength of the 
present'" (52). What is worse, we may sense, with Nietzsche, "in the 
historicist admiration of the 'power of history' a t endency that all too easily 
turns into an admiration of naked success in the style of Realpolitik"' (52). We 
live in "the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home" (Nietzsche qtd. in 
Habermas 54), and "[t]he modern time-consciousness, of course, prohibits 
any thoughts of regression, of an unmediated return to mythical origins" (54). 
The question of the sentimentum may thus be posed in the following way: 
what shape may sentimentality assume today, confronted with the absence of 
mythical consciousness and no longer erected on the assumption of the 
fundamental benevolence of man? Or: how can one be sentimental after 
Auschwitz? 
This thinking after Auschwitz, this "breaking up of the grand 
Narratives" in Lyotard's famous phrase (The Postmodern Condition 15), is 
mirrored in Swift's novels. In each of Swift's novels, there is a state of crisis, 
of emergency. There is a trauma that has to be worked through and worked 
from. Risking a sense of proportion, we may say that the figure of Auschwitz 
is present in each novel.48 In The Sweet Shop Owner, it is a rape, but also, and 
more importantly, the very protocol of efficiency and order that permeated 
modernity and mobilized the Holocaust.49 In Shuttlecock, it is the trauma and 
consequent catatonia of the narrator's father. In Waterland, it is a murder and 
a gruesome abortion. In Out of This World, it is the terrorist bomb that 
shatters Robert Beech into pieces. In Ever After, it is the suicides of the 
narrator's father and of the narrator's wife, as well as the suicide attempt of 
the narrator himself. Finally, in Last Orders, it i s the monstrous child June, 
born with neither sense nor sensibility, as both her mind and her body are 
dysfunctional. 
Less dramatically, if we consider the lost appeal of traditions and 
family bonds, one motif that is conspicuous in its constant return in Swift's 
fictions is the child—typically the son—who refuses to take over his father's 
48 As Peter Widdowson points out, "[i]t is as though Swift 'dates' his modern world from the 
catastrophic events of the mass warfare of the Second World War —one which re mains in their 
shadow and in which the destinies of ordinary lives, even in the 1980s and 1990s, are still 
determined by them" ("Novels of Graham Swift" 214). Thus, in a way, Swift faces the problem 
of writing after the horrors of the war delineated by Blanchot in The Writing of the Disaster. 
49 The seminal text for understanding the Holocaust as intrinsic to mode rnity rather than as its 
other, as its failure of assimilation, is Bauman's Modernity and the Holocaust. Quite 
provocatively, Bauman suggests that "[a]s the promotion of rationality to the exclusion of 
alternative criteria of action, and in particular the tendency to subordinate the use of violence to 
rational calculus, has been long ago acknowledged as a constitutive feature of modern 
civilization—the Holocaust-style phenomena must be recognized as legitimate outcomes of 
civilizing tendency, and its constant potential" (28). 
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business, or—typically the daughter—who chooses to reconfigure herself 
radically in society. Examples of the former are Harry in Out of This World 
and Vince in Last Orders', examples of the latter are Dorothy in The Sweet 
Shop Owner and Sophie in Out of This World. A related observation made by 
Lyotard is that "'[identifying' with the great names, the heroes of con­
temporary history, is becoming more and more difficult" {The Postmodern 
Condition 14). This is indeed a general problem in Swift's fictions, and it is a 
specific and personal problem for Prentis in Shuttlecock and Harry in Out of 
This World, each of whom questions his father's status as a hero. In 
Waterland the very aspiration to heroics is grotesquely parodied, as Dick, 
who is expected by his (grand)father to be "the Saviour of the World", turns 
out to be "a potato head". Yet an expansion of this motif is the very 
questioning of origins, the question of whether one's legal parents are one's 
biological parents, a problem that is clearly present in Waterland, Ever After 
and Last Orders. 
Similarly, Swift chronicles the change from an economy of local 
family businesses to the late capitalist stronghold of multi-national take-overs 
and franchising: both The Sweet Shop Owner and Last Orders portray the 
plight of small scale shop owners in the face of anonymous supermarkets and 
malls. At the same time as Swift tries to salvage the local and the parochial, 
he does not seem very hopeful: the rural Fens of Waterland, where one 
begets a child through adventurous passion—in a disused mill, none­
theless—are sinking, and in their place rises up a suburbia where one finds 
one's child in a shopping-cart at the supermarket. 
It is against or. as a somewhat hopeful matter of fact, within—this 
bleak, alienating world that the sentimental impulses of Swift's fictions are 
set. Significantly, they are done so with rising conviction throughout Swift's 
oeuvre. In fact, all of Swift's novels share "the prototypical structure of the 
genre [of sentimental literature]", in which the "plot centers on union" (Noble 
64). The "twin conditions" that sentimental literature rests on—"loss of union 
and drive toward its restoration" (65)—are heeded in Swift's novels, even as 
they are negated. In The Sweet Shop Owner, it is Willy Chapman who strives 
through the narrative toward the fulfillment of his dream of reconciliation 
with his daughter, in what amounts to a morbid ironization of the sentimental 
union, as he wants his daughter to come home and find him dead. In 
Shuttlecock, it is Prentis who seeks to be re-establish both communication 
with his catatonic father and a romantic relation to his estranged wife, but 
who ultimately attains this goal only by painting too rosy a picture of the 
world, as it were. Waterland's Tom Crick has been severed both from his 
beloved pupils and from his beloved wife, as he has lost his job as a history 
teacher and his wife has become schizophrenic. In typical postmodem ironic 
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fashion, his narrative fails to reach a point of reunion. Out of This World is 
more successful both in terms of offering the possibility of reunion and of 
convincingly narrating that reunion: the whole novel is a kind of dialogue 
between the abandoned father Harry Beech and his runaway daughter Sophie, 
leading up to the promise of their reconciliation. However, if we consider 
Noble's suggestion that "the lost state of unity that is central to the 
sentimental imagination is so frequently a mother-child bond" and that the 
mother thus "often functions in sentimental literature as a figure of plenitude" 
(66), it is interesting to note that Harry's mother died giving birth to him, and 
thus rather functions as a figure of the void, of an always already absent 
plenitude. This, then, is one example of how Swift simultaneously takes heed 
of and negates the conventions of sentimentality. In Ever After, matters are 
even more complex, as Bill Unwin is trying to reconcile himself with his 
father's suicide several decades earlier, as well as with the deaths of his wife, 
his mother and his stepfather, but also with the fact that his Victorian 
ancestor Matthew Pearce had to divorce his wife after becoming a Darwinist. 
Himself having survived a suicide attempt some months before the narration 
starts, Unwin still manages to meditate on this hyperbolic melange of loss 
and perishability with a sense of romance and hope intact. If reunion with the 
departed is not possible, Unwin is at least able to reconcile himself with the 
life he has tried to reject. In Last Orders, finally, the death of the butcher Jack 
Dodds becomes a gift of reconciliation to his wife, his son, his friends, and 
not least his estranged daughter, the mentally and physically challenged June. 
In the last chapter, Ray, the narrator, standing on the pier at Margate 
scattering Jack's ashes, experiences a moment of transcendental union with 
both Jack and the other men on the pier. 
From a more aesthetic angle, considering sentimentality vis-à-vis 
postmodernism, one could offer the following outline of the general 
development in Swift's oeuvre, although my close readings complicate this 
outline: The Sweet Shop Owner, published in 1980, is a modernist text, 
marked by alienation and crisis, and offering little in the form of 
sentimentality, spirituality or an ethics of alterity. Shuttlecock, published in 
1981, constitutes a move from modernism to postmodernism: there is a 
tension between alienation and caress, and between truth-seeking and truth-
making: aesthetically, the text moves toward overt intertextuality and 
metafiction. Waterland, published in 1983, raises the stakes of the 
sentimentum, pitting nihilist ironies against all kinds of sentimentalities. In its 
overt presentation of the notions of "the end of history" and of the storiness 
of history, and its complex intertextual play, it is something of a flying 
fortress of postmodernism; with its use of the phrase "Grand Narrative", it 
may be called Swift's "Lyotard novel". Out of This World, published in 1988, 
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is then Swift's "Baudrillard novel", illustrating as well as critiquing the 
hyperreal, confronting the simulacrum and world-weariness with magic and 
belief. It is also radically polyphonic in a way none of Swift's earlier works 
are, thus allowing for a play of difference. Ever After, published in 1992, 
continues the themes of Waterland and Out of This World, with a return to 
the more lavish arrangement of Waterland and with a skewed mirroring of 
Fowles's The French Lieutenant's Woman; at the same time, the novel 
constitutes a move toward a less defensive display of the sentimentum, and 
toward an embrace of what the narrator terms "make-belief'. Last Orders, 
published in 1996, leaves the defensive aesthetics behind altogether, at the 
same time as it is Swift's most obvious rewriting of an earlier text, namely 
Faulkner's As I Lay Dying.50 In Last Orders, Swift perfects the possibility of 
subtle double coding, writing a piece of realist fiction thoroughly marked by 
the sentimentum at the same time as writing a potentially controversial piece 
of "historiographie metafiction". 
The increasingly overt intertextuality or textual mirroring in Swift's 
oeuvre that I just touched upon, it is important to note, goes hand in hand 
with the increasing fulfillment of the sentimentum. Whereas modernism was 
very much about the creation of the radically new, postmodernism is about a 
more gentle acknowledgement and respect for the already said, an acceptance 
of the impingement of the past and the other on one's claim to originality; in 
postmodernism, "originality" becomes "origwality".51 In this sense, post­
modernism is an expression of love, of literature not as the anxiety of 
influence or as Oedipal drama, but as acknowledgement and respect. In 
Swift, as in much other postmodernist literature, the Now is written in past 
forms, or past forms are re-set for the Now. Most conspicuous in this respect 
are Waterland and Last Orders. The former is a re-writing, or collage, of 
Absalom. Absalom!, The Sound and the Fury, Great Expectations, The Great 
Gats by and Moby Dick—in the very least. In the latter, As I Lay Dying meets 
Canterbury Tales in contemporary England. Less overtly, The Sweet Shop 
Owner mirrors Mrs. Dalloway, To the Lighthouse and The Good Soldier, 
Shuttlecock alludes to The Good Soldier, Out of This World is a rehearsal of 
the mimicking of As 1 Lay Dying, and Ever After could be said to wed 
50 Of course, the novel is not, as John Frow argued in th e Independent on Sunday (9 March 
1997), simply a "direct and unacknowledged imitation" of Faulkner's novel (qtd. in Poole 167). 
Frow's "disclosure" does not so much show that the Booker Prize jury have not read Faulkner 
and cannot recognize a literary imposture, as it shows that professor Frow has apparently b een 
left nonplussed by the notion of postmodernist pastiche and textual appropriation. 
51 That is, whereas modernists such as Eliot and Pound made palimpsests of literary history and 
exploded the past with the aim of creating something radically new, postmodernists such as 
Swift and Peter Ackroyd use the texts of the past more subtly, in a mode of metafictional 
pastiche that is suspicious of the radically new. 
69 
An Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
Shuttlecock with The French Lieutenant's Woman. Significantly, most of the 
modernist texts which Swift's novels relate to are notable for a kind of 
subdued sentimentality: The Good Soldier, The Great Gatsby, Absalom, 
Absalom!, As I Lay Dying and To the Lighthouse are all testimonies to the 
waning of an older sentimental mode, but as such they also convey traces of 
that mode. 
However, one may ask whether such a play of mirrors, although 1 
suggested above that it constitutes an acknowledgement of, and a respect for, 
the already said and for other texts, does not also, and more fundamentally, 
constitute a repetition of the said and a short-circuiting of the saying. One 
must note that any kind of representation, naively realist or self-consciously 
hyperrealist, precludes the articulation of the saying and reinstates the fixity 
of the said. In other words, one may ask how a Levinasian ethics may be 
reconciled with art in general and postmodernist art in particular, especially 
as art can never quite rid it self of representational impulses. There is, indeed, 
in Levinas's earlier writing an "antipathy to art"—and particularly to 
literature, with its clear representationalist impulse and, at least traditionally, 
its drive toward closure—and it might therefore be the case, as Robert 
Eaglestone points out, that "|i|f Levinas is as opposed to the aesthetic in 
general as these writings suggest, a Levinasian criticism will be either 
impossible or, at best, weak to the point of incoherency" (Eaglestone 99). 
However, as Derrida has shown in "Violence and Metaphysics", and as 
Eaglestone himself shows in Ethical Criticism, Levinas's antipathy does not 
hold up to close scrutiny, as Levinas is himself caught up in aesthetics, in 
literature, in writing, in language—in representation. He can speak of the 
saying only as always already said, he can speak of the other only insofar as 
the other is always already within the realm of the same, within the realm of 
some kind of representation, whatever the extent of the anti-representational 
pull of the mode of that representation is. 
Indeed, Levinas himself responded to Derrida's critique and developed 
his thinking in Otherwise than Being to go beyond the primacy of the face-to-
face as presence and hence to approach a site in which representation would 
be as, or even more, relevant to the question of ethics as the actual face-to-
face situation is; as Eaglestone puts it, "[i]n Totality and Infinity the 'beyond' 
was manifest 'within the totality and history, within experience' ... in the 
face; in Otherwise than Being the infinite, the 'otherwise than being', appears 
within language" (140). Still, as Eaglestone observes, art is somewhat suspect 
in Otherwise than Being: "A poem, thematised, said, lacks the 'non-
assemblable diachrony' which is the fracturing of temporality by the 
saying . . . Words word, or words only make their essence as words clear in 
poetry, and do not open beyond. . . . [T]he art work is locked up in the 
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temporalisation of essence. Art still has no access to the saying" (154). When 
one brings this view into play with Levinas's general development in 
Otherwise than Being, though, there is, as Eaglestone points out, "a self-
contradiction in Levinas's work" (156). There are moments in Otherwise 
than Being in which "the exorbitance of the saying, surpassing the logo-
centric constrictions of the said, is clearly understood to occur in art. The 
saying, the caress of love, overflows through the songs and poems in which it 
is said. . . . These moments . . . then suggest that a literary art work is, in fac t, 
an interweaving of the saying and the said, and not simply the said 
resounding" (160). 
It would thus seem to be the case that, as Richard Kearney argues, 
"Levinas's suspicion of images is not directed against the poetic imagination 
per se but against the use or abuse of such power to incarcerate the self in a 
blind alley of self-reflecting mirrors" (15). Thus, "[f]or Levinas, not 
surprisingly, the best poetry is unfinished poetry" (15), something Levinas 
finds in for instance Celan and Proust. In Kearney's view, this sort of poetry 
would seem to be currently facing a difficulty, as he speaks of "the 
contemporary crisis of poetics" (16) and sets out to disentangle de-
constructive writing "as ethical irrepresentability", on the one hand, from 
deconstructive writing "as mere fashionable cant", on the other (18). Though 
I look at contemporary literature with more trust than Kearney, the attempt at 
such a disentanglement animates my own pages here: if one turns to 
"deconstructive" or postmodernist literature, one finds an aesthetics of 
disruption and inconclusiveness, an ethical poetics,52 that would fit Levinas's 
project (which is a project of interminable projects), but one may also find 
repetition without difference as well as partial deconstruction. Still, as 
Kearney concludes, "[ejthics needs poetics to be reminded that its 
responsibility to the other includes the possibility of play, freedom and 
pleasure" (23). 
In connection with this discussion, I should make it clear that I am not 
writing here as a devout follower of Levinas. Rather, I am using his key 
concepts, of alterity, of the same and the other, of the face-to-face, of the 
saying and the said, to open up Swift's texts to readings that may ultimately 
be in conflict with Levinas. But i s not such conflict precisely the point? As 
Eaglestone points out, "[tjhere is obviously no one critical process which 
embodies Levinas's ideas, no one answer. Rather, the saying can be 
recognised in all critical approaches which interrupt established under-
52 As Gibson notes, pace Levinas, "[IJinearity and homogeneity are not essential conditions of 
narrativity, as modernist and postmodernist texts have abundantly shown. It is rather in narrative 
that particularity may be most insistently recast in a manner that also insistently refines and 
subtilizes our perception of it" (Postmodemitv 140-41). 
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standings, the said" (176-77). And the said includes Levinas's thought as 
well. What I want to present here are readings that bear witness to the full 
spectrum of the sentimentum in Swift's novels, rather than neatly framed 
readings that rid themselves of whatever elements do not fit. Of course, 
temporal and spatial constraints render inescapable selectivity and exclusion, 
even blindness, in my readings here. But this acknowledgement of the partial 
nature of all readings should not, I think, make us lose sight of the 
(de)regulating idea, formulated by Eaglestone in his conclusion to Ethical 
Criticism, that "[e]ach text requires reading in such a way as that its saying 
can be heard, that the flaws in the said appear" (176). 
1 should also make it c lear that I am not simply reading Swift's texts 
through Levinasian goggles, as it were, substituting what would amount to a 
complexified but still largely moralistic reading for what is now deemed a 
naïve moralism. It is the internal logic of each given text that is my horizon 
of interpretation, rather than a preconceived moralism (whether it is a 
moralism of right in opposition to wrong, or of the saying in opposition to the 
said). Indicting texts, as regards their aesthetics, their thematics and their 
characters, from outside, in terms of a preconceived ethics that cannot be 
detected in the text is not what I am interested in here. I am, instead, trying to 
show how each novel itself sets up a frame of values within which one may 
find grounds for a critique of, or a problematization of, various aspects of the 
text—perhaps in particular the behaviour of its characters. Each of Swift's 
texts requires great attentiveness to details; it is i n specific, singular passages 
or in details of form that one may find, not a centring or limiting device, a 
kernel, but a disruption that forces one to renegotiate the seemingly fixed 
vision of the narrative. In reading Swift's texts in this way, I am not 
suggesting that a direct influence from Levinas, or any other of the theorists I 
bring into my discussion, is at work in the texts, but that, on the one hand, an 
affinity may be detected, and that, on the other hand, those theorists enable an 
opening up of the texts to certain readings. I t is to those readings that I now 
turn. 
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"Away From the Shore": Toward a Voicing of 
Sentimentality in The Sweet Shop Owner and Shuttlecock 
A heartless woman he called her; she 
never told him that she loved him. But it 
was not so—it was not so. 
—To the Lighthouse, Virginia Woolf 
You will gather from this statement that 
one of us had, as the saying is, a "heart", 
and, from the statement that my wife is 
dead, that she was the sufferer. 
—The Good Soldier, Ford Madox Ford 
A happy en ding, that is what it work s out 
at. 
—The Good Soldier, Ford Madox Ford 
Swift's first novel, The Sweet Shop Owner, formally exhibits techniques that 
we know well from modernism: inner monologue, free indirect narration and 
a ka leidoscopic structure. The novel is barely metafictional, and is also, with 
the exception of Out of This World, the least overtly intertextual of Swift's 
novels; it thus retains a modernist aura of originality.1 On a more thematic 
level, the novel presents a bleak view of Western society and of the modern 
Western soul. It charts a Prufrockian world of repetition, futility and charade, 
in which people are incapable of communicating with and touching each 
other. Somewhat jocosely, one might say that what ails the characters in the 
novel is that they are in a modernist text. Still, one may argue that in The 
Sweet Shop Owner what faces one is rather a limit-modernist text of sorts; a 
text that closes the lid on modernism, as it were. To me the novel seems too 
knowingly allusive not to be characterized as a postmodernist indexing of the 
1 Patricia Waugh suggests that "[t]he examination of fictionality, through the thematic ex­
ploration of characters 'playing roles' within fiction, is the most minimal form of metafiction" 
(Metafiction 116). If we accept this definition, then The Sweet Shop Owner is indeed a 
metafictional novel. It is also a novel that attests to Waugh's notion that that most minimal form 
of metafiction "is a form that can be 'naturalized' ultimately to fit realist assumptions". The 
Sweet Shop Owner belongs to the category of such realist metafictions, which "tend to present 
characters who are involved in a duplicitous situation requiring the perpetration of some form of 
pretence or disguise". 
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history of modernism, from its proto- through its High to its late phases; it is 
virtually "hypermodernist".2 
With Swift's second novel, Shuttlecock, we enter a different realm of 
aesthetics: there is some overt intertextuality, as well as the play with 
ontological boundaries that Brian McHale identifies as a dominant mode of 
postmodernist fiction. The novel is a perfect example of the sort of novel 
McHale champions in Postmodernist Fiction, as it portrays the gradual 
breakdown of epistemological mastery of the real and the consequent 
embrace of pragmatist truth- and world-making, sports a Chinese-box struc­
ture with different levels mirroring and overlapping each other, and is a self-
consuming or self-erasing text. The novel also easily falls under Linda 
Hutcheon's rubric of "historiographie metafiction", dealing as it does with 
the problems of archiving and recovering the past. 
What is important for my argument in this study, though, is that in 
Swift's first two novels the full spectrum of what could be recognized as the 
sentimentum is only very partially realized. Sentiments and ethical 
consciousness lurk around, behind, beneath, or above a kind of existential 
degree zero. God, with or without being, is absent. One may say of Swift's 
first two novels, as well as the short-stories collected in Learning to Swim in 
1982, what Kiernan Ryan says of Ian McEwan's earlier fictions: "The 
protagonists are frequently housed in some suburban deadzone and sealed 
inside a situation from which the oxygen of emotion has been pumped" 
(209). The Sweet Shop Owner hardly houses the sentimentum at all, as the 
novel is swept up in the logic of modernity and modernism, thematically as 
well as formally. There is little sense of irony and of the contingency of 
identity and of values in the novel, two aspects necessary for the expression 
of the sentimentum. Shuttlecock, on the other hand, is a prototypical 
2 Despite the absence of what I called "overt intertextuality" above, one may easily see allusions 
in the novel to Joy ce, Woolf, Ford and Eliot, to mention a few authors that easily spring to mind. 
As a novel in which the events are presented as taking place on a single day, it may be seen as a 
rewriting of Mrs. Dalloway, or as a minimalist Ulysses; contrary to the protagonists of Woolf s 
and Joyce's novels, however, Swift's Willy Chapman returns at the end of the novel to an empty 
house, his Penelope having passed away. As Del Ivan J anik notes, "[t]he novel's abrupt shifting 
of time and point of view is reminiscent of Virginia Woolf s narrative technique in Mrs. 
Dalloway, and Swift, like Woolf, communicates a sense of the seamlessness of experience" (75). 
As Janik further observes, "The Sweet Shop Owner is also reminiscent of another early-modern 
British novel, Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier, in that like Ford's it is a story of defective 
hearts" (75). Swift twists the configuration of Ford's novel, as both husband and wife not only 
have heart disorders, but actually d ie from them. What is more important, however, is that, as 
Janik puts it, "like Ford's characters Swift's suffer more poignantly from an absence of 'heart' in 
the metaphoric sense" (75). What is more, narrating the death of a shop owner called Willy 
Chapman, Swift's novel cannot but evoke Miller's Death of a Salesman (the name of that play's 
tormented husband being Willy Loman). 
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postmodernist novel, sporting a self-conscious first-person narrator who 
presents us with an ultimately indeterminate and interminable narrative. The 
novel introduces a more thorough element of sentimentality and a more 
thoroughly ironic aspect. However, the sentimentality and the irony in 
Shuttlecock are never wedded on the plane of narration, since the narrator 
himself does not ultimately display an ironic imagination. Rather, the narrator 
and his sentimentality are ironized by the contradictions of the narrative, or 
ultimately by the reader's subjecting the narrative to his/her critical scrutiny. 
The novel belongs to a line of literature in which narrators unwittingly 
ironize themselves.3 This is one of the reasons why it cannot be a novel of the 
sentimentum. 
In a teleological reading, Swift's first two novels would thus witness 
the struggle of the sentimentum to break through a somewhat limiting sense 
of form. It is as if Swift is working his way through the themes and forms of 
recent literary history to pave the way for the emergence of the sentimentum 
in his subsequent novels. The Sweet Shop Owner and Shuttlecock hence 
provide a contrast by which we may perceive the contours of the senti­
mentum and understand what it is not. 
The Sweet Shop Owner: A Kind of Not Acting? 
The Sweet Shop Owner narrates the last day in the life of Willy Chapman, a 
High Street shop owner, who has decided to commit suicide by straining his 
weak heart. The novel shifts between third-person narration and the first-
person interior monologue of Willy, in which he addresses his daughter, 
Dorothy. At one point, this narrative order is disrupted by what purports to be 
the voice of Willy's dead wife, Irene, nee Harrison. Now and then, the use of 
free indirect narration places the point of view with Willy's shop assistants, 
Mrs Cooper and Sandra. By piecing together these voices, the reader may 
form what seems to approximate a complete picture. 
It is the picture of a sham and a debacle. The marriage of Willy and 
Irene has been a th irty-five year long shared alienation, Irene's condition for 
providing Willy with a marital home, a shop and a daughter being "that there 
3 Another novel that belongs to this line of literature is The Good Soldier, which Swift's novel 
explicitly refers to by its title: at the end of Ford's novel the young girl Nancy Rufford suffers 
from a ca tatonic condition, which leaves her unable to utter a word except for her repetition of 
the exclamations "Shuttlecocks!" and "Credo in unum Deum omnipotentem". Notably, in Swift's 
novel there is only the shuttlecock, no Omnipotent Deity. At any rate, like John Dowell in The 
Good Soldier, Prentis in Shuttlecock is a radically unreliable narrator who finally comes across 
as either blind or manipulatively awake to his own contradictions and his implications in the 
plot. As Malcolm Bradbury says of Dowell, "the story he tells as it were deceives him" (Modern 
90). 
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be no question of love" (22). Willy, being a man of few if any aspirations and 
initiatives, accepts the condition. He soon finds out that Irene suffers from a 
nervous condition involving attacks of asthma and requiring calm and rest. 
Willy never learns any reason for Irene's condition, but the reader does: in 
her brief narrative, Irene reveals that she was date raped by a family friend, 
and soon after was taken by her family to a Home to be treated for a con­
sequential psychosis. The only thing Irene ever says to Willy, however, is, on 
the first night of their honeymoon: '"Willy, I'm sorry. I'm not—all I should 
be. Do you forgive me?"' (30). 
Growing up amidst such silence and alienation, their daughter, 
Dorothy, has in turn become estranged from her parents, escaping into books 
as a teenager, and then running off to university, where she has found love in 
the lecturer Michael. After the death of Irene, who, l ike Willy, developed a 
heart condition, Dorothy returns one day to claim her mother's valuables. 
Willy, happening to close the shop early that day, comes upon her and tries to 
make peace with her. Dorothy, however, declines. These events make Willy 
take initiative for the first time in his life: he sends Dorothy the £15,000 
inheritance from Irene as a token of absolution, and asks her to come and 
visit him on her birthday. And thus we find him, on his last day as the sweet 
shop owner, settling things before going home to die in his chair, where 
Dorothy will find him when—if—she comes. 
As we may begin to see, The Sweet Shop Owner offers a quite 
horrifying vision of a modern society caught up in the logic of exchange. 
Human relations are viewed in terms of bargains and settlements, and each 
act requires a counter-act in accordance with the law of equivalence. There is 
no unconditional gift and no unconditional trust, and hence little room for an 
ethics of alterity. I am referring here to the notion of gift-giving worked out 
by Marcel Mauss in Essai sur le don and elaborated in more postmodern 
terms by Baudrillard in Symbolic Exchange and Death and by Derrida in 
Given Time: Counterfeit Money and The Gift of Death.4 In the view of these 
thinkers, as Calvin O. Schräg explains, "[a] gift, to be genuinely a gift, is 
given without any expectation of return. There can be no expectation of a 
'countergift', for such would place the giving within the context of a con­
tractual rather than a g ift-giving relation" (139). Thus, the gift is that which 
exceeds or transcends a restricted economy: "This applies not only in the 
giving of goods but also in the rendering of services, in the helping of a 
friend in need, in the offering of words of counsel and encouragement, in the 
paying of a visit through the giving of one's presence" (140). One may add 
4 Notions of unconditional giving may be traced back through Kierkegaard to Augustine; in 
postmodern thought, however, they are given more widespread prominence and are set in a 
different kind of motion. 
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the gift of unconditional love, the offering of oneself to the other, the gift of 
trust, and, as Derrida suggests, the gifts of time and of death. 
No such unconditional gifts are given in The Sweet Shop Owner. It is 
hard to think of a novel in which there is les s love lost. The novel is not the 
site of the sentimentum as much as of its negation, a negation which owes 
much to a secular, economistic bourgeois order that is apparent from the very 
first page of the novel, which finds Willy reading a letter from his daughter: 
Dear Father, 
I have the £15,000. The bank notified me last week. Thank 
you for sending it at last. I'm sure this is for the best and how 
Mother would have wanted it. You will see in the end. 
1 think we can call everything settled now. Don't bother 
about the rest of my things. You said I should come—do you 
really think that's a good idea? After all that you say I've put 
you through, I should have thought you'd be glad to be finished 
with me at last. 
Dorothy (9) 
As Willy notes, "there was not even, before that final signature, a farewell, a 
'take care', a 'with love, your daughter'" (9); being settled with people means 
paying them off or being paid off, in strictly monetary terms, and love does 
not enter into it. However, there is a reason for Dorothy's acting according to 
this logic of economism and disaffection: she is the child of it. On the very 
next page, we learn that Dorothy herself is all but a commodity, part of the 
bargain struck between Willy and Irene. We should note that her name is 
infused with the spirit of an arcane and archaic order: "Dorothea: God's gift", 
as Willy notes (112). However, Dorothy is neither God's gift nor the product 
of love, but a concession. Instead of reconciling and uniting the alienated 
parts of the marriage, Dorothy is the symbolic coin with which Irene pays 
Willy for his performing according to her designs: 
He had come, ushered by the nurse, laden with flowers. This 
might change everything. There was a little thing, wrapped like a 
gift in a shawl beside her. He had approached the bed with 
outstretched arms. But she had looked up, immovable, chestnut 
hair stuck to her forehead, and her eyes had said: There, I have 
done it, paid you: that is my side of the bargain. (10) 
So, Dorothy is not a gift, as a gift would demand no reciprocation, but a 
payment for services rendered or expected to be rendered. And the service 
Irene expects of Willy is that he perform the role of the sweet shop owner: "I 
will buy you a shop, I 'll get you a shop. 1 will install you in it and see that 
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you have all you need. Then I'll watch. I 'll see what you can do. That will 
content me" (21).5 As we can see, Irene practically employs Willy, deciding 
the terms of the employment: "You will be freed, absolved; for the 
responsibility—don't you see?—will be mine. . . . And all I ask in re turn for 
this is that there be no question of love" (22). Not being completely bereft of 
a sense of proportion, she throws a baby into the bargain; indeed, when Irene 
gets pregnant with Dorothy, "her face show[s] only the pinched looks of 
someone labouring to pay a debt" (101). 
In fact, the general mode of communication between all the characters 
in the novel is capital and commodities. Irene notes with some bitter irony 
that when her family brought her home from the Home, "[t]here were little 
shows of reconciliation. Father bought me a dress, my brothers per­
fume . . . They even bought me the house and gave me a settlement, half in 
cash, half in shares. For their own guilt in disposing of me had to be paid for" 
(55). However, while Irene sees the fundamental disaffection of such an act 
of paying-off, Sandra, Willy's young shop assistant, reacts to Willy's giving 
her a bonus payment on his last day by thinking, "perhaps he did like her; for 
he'd given her . . . twenty-five pounds" (106). Similarly, when Willy doubts 
whether Dorothy will actually come and see him, he assures himself by 
thinking, "I sent you the £15,000. You'll come" (206). Accordingly, when 
Mrs Cooper gets her bonus payment from Willy, and her face betrays some 
disappointment, Willy himself betrays his unrelenting, albeit bitter, logic of 
exchange: 
But she didn't look gratitude. Behind her smile her face pleaded, 
as if she'd expected something else, something more. 
But that was all, Mrs Cooper. Take it. The things you want 
you never get. You only get the money. (38) 
As Willy tersely notes: "She was paid" (39). 
This sense of a logic of exchange is reinforced by the imagery used to 
describe people and their relations in the novel. The few times Irene actually 
smiles, it is "[a] lovely smile, like a shining seal upon a contract" (21), "a 
smile, l ike the scattering of coins" (46), "like a throwing of coins" (30), or 
"those short, quick smiles that were like small coins thrown without fuss to 
someone who has done a service" (29). When Irene relates how Hancock 
date raped her, she notes that "[h]e took me out like a boy on his best 
behaviour, as if I should reward him in some way", and that when the actual 
rape occurred, "[h]e pulled up my clothes like a man unwrapping a parcel" 
5 These words are actually Willy's, constituting his inference of what Irene implies by her 
behaviour. I will elaborate this question of point of view and narratorial reliability below. 
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(52). Similarly, when Willy comes to the delivery ward, he sees, "in between 
[the beds], wobbling with little unseen movements, these wicker baskets, like 
the fruits of some bizarre shopping trip" (102).6 
Presenting such a bleak vision of a society organized according to the 
law of exchange, The Sweet Shop Owner sets itself up as a literary illustration 
of the society the arrival of which Marx predicted in the nineteenth century, 
and which post-Marxists like Baudrillard have analysed in the last few 
decades.7 The novel twists its vision of this society into absurdity, though, 
and thus, the novel would seem to correspond to Adorno's notion of the 
modernist work of literature as marked by an aesthetics of negativity, 
whereby the literary work seeks to produce a negative impression of "an 
ever-expanding, monolithic capitalist society, moving toward a system of 
total exchange as well as total rationality, which is equivalent to absolute 
reification in matters of social interaction" (Eysteinsson 41). Importantly, 
such a negative impression precludes the display of sensibility, and thus of 
the sentimentum, which depends on what Bataille called "an unrestricted or 
general as contrasted to a restricted economy" (Gibson, Postmodernity 165). 
As Gibson argues, "[i]n Bataille's terms, Levinasian sensibility is a kind of 
radical economy of the self that is profoundly distinct from more familiar 
economies determined by modern Christianity, capital, 'practical judgment' 
and 'utility'. . . . As, for Levinas, sensibility is in some sense prior to 
cognition, so, too, for Bataille, expenditure is prior to accumulation and 
production, prodigality or generosity to calculation, the general to any 
restricted economy" (166). 
Indeed, Irene, being perhaps more damaged by her uncompassionate 
materialist family than by the rape, is living out a scheme of perverse revenge 
on a totally rational, perfectly reified world, with Willy as a vicarious agent. 
Irene has no illusions about the system and determinately plays out its rules, 
laughing at the irony of it all, acutely obeying the system by getting more 
shops, more commodities—the more useless the better.8 Irene is getting, not 
giving, and if giving, then only to get. Exchange-value has eclipsed use-
value; when Willy says of all the crystal and porcelain that Irene buys only to 
stash away, "They're beautiful", she just replies, "her tired eyes somehow 
6 This simile turns into tragic actuality in Waterland, where the narrator's schizophrenic wife 
kidnaps a baby sitting in a shopping-cart at the supermarket. 
7 See, for instance, The Consumer Society and Symbolic Exchange and Death. 
s The ephemeral quality of modern goods was an object of critique for many twentieth-century 
thinkers. For instance, as Charles Taylor tells us, "Hanna Arendt focussed on the more and m ore 
ephemeral quality of modern objects of u se. She argued t hat 'the reality and reliability of the 
human world rest primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things more permanent than 
the activity by which they are produced'. This comes under threat in a world of modern 
commodities" (501). 
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disinterested: 'They will keep their value'" (148). Irene's perverse pleasure in 
this order of things is nowhere better revealed than in the following scene: 
"We don't have to make money", he said . . . "We have 
money—now—don't we? So the shop—" 
He eyed her over the green baize table-cloth. .. . 
"Exactly", she said in a lucid tone. "Exactly, do n't you 
see?" 
She held her gaze on him. . . . 
And he knew : the shop was useles s ... He was the shop­
keeper. 
The laughter leapt suddenly from her throat and skipped 
round the room. (99) 
Accordingly, when Irene gets diagnosed for her heart condition, and 
Willy, seeing a chance to end the charade, is about to ask, "Should we be 
thinking about selling the shop?", Irene says, "as if to forestall him, 'I think 
we should get another shop'" (171). And so they acquire the Pond Street 
shop, which sells more useless things and brings in more useless money. 
Eventually, Willy learns to appreciate the game himself, musing over the 
commodities on display in his shop only to conclude: "And none of it—that 
was the beauty of it—was either useful or permanent" (18). The greatest 
pride is "his own addition. Toys" (18). Coming home one day in 
1962—twelve years before his last day of life—Willy says to Irene, '"Toys. I 
will sell toys in the shop.' She had looked, and repeated slowly the 
word—'Toys'—as if ro lling round her mouth a morsel of something whose 
taste she hadn't fixed. And then—the identification was made—the wry 
smile touched her lips. He'd known it would please her" (18-19). In this way, 
Willy and Irene seem to act according to the "hyperlogic" described by 
Baudrillard in In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities'. "[The masses] know 
that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it 
into hyperlogic, by forcing it into an excessive practice which is equivalent to 
a brutal amortization. 'You want us to consume—O.K., let's consume always 
more, and anything whatsoever; for any useless and absurd purpose'" (46). 
Nonetheless, the question arises of exactly why Willy puts up with this 
charade. One answer lies in his own sense of disillusion and fundamental 
futility. Willy is a Prufrock who has been cooled down to the point of inertia. 
Like Eliot's anti-hero, who asks, "How shall I presume?", Willy says, "I 
didn't believe . . . that the future belonged to me. I thou ght: things come to 
you anyway" (189); "plans emerged. You stepped into them" (24). Even 
when he does take initiative, he views himself as "the man from the audience 
taking the stage" (27). Like Prufrock he is haunted by a sense of numb 
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repetition: "Every day at the same time the same faces" (10).9 Unlike 
Prufrock, however, he is neither Prince Hamlet nor "an attendant lord", but 
rather wholly the Fool;10 while he recalls how he "once joked about [the pub] 
the Prince William ... I said to Irene: 'The Prince Willy—they named it after 
me'" (174), what is more conspicuous about him is "his fondness for 
children, for childishness" (13) and his "fool's posture" (32); ultimately, 
"[h]e could only play tricks" (32). And so, Willy does not really act—"cause 
a scene or two"—in the sense of initiative and action, but in the sense of 
performance and semblance. He is forever suspended by Prufrock's question, 
"Do I dare / Disturb the universe?"; there is a scene in the novel that 
illustrates Willy's inability to act and seems a conscious play on Prufrock's 
lines, "Should I, after tea and cakes and ices, / Have the strength to force the 
moment to its crisis?": "For one moment he wanted to sweep aside the tea 
cups, to catch her like some wild thing glimpsed in a forest. But her eyes 
sharpened, held him, as though to save him from stumbling headlong. She 
balanced her plate on her knee. Let nothing happen."(42-43). 
Similarly, when Willy and Irene correspond during Willy's service in 
the Second World War, "he wondered should he write 'I love you' (for 
perhaps in this time of war—); though he knew, if he did, it would alarm her, 
more than war, more than bombs and blackness" (65). Willy's suppressed "I 
love you" would be the saying that interrupts the said, and so cannot be 
spoken, as the said governs the logic of not only Irene's, but his own life. 
Life, to Willy, is always already said: an endless repetition of the same 
patterns, a kind of suspension between cradle and grave, a series of rituals 
that are all but interchangeable. Scanning the notices in the newspaper, Willy 
sardonically notes "the neatness of the columns. Deaths, marriages" (47). At 
his father's, and shortly thereafter his mother's, funeral, "the white graves in 
the cemetery sparkle like wedding cakes" (46), and at Dorothy's baptism, 
"the vicar spoke, who had spoken over Mr Harrison's coffin" (108)." 
To Willy, then, everything is ultimately a performance, a simulation, 
and one may as well sit back and wait for history to impose its patterns on 
one. "I never believed you could have the real thing", he says (184). Even as 
a schoolboy, he notes how 
the history master was speaking as if his words were turning into 
print. Henry VIII and his wives were like characters in costume. 
9 
"And I have known the eyes already, known them all" ("The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock"). 
10 
"No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be; / Am an attendant lord, one that will do / 
To swell a progress, cause a scene or two /. . . / At times, indeed, almost ridiculous— / Almost, 
at times, the Fool" ("Prufrock"). 
11 There is an echo here of Beckett's woman giving birth astride a grave. 
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They weren't real, but they didn't know it. History fitted them 
into patterns. ... He had laughed then, unheard. ... So that he 
didn't mind about his school reports ... or that his parents were 
disappointed, or that those others around him in that chalky 
class-room would get on better than him. Let them go to meet 
history. History would come anyway. Nothing touches you, you 
touch nothing. (44-45) 
With the last sentence of the quote just given, we begin to approach the heart 
of the matter—or the absence of heart in the matter. Those words, "Nothing 
touches you, you touch nothing", are repeated like a mantra throughout the 
novel, and they attest to a modern revulsion against exposure to the other, as 
does Willy's (and Irene's) insistence on pattern. Willy may thus be seen as an 
emblem of the modern self, barricading itself in the said, violating the world 
by compartmentalization, adhering to what Zygmunt Bauman rubrics "the 
quest for order" in modernity.12 It is the same with Irene, who, we learn, "al­
ways read her papers . . . not because she liked news . . . [but] to take stock, 
to acquaint herself, to hold sway over the array of facts and regard them all 
with cold passivity. And sometimes, indeed, it was as if. . . her head hidden 
behind the outspread page . . . peered through it, as through a veil, at a world 
which might default or run amok if it once suspected her gaze was not upon 
it" (17). Whereas postmodernism entails accepting contingency and dif­
ference, and postmodern ethics is precisely about "the risky uncovering of 
oneself, in sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all 
shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability" (Levinas, Otherwise 48), Willy 
steps into a disguise that means "that though you moved and gestured and the 
grime of loose change came off on your hands, you were really intact. 
Nothing touches you, you touch nothing" (44). As he notes, "[Irene] too 
sheltered behind that same disguise" (99). 
And so Willy takes the same perverse pleasure as Irene in repetition, 
charade and the pointless accumulation of wealth. After he and Irene have 
met and become a couple, "it was precisely the predictable formula that 
pleased him: meeting in parks, sitting on benches, his being the humble 
suitor, buffing his shoes, scrubbing his nails before seeing her" (28). 
Accordingly, when Irene suggests that they buy the place on the corner of 
Briar Street, Willy thinks, "Yes, of course—seeing it all fall into place—I 
will be a shop-owner" (21); "though he knew nothing of shop-keeping, he 
would get a shop-keeper's coat and adopt a shop-keeper's manner. And in 
time it would be wholly plausible" (42). Irene and Willy are thus virtually 
12 See Modernity and Ambivalence, 1 . Cf. Bauman's Intimations of Postmodernily, where he 
discusses modernity under the heading "Modernity, or Desperately Seeking Structure" (xi). 
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parodies of the modern bourgeois self, which, emerging out of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, "stressed the goods of production, an ordered life, 
and peace" (Taylor 286). This modern bourgeois self, The Sweet Shop Owner 
implies, thus also precludes any invitation of the saying, either as caress or as 
wounding. 
In his quest for order and smooth operation, Willy fortifies the said as 
he becomes a kind of automaton, his credo "The body is a machine" (19, 194, 
205). Alienated from himself, or virtually vacated of a self, he "watche[s] 
himself fold the papers between his thumb and fingers; ring the till, swop 
pleasantries with customers . . . Watche[s] himself drive home at night . . . 
Watche[s] himself construct his performance" (133). Rising on his final day, 
he sees in the mirror "fsjomeone mimicking himself' (11). Closing up the 
shop for the final time, he thinks: "Tomorrow they would discover the fraud, 
the deception: the costume discarded" (212). Looking around the shop for 
one last time, he "[feels] l ike a conjuror, amidst his tricks, for whom, alone, 
there is no illusion" (213). Then "he [turns] his back on the shop and [passes] 
through the plastic strips. Best to go by the back. Actors slip out by back-
exits, leaving their roles on the stage" (215). 
The thorough sense of simulation that Willy thus gives voice to is 
reinforced by the novel's theatric, photographic and filmic imagery. During 
Irene's and Willy's honeymoon, in their hotel, "[m]oonlight, like some 
theatrical trick, filtered through the lattice windows and lace curtains", and 
"every day the pieces of the picture fell into place: the boat trips to 
Weymouth, the little scenes of themselves arm in arm on the beach or at 
tables for two, about which the nodding onlookers might whisper, 'honey-
mooners'" (30). Similarly, when Willy speaks to a doctor about Irene's 
worsening condition, "outside the view of the hospital—tall windows, fire-
escapes, the black pipes of a boiler-house—lay flat and frozen in a dead 
November light as if projected on a screen" (126). When Dorothy reveals that 
she has been seeing Irene's brother Paul, and that he has told her that he is 
the lover of Mr Hancock's wife, she "blurt[s] out those words as if they were 
the caption to some vivid and indelible photograph" (152). And this is how 
Willy describes the scene after the death of his friend, Smithy the barber: 
"November the sixteenth, 1969. The figures on the pavement who had 
stopped to look moved on and the traffic in the High Street seemed to resume 
a halted progress like a film jerking back into life" (165). This imagery 
reinforces the sense of a world of spiritual, ethical and emotional detachment, 
a world in which nothing touches you and you touch nothing. 
This discussion of imagery also brings me to the explicit theme of 
photography in the novel. The Sweet Shop Owner charts the movement 
throughout the twentieth century of what Walter Benjamin referred to as "a 
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sense perception that has been changed by technology" ("The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" 235), and more specifically of what 
Susan Sontag terms "the aestheticizing of reality that makes everything, 
anything, available to the camera" ("The Image-World" 364). This 
transformation of seeing, which has obvious implications for an ethics of 
alterity, is portrayed in The Sweet Shop Owner. Recalling Irene's and his 
honeymoon, Willy remembers how he saw "the country cottages, and the 
honeymoon hotel set back from the road, seen already as if in a frame, as if in 
a photograph in an album opened many years after" (29). Running against 
Irene's brother Jack in the mile race at school, Willy notes that Jack has "the 
kind of body that would wear well and look good in photographs" (196). As 
we can see, photography restructures perception, the world becomes the 
always already photographed. What is more, the photograph restructures the 
relation to time so that people begin to have expectations of nostalgia; when 
Jack and Paul are home on leave during the Second World War, the whole 
Harrison family, with Willy looking on, gather on the lawn to be photo­
graphed: "Figures grouped, regrouped; fussed and posed ... Mr Harrison 
bore the camera like a master of ceremonies . . . This deserves a picture, this 
is something to be kept. And someone leafing through the pages, the school 
photos, the holiday snaps, would say, '—and there, at Aunt Maud's in their 
uniforms: what fine boys'" (66). Thus, photography serves to freeze the 
world in moments of perfect balance and harmony, circumventing con­
tingency and aestheticizing everyday experience. 
This transformation of the general perception and conception of the 
world brought on by the advent of photography is explained forcefully and 
succinctly by Sontag: 
The mechanical genesis of these images [i .e. photographs], and 
the literalness of the powers they confer, amounts to a new 
relationship between image and reality. And if photography 
could also be said to restore the most primitive relationship—the 
partial identity of image and object—the potency of the image is 
now experienced in a very different way. The primitive notion of 
the efficacy of images presumes that images possess the qualities 
of real things, but our inclination is to attribute to real things the 
qualities of an image. ("The Image-World" 352-53) 
This is also, as we have seen, the inclination of the characters in The Sweet 
Shop Owner. And this inclination too attests to a revulsion against the other, 
against the event, against the saying. As Sontag puts it, "[pjhotographs are a 
way of imprisoning reality, understood as recalcitrant, inaccessible; of 
making it stand still" (356). In other words, photography is a way of 
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possessing the singular event, of framing it, mechanically and unreflectedly. 
However, as Gibson argues, "[t]he other always and definitively overflows 
the frame in which I would seek to enclose the other" (Postmodernity 25). 
This overflowing is what is constantly denied in The Sweet Shop Owner, in 
which faces are seen not as portals to infinity, but as impenetrable, as mirrors 
for the same, or simply as something to be avoided. Irene's "face [is] a mask" 
(30), and hence not "exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what 
wounds it" (Levinas, Otherwise 49); indeed, Willy feels that "he had not 
touched her" (30). Moreover, at one point, when Willy looks up at her after 
resting in her lap, she responds by "moving her gaze at once away from 
his . . . as though ignoring something, some mystery perhaps too delicate to 
probe" (56). Similarly, as Willy walks to the Pond Street shop on his final 
day instead of taking his car as he has always done, he happens upon Mr 
Hancock in a scene that effectively illustrates the vertigo of the face-to-face: 
"They stared inertly at each other as if looking into mirrors. Save for 
Hancock's visits to the shop, they scarcely met, and now that they came face 
to face in the street it was as if something needed explaining. . . . [Hancock] 
held out a hand indecisively. It was as if he were about to offer support—or 
needed to be steadied himself' (176). However, this chance meeting does not 
yield engagement, but only the unsettling dizziness of an alterity that needs to 
be immediately circumscribed. 
This question of alterity brings me to the more general question of 
representation in the novel. As Sontag notes, "'[o]ur era' does not prefer 
images to real things out of perversity but partly in response to the ways in 
which the notion of what is real has been progressively complicated and 
weakened, one of the early ways being the criticism of reality as façade 
which arose among the enlightened middle classes in the last [i.e. the 19th] 
century" (354). The notion of reality as façade suggests a belief in depths and 
origins, rather than in infinities, behind surfaces and images; this is the 
epistemo-ontological creed of modernism, in which access to the truth behind 
appearances was thought highly problematic but still possible—or, Truth and 
the Real were deemed agonizingly elusive, but their existence was not 
doubted. As in the romantics, access to truth and to the true reality behind 
appearances was thought to be provided by epiphanic moments, although in 
modernism the epiphany itself becomes somewhat more fragmentary and 
particular than in rom anticism; we need only think of Pound's "[p]etals on a 
wet, black bough".13 Those epiphanic moments are, nonetheless, often what 
Ij As Charles Taylor puts it, in romanticism "[t]he epiphany which will free us from a debased, 
mechanistic world brings to light the spiritual reality behind nature and uncorrupted human 
feeling. Epiphanic art can take the form of descriptions of these which make this reality shine 
through, as Wordsworth and Hölderlin, Constable and Friedrich do, each in his own way. But 
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brings closure to many modernist texts; the most famous example of this kind 
of epiphanic closure is probably Lily Briscoe's vision and completion of her 
painting at the end of To the Lighthouse.'4 Indeed, The Sweet Shop Owner 
establishes a dialogue with Woolf s novel. On the first night of the 
honeymoon, Willy thinks, in an echo of Lily Briscoe, that "the picture was 
incomplete" (30). However, unlike Lily Briscoe, he has no illusion of 
completing the picture; when, a few days later, Irene suffers an attack of her 
psychosomatic asthma, all his hope vanishes: "he knew now the picture 
would never be complete" (33). He is right; while the novel ends with the 
actual death of its main character and narrator, there is no revelatory closure. 
The novel almost parodically sets itself up from the very beginning as geared 
toward finality, as it begins with Willy puzzling over Dorothy's letter: '"In 
the end.' 'In the end'? What did she mean—in the end he would see?" (9). 
This beginning invites the reader to a journey toward closure. However, the 
reader, following the course of the narrative, comes to realize that neither 
s/he nor Willy—and Willy perhaps even less so—will see in the end, will 
arrive at closure. 
And here the reader may also realize that the continual reference to 
photography in the novel serves as a subtle metafictional signal. As Sontag 
points out, "[i]t is not reality that photographs make immediately accessible, 
but images" (357). Rather, "[w]e make of photography a means by which, 
precisely, anything can be said, any purpose served" (364). Thus the 
photograph becomes the free-floating signifier par excellence. And thus 
photography and movies provide metaphors in fiction of the free-floating 
nature of the text itself; these metaphors, then, serve a metafictional function, 
bringing attention to the vagaries and ruses of representation. As Willy notes, 
the picture is never complete; representation is not a transparent film laid 
over an immovable reality. Narrative patterns are indeed imposed, as those of 
the history master shaping Henry VIII and his wives into a sensible story. As 
Willy observes, recalling how Irene reluctantly posed with her family for 
photographs, "under the composure there was discomposure" (71), and 
indeed the photo album housing those pictures would not present a faithful 
narrative, as "[t]hey didn't want him in their photographs" (67). These 
observations serve to draw the reader's attention to the selectivity and 
subjectivity of the narrative of the novel, and to make the reader ponder the 
this recourse is no longer available in the twentieth century, at least not in this direct way—for a 
host of overlapping reasons" (457). 
14 We may also note, for instance, Molly Bloom's "Yes" that closes Ulysses and the "Shantih 
shantih shantih" at the end of Eliot's The Waste Land. For a thorough discussion of the place of 
the epiphany in modernism, see the chapter in Taylor's Sources of the Self called "Epiphanies of 
Modernism". 
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reliability of Willy as a first-person narrator and as a f ocalizer for the third-
person narration. It is, after all, his views of Irene and Dorothy that the reader 
is presented with. All the statements, explicit or implicit, attributed to Irene 
and Dorothy are actually Willy's impressions and inferences. Those 
impressions and inferences may not be inaccurate, but they nonetheless take 
on a specious nature, like the stories people coming into the shop at the end 
of the war tell, "stories which grew more unreal, more pensive, the nearer the 
teller got to the end of them" (98). Roaming through the narrative, the reader 
may feel like Willy does as he walks the streets of a bomb struck London: 
"[Y]ou seemed to walk (but perhaps you always had) through a world in 
which holes might open, surfaces prove unsolid" (96). This feeling is 
reinforced by the graphics announcing the three parts of the novel: for the 
first part, there is a pattern of circles enclosing the Roman figure "I"—the 
pattern is almost symmetrical, but a few circles are missing; for the second 
part, more circles are missing; and for the third part, the symmetry is 
completely broken, so many circles missing that the figure "III" is not 
enclosed. A reading in terms of alterity readily suggests itself: the three-part 
progression of graphics illustrates the effect of the impact of the other who 
transcends my hold on the world, my delimitation of "all that is the case", my 
setting up of boundaries around the other. In the words of Gibson, when "the 
other . . . overflows the frame in which I would seek to enclose the other . . . 
that means that the frame itself is broken or disintegrates" (.Postmodernity 
25). 
Indeed, a hole does open in the narrative and renders the surface 
established by Willy's voice unsolid, his pattern broken: in chapter seven, 
there is the unexpected disruption of his voice by that of Irene, an imprint of 
the past. Notably, it is the imprint of an unusually tender occasion, as Irene's 
interior monologue proceeds as Willy rests with his head on her lap: "Sit 
back Willy; drink your tea, rest your head, if you like, on my lap (he did not 
hear, there in the autumn-evening by the french windows, but what did he 
ever hear of those inward commands, spoken to soothe her own nerves?)" 
(49). As we can see, Irene immediately draws attention to the lack of 
communication in their marriage; "How little you know me, Willy", she says 
(49), and goes on to disclose to the reader what Willy has never known, the 
story of her rape and her psychosis. However, the picture Irene draws of 
herself and her motives does concur generally with Willy's image of her; 
nonetheless, that image is, to use Irene's own words, "[o]nly an image in a 
mirror" (55)—a reflection of a surface, a representation of a façade. Willy 
and Irene, then, are lost in the wasteland of the simulacrum, lost in what 
Richard Kearney describes as "the postmodern crisis of endless self-
mirroring, wherein the face of the other is dissolved into a play of sameness 
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with itself' (15). The reader of the novel, however, moving on a higher 
narrative level, becomes aware of the failure, the impossibility, of Irene's and 
Willy's project of containment; that is, the reader sees "the delusion of the 
possibility of possession of the other" (Gibson, Postmodernity 25). 
Consequently, as Willy sits down to strain his heart, neither he nor the 
reader has seen; neither he nor the reader has been able to unravel the riddle 
of Irene, and neither he nor the reader has any certainty that his daughter will 
come: 
He gripped the arm-rests. Metal pain was filling his limbs and 
welding him to the chair. . . . She will not come. She will 
come. . . . She would come: he would be a cold statue. . . . She 
will not come. The lilac sh immered. The garden framed in t he 
window was like a photograph. 
All right. All right—now. (222) 
As we can see, Lily Briscoe's impressionistic painting has been replaced by 
the semblance of a quite expressionless and mundane photograph. In his very 
last moment, Willy still frames the world, and he also times his own death. 
There is neither chance nor complex contingency involved: Willy's death is 
not an event, it is a simulation. For that reason, Willy's attempt at closure and 
revelation fails. Unlike the modernist To the Lighthouse, which ends with the 
closure and containment provided by an act of artistic structuring that still 
involves an element of chance and which also affords epiphany—"It was 
done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme 
fatigue, I have had my vision" (306)—the mock-modernist The Sweet Shop 
Owner ends by revealing the impossibility of revelation and the inadequacy 
of attempts at closure; the ending may be paraphrased: "It is not finished. I 
have not had any vision. Nor is that possible". Indeed, as Lily Briscoe's re­
demption lies in artistic impression and expression—a notion that, once it is 
stripped of pretence and grand claims, is not incompatible with post­
modernism—it is relevant to note that Dorothy's interest in art and literature 
leaves Willy nonplussed; recalling Dorothy's school's rendition of The 
Merchant of Venice—with supreme irony, Swift has her play the part of 
Shylock's daughter -W'ilh thinks: "What did I know about Shakespeare, 
Dorry? I'd sat in an uncomfortable wooden chair after a hard day at the shop, 
while on the stage schoolchildren in costume played the parts of grown-ups 
and spoke lines I did not understand" (145). Two pages later, he muses 
further: 
Shakespeare, history books, volumes of poetry. Postcards from 
art-galleries ... on the wall; and faded ink-splotched school 
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copies of Latin texts, Virg il and the Metamorphoses . . . You 
were doing your project on Keats and over your shoulder I read 
lines of verse .. . which I didn't understand: 
Bold lover, never, never canst thou kiss . . . (147) 
Willy's stance on art and literature of course befits the mechanical man who 
prefers that he touch nothing and nothing touch him. In connection with this 
issue of art, we should also note the perfect absence of any spiritual 
dimension in the novel; the sole intimation of spirituality we get, if any, is the 
rather indistinct vicar who speaks over Mr Harrison's coffin and baptizes 
Dorry. 
Yet, for all his Prufrockian world-weariness and cynicism, the question 
that animates Willy, and which he is unable to answer through his final day, 
is indeed the question of love, the question of the bold lover who never can 
kiss. Like Mr Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, Willy spends his life wishing 
that his wife would say "I love you". Willy, however, would settle for even 
less: "But if only she would say, 'I love you.' No, not even that, if only she 
would say ... 'I know that you love me.' But she wouldn't" (30). Willy 
returns to this wish: "And if only she would say, not that she loved him, 
but. . ." (43). As we have seen, Willy, for his part, is equally unable to utter 
those words, considering them "the words which he was forbidden to speak, 
that [would break] the terms of the bargain" (102). All of which makes Willy 
ask the central question: "If the word love is never spoken, does it mean there 
isn't any love?" (116). For Mr Ramsay, the answer is affirmative: "And as 
she looked at him she began to smile, for though she had not said a word, he 
knew, of course he knew, that she loved him" (To the Lighthouse 185). 
Willy, however, is alienated from his own feelings in the first place, and the 
same seems to be the case with Irene; in an echo of The Good Soldier, Willy 
and Irene suffer from heart conditions in both the literal and the metaphoric 
sense: "With both of them it was heart trouble" (19). Willy's "heart trouble" 
is apparent in a p assage where, remembering the funeral of Irene's father, he 
wonders: "Why did he weep? Why did he put his head in h is hands and feel 
tears smear his palms, coming back in the car from St Stephen's church?" 
(79). The scene is redolent of the return of the repressed; faced with the 
ceremonies of loss and spirituality, Willy's sentiments gush forth, but he does 
not understand what is happening. Yet, this scene attests to the growing 
suspicion the reader might have that Willy is actually, for all his claims to 
fundamental disillusion, quite sentimental. 
Indeed, his final act is a violent eruption of sentimentality and 
melodrama. As he envisions the scene that will take place when Dorothy 
comes to see him, he projects his own sentimentality onto her: 
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She would come—she hadn't said she wouldn't—through the 
hallway . . . past the mirror, the barometer clock, the photo­
graphs of Irene and herself on the wall. Her eyes would be moist. 
She would find him in the armchair in the living-room, by the 
french windows where he always sat—where Irene had sat with 
her medicine—still, silent, his hand gripping the arm-rests. She 
would go down, weep, clasp his knees, as though she were 
clasping the limbs of a cold, stone statue that stares out and 
beyond, without seeing. (9-10) 
Having read the novel, one realizes the irony of the final phrase: "without 
seeing". Willy is blind to his own violations, projecting his lack of en­
gagement and of certainty onto Dorothy: "Dorothy, you thought she didn't 
have a heart. You never loved her. You merely suffered each other. . . . But 
you never saw that look she gave me. How could you? And you never knew 
how I unders tood, then, how much she'd done for me. . . . But you will see" 
(103). Of course, Dorothy will not see; Willy's whole address, his attempt at 
an explanation that might have reconciled him with Dorothy, has been an 
interior monologue, and the only thing Dorothy will possibly see is his death 
mask. As Wendy Wheeler puts it, the ending shows "that Willy's unreflective 
romanticism—his attempt, in staging his own death, to force the symbolic 
unity which will be signified by his estranged daughter Dorry's return home 
on her birthday and his deathday—does not work" (67). The novel ends not 
with a revelation of love, but with the actual stopping of that weak heart 
which has served in the novel as a metaphor for a general inability to express 
feelings or even to house them in the first place. Thus, The Sweet Shop 
Owner in effect ends with the death of the modern ego. 
Yet, though the novel ends in tragedy, a subdued sense of love and 
charity may linger in the reader's mind. As we have seen, there is a 
Beckettian sense of repetition, of force of habit and of maddening pattern in 
the novel, and so the novel may testify to what Hassan has noted in one of his 
discussions of Beckett: "If habits, of which language is the deadliest, deaden, 
only the 'suffering of being' awakens all h uman faculties to their own irony 
and their own mystery" ("Joyce, Beckett" 118). In this suffering one might 
even, as Hassan does in Beckett, detect love: "The relations of Beckett's 
characters, master and slave, parent and child, husband and wife, certainly 
reveal bondage, cruelty, autism. Yet these characters suffer, suffer alone and 
have nothing to fall back upon except each other. I sense a great charity in 
Beckett, a charity delayed to the end of time yet charity still, and it is akin to 
love" (119). This is perhaps the charity of Willy, who in his numb lack of 
engagement still assumes a kind of responsibility for Irene: "He couldn't save 
her. He owed her eternal service, for he couldn't save her" (31). Still, those 
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are the words of the third-person narrator, and not what Willy himself 
expresses. 
So what we have in The Sweet Shop Owner, in a generous reading, is 
perhaps a wedding of existential nullity with an unspeakable love, resulting 
in, to borrow the words Willy uses to describe Irene's and his life in one of 
his more hopeful moments, "a kind of not acting" (77). However, like the 
characters of Beckett, Willy and Irene suffer alone; they do not engage with 
each other, open themselves to each other. They remain trapped in the 
absurd, in the impossibility of reaching out, and as in Camus this entrapment 
precludes anything but a residual compassion for the other as wholly other 
and incommensurable, a compassion based on one's identification with the 
other as as alienated as oneself. This is not the alienation of "the self 
alienated as 'hostage'" (Eaglestone 160), that is, as hostage of the other who 
calls me into the saying, but the alienation of the self alienated from the other 
and from the liberation of the saying; the alienation of the self through the 
modern programme of sameness and the ruse of commensurability. For the 
characters in The Sweet Shop Owner, the only option is to play out or act out 
the modern programme to the extreme, and escape l ies only in d eath; it i s a 
vision bleaker even than Baudrillard's "fatal strategies" of opposition through 
symbolic exchange, which still hold on to some kind of hope. 
In The Sweet Shop Owner, then, Swift's fiction remains in the 
disenchantment of late or limit-modernism. In other words, Swift's fiction 
has yet to enter the realm of the postmodern credo quia absurdum, or of the 
postmodern re-enchantment of the world. The modernist or limit-modernist 
aesthetics of The Sweet Shop Owner cannot support postmodern sensibility or 
the expressions of the sentimentum; we may infer that the characters in the 
novel suffer a whole deal, and that they may even love each other in some 
way, but neither suffering nor love is ever expressed. This expression would 
seem to rely on a self-conscious first-person narrator and the employment of 
the postmodernist aesthetics of double coding. A step in this direction is 
taken in Swift's second novel, Shuttlecock, to which I now turn.15 
Shuttlecock: The (Un)sentimental Agent 
In Shuttlecock, the modern ego that was put to death in The Sweet Shop 
Owner is resurrected and set on a path toward postmodern redemption. The 
15 As David Leon Higdon puts it, in Shuttlecock "there is a shift from omniscient to first-person 
narrator, the latter point of view more aesthetically appropriate to the 'unconfessed confessions' 
here and in later novels. ... In h is second novel, Swift has found his 'voice' in the form of first-
person retrospective visions of souls lost in the power of memory and history" ("Unconfessed 
Confessions" 184). The phrase "unconfessed confessions" is taken from Out of This World., 45. 
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narrator, Prentis, comes to realize that if one pursues the big white whale one 
will eventually be dragged down by it into the depths without possibility of 
return, and so comes across as an Ahab who himself has escaped to tell us. 
The narrator's name suggests the role of the "apprentice", and Prentis is 
indeed slowly learning something of great import: the virtues of "negative 
capability" and of a kind of "sentio quia absurdum". However, as we shall 
see, Prentis's redemption is not cast in the terms of the sentimentum; rather, 
Prentis's narrative as a whole is swallowed up by a radical indeterminacy and 
a thorough ironization of all the terms of the narrative and of its narration. 
Thus, irony and play engulf the novel, leaving little if any room for the 
reversals and the make-belief of the sentimentum. In the final analysis, 
Prentis is, like the characters in The Sweet Shop Owner, a victim of 
modernity; Prentis is sentimental, but not very sensitive or "sensibil" (as in 
sensibility). His narrative, however, is the victim of a postmodernist 
excess—of infinite regress, of ironies of indeterminacy and interminability. 
The narrative in Shuttlecock is constituted by the diary somewhat 
sporadically kept by Prentis, who works as a clerk in the "dead crimes" 
department of the London police. Incorporated into this diary are passages 
from Prentis's father's memoir, Shuttlecock: The Story of a Secret Agent. 
This memoir is to a large extent what Prentis is trying to come to terms with, 
to decipher; in other words, the whale that he is trying to get a grip on. 
Prentis senior's status as a war hero, established to a great deal through the 
memoir's account of how he escaped from imprisonment by the Germans at 
the end of the Second World War, is an unbearable pressure on Prentis 
junior, who feels unable to l ive up to his father's example. Displeased with 
himself, he takes his anguish out on his wife and his two sons, through 
countless and pointless arguments and punishments. Prentis starts his 
narrative when he is beginning to feel added pressure from his menacing boss 
Quinn, who delegates seemingly impossible tasks to Prentis and also seems 
to be deliberately hiding significant files. Prentis's paranoia increases as his 
current task involves files vaguely connected to his father, but he also begins 
to discern the possibility of exposing his father's heroism as a myth and a 
sham, an exposure which would bring him peace of mind. 
Thus, in one of the many overlappings of the framing Shuttlecock and 
the embedded Shuttlecock, Prentis's tale also becomes that of a secret agent 
of sorts, as Prentis seeks to uncover the truth about his father by reading 
between the lines of the memoir and piecing together the information in those 
files in his office that he suspects are somehow related to that truth. 
Significantly, Prentis senior himself, or "Dad" as Prentis refers to him, is 
inaccessible to Prentis's probings, as he has been the mute and semi-catatonic 
inmate of a mental hospital for the last t wo years, having had "some sort of 
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sudden breakdown, as a result of which he went into, for want of a better 
word, a kind of language-coma" (40). Yet Prentis goes to visit him each 
week, searching for the phrase that will shock his father out of silence, but 
mainly using him in the same way he uses the reader: "[BJecause Dad does 
not answer back, because he neither hinders nor encourages whatever I say, 1 
use him as a sort of confessional" (43). 
Hence, we can see that Shuttlecock primarily relates to two genres, one 
about as old as Western prose literature, the other quite recent: the 
confessional autobiography and the anti-detective novel. The first is bound 
up with the spiritual (St Augustine) and the sentimental (Rousseau), as well 
as with notions of presence, plenitude and authenticity, the second with 
nihilism, indeterminacy and play (from Beckett and Pynchon to Ackroyd and 
Auster). Importantly, the second usually contains elements of the first (as in 
Beckett's Trilogy, for instance): the confession as a th riller without closure. 
Indeed, Prentis's discourse has traces of the figure of the weakling sinner: "I 
am essentially a weak man", he tells us (11), and later: "What a weak, what a 
cowardly man I am" (33). He speaks of his "voluntary confession" and his 
"upsurge of guilt" (75). But he also tries to exculpate himself by pleading 
profound confusion: with his father's sudden breakdown comes the incessant 
question "Why? Why?" (67). Not long thereafter he begins to feel that Quinn 
is playing "little games to confuse and harass [him]" and at least once he has 
"this sudden urge to say to [Quinn], in all sincerity: I don't understand. 
Please tell me. You see, I don't understand at all" (30-31). Consequently, 
when Marian says to him one night, "It's not like you to bring home work 
from the office. What's going on?", he can only think to himself, laconically, 
"Marian, I wish I knew" (111-12). Furthermore, he is haunted by the 
question, "Why is it my own children don't respect me?" (48). As his 
paranoia increases, he even finds himself asking, "Supposing they're all in it, 
all together?" (97). 
Prentis, then, is, in his own eyes, a benevolent man who is a victim of 
sinister, bewildering circumstances: "You see, underneath, 1 am a soft­
hearted man" (13). Like Richardson's Pamela, Prentis constructs himself as a 
virtuous being who is at a loss as to why everyone is after him. Unlike 
Pamela, though, he is not blind to his own persecutions and manipulations, as 
we shall see. Thus, Prentis is suspended between a conception of failure (of 
living up to his Dad's heroism, of confronting Quinn, of making Marian and 
his sons respect him) and a conception of guilt (for bullying his sons, for 
abusing Marian, for wishing to dethrone his father). Importantly, the 
difference between these two conceptions, and between modes of guilt in 
turn, is one that is fundamental to Levinasian ethics: as Robert Bernasconi 
explains, in an essay notably titled "The Truth that Accuses: Conscience, 
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Shame and Guilt in Levinas and Augustine", the question for Levinas is 
how one is to understand [the] inhibition of spontaneous 
freedom, as it takes place in a being that distrusts itself, puts 
itself into question, or is critical . . . Does this inhibition take 
place as a consciousness of failure, arising in the discovery of 
one's weakness, or is it a consciousness of guilt, arising in the 
discovery of one's unworthiness ... ? According to Levinas, the 
former represents the predominant tradition of Western thought, 
in which the spontaneity of freedom is only limited and not 
called into question as such. Levinas proposed the alternative 
whereby "the critique of spontaneity engendered by the 
consciousness of moral unworthiness . . . precedes truth, pre­
cedes the consideration of the whole, and does not imply the 
sublimation of the I in the universal" . . . (27)16 
We may compare the ideas of Levinas presented here to what I stated in my 
first chapter, namely that the longing and suffering in question in the 
sentimentum are not a result of the failure of the e go's project so much as of 
the failure of intersubjective connection. The latter kind of failure takes the 
form of guilt and unworthiness. It is important to note that "in Levinas, 
neither guilt, nor shame, when he evokes them in developing his own 
account, are tied to an accusation focused on a specific deed" (Bernasconi 
33). Guilt and shame come before on e's deeds, and there is no room for self-
righteous complacency: "The more I return to myself, the more I divest 
myself, under the traumatic effect of persecution, of my freedom as a 
constituted, willful, imperialist subject, the more I discover myself to be 
responsible; the more just I am, the more guilty I am" (Levinas, Otherwise 
than Being 112). This view of ethics is in sharp contrast with the traditional, 
legalistic one, in which "[t]he codes of behavior that direct one how to act, 
the debilitating sense of guilt that can arise when one obsesses about specific 
misdeeds, and the good conscience produced by casuistry, all serve to 
alleviate the fundamental feeling of unease that arises when one is put in 
question" (Bernasconi 35). Prentis, as we have begun to see, conforms to this 
latter view: he experiences a specific guilt, his suffering is basically one of 
interiority, and only gradually and by slippage, if at all, does he awaken to 
exteriority and alterity and to "original guilt". 
Prentis's is not an intersubjective sentimentality, then; as T stated 
above, Shuttlecock does not present us with a narrator who is ultimately able 
to lodge sentimentality in irony—the kind of irony, that is, that decentralizes 
16 Bemasconi's reference here is to Levinas's Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 
1969), 83. 
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the desiring, imperialist subject. Rather, Prentis shifts somewhat uneasily but 
quite unselfconsciously between a sentimentality and a cruelty which he is 
unable to reconcile. This shifting is clear from the first page of the novel, 
which amounts to a peculiar sentimental build-up, as Prentis immerses 
himself in nostalgia over his childhood pet, the hamster Sammy: "Today I 
remembered my hamster: my pet hamster, Sammy, a gift for my tenth 
birthday" (5). Prentis goes on to remember (the phrase "I remembered" 
appears six times in that first page) various characteristics and behaviours 
typical of a pet hamster, before asking himself: "Why should I have thought 
of these things? They say you only recall what is pleasant and you only forget 
what you choose not to remember. Perhaps. But do 1 say 'remember'? This 
was not so much a memory as a pang . . ." (5). It is a pang indeed: in the very 
next moment of the narration, the sense of innocence evoked by reminis­
cences of childhood and pets is immediately crushed by Prentis's confession, 
"You see, I u sed to torment my hamster. I w as cruel to Sammy. It w asn't a 
case of wanting to play with him, to train him, or study how he behaved. I 
tortured him. . . . [A]t some time after Sammy's arrival I made the discovery 
that this creature which I lo ved and pitied was also at my mercy" (6). Still, it 
turns out that this torturing had a twisted sentimental purpose: "Will you 
believe me if I say it was all, still, out of love and pity? For love and pity 
hadn't disappeared. I needed only new means of eliciting them. Love ought 
to be simple, straightforward, but it isn't. All these cruelties were no more 
than a way of making remorse possible, of making my heart melt" (6). 
Thus, in its first two pages the novel establishes its main polarity, or 
vacillation: that between "nature" and "artifice", between "straightfor­
wardness" and "new means", between sentimentality and instrumentality. 
Both Sammy's function as an emblem of "nature" and the importance 
"nature" has to Prentis are made obvious by Prentis's subsequent recollection 
of how 
one day Mr Forster carried into the class-room this green cage 
with a wire-mesh front a nd something living inside it. And in 
producing the hamster before us, like a conjuror, he used the 
words—as if he were revealing to us a fragment of some 
precious lost treasure —"a part of nature". It was these words, 1 
swear it, and not any sentimental child 's craving for a "pet", for 
a fluffy thing with legs, which sowed the seeds of m y desire for 
a hamster of my own. . . . How jealously I longed to possess a 
part of nature. (34-35) 
This passage is highly charged with meaning. First of all, "nature" is 
presented as something that needs to be caged and contained—a very modern 
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notion. Secondly, it is not very natural after all, but rather like the trick of a 
conjuror. Thirdly, "nature" is something lost, available only in fragments. 
Fourthly, "nature" is something that one longs to possess, and that one hence 
presupposes can be possessed. Lastly, Prentis's stressing that his was not the 
"sentimental child's craving for a 'pet'" simply indicates that it was instead a 
sentimentalizing and awe of "nature" that induced his longing for a hamster 
of his own. Indeed, Prentis informs us that he "never really thought of Nature 
as something ordinary and familiar", but rather "as a rare and mysterious 
commodity", and that "[a]bove all, it was something quite separate and 
distinct from me" (33-34). Still, "nature" is "a stuff which could be gathered, 
or mined like gold, if only you knew where to find it" (34). 
In other words, the scenario is fairly typical: it is that of modern 
man—and the choice of gender here is not accidental—who senses an 
alienation not only from other men but also from the very nature whence he 
has come, and so wants to reclaim the real, the natural "Nature". Indeed, 
there are traces of the romanticist view of nature in Prentis's musings and 
longings; for instance, he notes how "animals, when they meet, sniff each 
other's arses and nuzzle each other's fur . . . innocently and—who 
knows?—with affection", whereas people crammed in the Tube "look at each 
other beadily and inquisitively . . . with suspicion and menace" (25). In a 
similar vein, Prentis describes his sons' room as "a cybernetical junkyard" 
where there is "[njothing simple and down-to-earth" (80), and contrastingly 
points out that "we couldn't live without trees and grass" (26). 
His observations are thus redolent of a commonplace that lingered on 
from romantic poetry through the Victorian novel: nature (and the rural) is 
benevolent, culture (and the urban) is menacing. However, this trace of 
romanticism is swallowed up in an alienation profounder than what either 
Wordsworth or Dickens could dream of: nature is now wholly other, not-
human, not-same, and is ultimately accessed indirectly or vicariously, in a 
cage of one sort or another. For instance, discussing the benefits of zoos with 
his son Martin, Prentis thinks, "what else can you do these days, if you want 
to be close to nature, but put it in a cage?", whereas Martin, unimpressed by 
his father's offer to take him to the zoo, claims that "[tjhere are plenty of 
good programmes about animals—on television" (154). So, nature has 
entered into simulation and hyperreality. And so has Prentis, who reveals that 
as a child he considered himself "odourless and non-descript—as if I were 
made from something that didn't exist" (34).17 Like Willy in The Sweet Shop 
Owner, he views his actions "like a scene in a p lay . . . perfectly timed and 
17 This statement may serve as a subt le metafictional signal; it resembles the conclusion of the 
narrator in Martin Amis's London Fields: "I feel seamless and insubstantial, like a creation. As if 
someone made me up" (470). 
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calculated" (11), and himself as an "effigy" or "dummy" engaged in "hope­
less pantomime" (43), as "no more than a puppet" (101). As Prentis nears the 
end of his narrative, he concludes: "[NJatural and artificial at the same time 
. . . perhaps this is the way things must be now" (152). That is, we do not 
experience or know nature as such, but as subjected to our programmes of 
containment and orchestration, whether actual physical containment and 
orchestration or containment and orchestration by the image industry.18 As 
we have seen, the hamster which is a piece of nature quickly leaves the 
sentimental imagination and enters the instrumental imagination, becoming 
the object of tests and surveillance. And thus Sammy is emblematic not only 
of the plight of his own species at the hands of the cosmetics and medical 
industries, but of the plight of modern man subjected to his own programmes 
of mastery.19 
In the same way that Prentis's love for Sammy is, if not eclipsed, then 
heavily complicated, so his love for his wife Marian is complicated by a 
modern code of mastery, control and optimization: "[T]he thing I l ike most 
about Marian ... is her malleability, her pliancy; the feeling I get that 1 could 
mould and remodel her . . . , contort and distort her, parcel her up and stretch 
her into all kinds of shapes" (27). Prentis is referring to their bedtime 
routines, which have also entered into simulation and hyperreality: love-
making according to models, settings and manuals. Some ten pages later we 
find Prentis "making adjustments to her body and manoeuvring her limbs 
into one of my favourite positions for love-making. I won't go into exact 
details; it is something developed over the years which requires a little setting 
up. Marian is quite accustomed, almost indifferent to these preparations. She 
lies back, lets me continue and lets herself go putty" (38). We may read this 
passage in the light of what Bauman writes in his brief history of modernity 
in the introduction to Intimations of Postmodernity: in modernity "perfection 
could be reached only through action: it was the outcome of laborious 'fitting 
together'" (xiii). Indeed, Prentis often spends his whole day at the office 
"planning in meticulous detail [their] activities of the night" (73). As with 
Sammy, though, all this circumstance serves a profounder, finally more 
"laudable" purpose: "[W]hen I started to buy certain 'manuals', to get Marian 
to send off for certain articles from catalogues ... all this paraphernalia 
18 In "Why Look at Animals?", John Berger argues pessimistically that "[t]his historic loss, to 
which zoos are a monument, is now irredeemable for the culture of capitalism" (28). 
1 We may think here of Foucault and his studies of modes of subjection in modernity, and of 
Bauman's description of modernity as an ideology in which "as nature became progressively 
'de-animated', humans grew increasingly 'naturalized' so that their subjectivity, the primeval 
'givenness' of their existence could be denied and they themselves could be made hospitable for 
instrumental meanings; they came to be like timber and waterways rather than like forests and 
lakes" (Intimations xi). 
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wasn't an end in itself, believe me, it was all in the hope of achieving some 
ultimate thing that always seemed elusive . . . [W]hen, night after night, I 
conduct my sexual experiments with Marian, for ever modifying the formula, 
it's with the yearning that one day it won't just be sex, but enlightenment" 
(73). The phrase is hardly accidental: "enlightenment", the name both of the 
ultimate inauguration of modernity and of its professed telos, its 
legitimization and master-narrative. Prentis's goal is decidedly modern—the 
very presupposition of "enlightenment" is—and he pursues it through a 
modern method of protocol and optimization, but also of consumerism; 
sexual liberation, as most other things put under the sign of "liberation", is 
also a commercialization, as Baudrillard illustrates in The Consumer 
Society?0 Sexuality has also, as Prentis himself notes, replaced religion as 
"opium for the people": "[Sexuality] compensates for a ll the excitement and 
initiative we've lost in other ways. The only true revolution now is sexual 
revolution, and that is why everything—look around—is becoming in­
creasingly, v isibly oriented to sex. Well, if sex is the only true revolution, I 
don't see why Marian and I shouldn't play our part" (74). As we see, there is 
an attempt at exculpation here: Prentis is no worse than anyone else, he is 
simply obeying the programme. In the very next instant, however, he turns to 
self-denuding, self-denouncing confession: "All right, so you've gathered it 
by now. My sex-life is really a preposterous, an obsessive, a pathetic affair. A 
sham, a mockery. Systematically and cold-bloodedly, like a torturer bent on 
breaking his victim, I am turning my wife into a whore" (75). 
Once again, though, Prentis contrasts his own circumstantial behaviour 
with the image of an uncomplicated "nature", a logos and an originary 
authenticity.21 In relation to Sammy, he poses the rhetorical question: "For 
what else is love—don't tell me it is anything less simple, less obvious—than 
being close to nature?" (35). Later, with regard to his sophisticated love-
making, he elaborates: 
Making love ought to be the most natural thing. This week, in 
the full flush of spring, I have been watching the sparrows 
copulating on our guttering—a mere hop and then it's over—and 
the ducks—more rapacious—on the common. It is so simple. . . . 
And sometimes that is just how 1 see it with Marian and me: a 
little careless, unadorned instant, like the sparrows; a little flutter 
of wings and hearts: at one with nature. Perhaps it was like that 
20 As Baudrillard argues, "[i]t is the same with the body as it is with labour power. It has to be 
'liberated, emancipated' to be able to be exploited rationally for productivist ends" (135). 
21 In an essay revolving around Aristotle's Physics and the concept of "nature", Martin 
Heidegger points out that the Latin "Natura comes from nasci, 'to be born, to originate 
Natura means 'that which lets something originate from itself" (183). 
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once, long ago. . . . But now we have to go throug h the most 
elaborate charades, the mos t strenuous perfor mances to receive 
enlightenment. (73) 
There is an obvious strain in t his passage: nature, origin, and simplicity are 
still connected to enlightenment, which is a highly cultural phenomenon or 
notion and indeed requires strenuous performances of calculations, 
measurements, repetitions and falsifications. 
What is more, enlightenment, as Prentis comes to understand at the end 
of the novel, is ultimately a ruse, or at least always partial, and also may not 
be desirable. At any rate, the idea of enlightenment serves "what Levinas 
calls 'ontological imperialism"', which constitutes a "denial of the ethical 
relation" and emerges "in the expression of the naive, arbitrary, spontaneous 
dogmatism of the self which directs the understanding at its thitherto obscure 
object as a clarifying 'ray of light' (77, p. 44), delivering being out of secrecy 
. . . and thus neutralizing in encompassing the other" (Gibson, Postmodernity 
56-57).22 As John Wild writes in his introduction to Totality and Infinity, 
"[t]he other is not an object that must be interpreted and illumined by my 
alien light. He shines forth with his own light, and speaks for himself' 
(Levinas, Totality 14; emphasis mine). In terms of the metaphoricity of the 
word, then, to think one has attained enlightenment is to close oneself off 
from the other light (not the other of light), or from the light of the other, 
from the infinity of that unseeable, unbearable light a fraction of which one 
has drawn into one's own. As Caputo and Scanlon put it, "modernity and its 
Enlightenment imposed certain restraints upon our thinking, certain 
'conditions of possibility', to use Kant's expression, which, like border 
police, mark off the boundaries and patrol the limits of possible experience" 
(2). Importantly, though, mastery—the attempt at mastery, the ruse of 
mastery—of the other in the quest for enlightenment entails not only a 
closing off of the same, a m arking off of the boundaries, but also an active 
violation of the other in its infinity. This is what we witness in Prentis's 
subjections of both Sammy and Marian to his schemes of "love" and "en­
lightenment". 
Still, Prentis posits, if not impenetrability and infinity, then an 
inviolable core and an essence; in his confession of his carnalization and his 
subjection (which is simultaneously an objectification) of Marian, he reaches 
a point of sentimentalization: "[B]ut, just as you can work a piece of clay a 
thousand times but still have left the same piece of clay, she would still, at 
the end of it all, be Marian. Marian" (27). There is an uneasy tension here 
between Prentis's likening of his wife to a piece of clay and the sentimental 
22 Gibson's reference is to Levinas's Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969). 
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tone resulting from the pause and repetition: "Marian. Marian". More 
importantly, the positing of an essence and a stable core is precisely what 
animates "enlightenment" and the quest for truth. The resulting violations of 
bodies and souls through dissection and interrogation is given a grotesque 
illustration in Prentis's relation of one of the cases found in the files in the 
"dead crimes" archives. The case concerns a boy who was locked up with the 
corpse of his dead father, and who "found a penknife, belonging to the dead 
man, in one of the bedroom drawers, and with it—for reasons never 
established, though according to the boy himself, 'to find out what his father 
was made of—systematically disfigured and mutilated his father's body" 
(24). 
The boy's dissecting his father, and his objective in doing so, is of 
course really only an extreme version—an allegory—of what Prentis is doing 
to his father. As Prentis asks himself, "Why do I need to know these 
things—to eavesdrop on my Dad's suffering? So as to become like one of his 
tormentors?" (146). Prentis's project of dissection is, however, put under the 
strain of indeterminacy and uncertainty, as he is faced with the alterity of not 
only the text of his father, but that of Marian, as well as that of Quinn. But 
while Prentis has these intimations of alterity and "original guilt", his 
narrative is not finally ruptured by them; on the contrary, it seeks to contain 
them by feigning closure, as we shall see when we turn to the ending of the 
novel. 
Indeed, with Marian, alterity actually returns Prentis to his interiority: 
it is Marian who "sometimes makes me feel (it is a strange thing to say, I 
admit) that she doesn't know who I am" (27; emphases mine). Prentis is 
overcome by "some sense of dreadful loneliness. My wife . . . does not know 
me" (100). The focus is on "me"; there is no indication of Prentis losing sight 
of her, of his unknowing of her. Congenially, when Prentis seems to realize 
the virtue of vulnerability, of baring one's skin, this baring is placed with 
Marian and not with himself: when they first made love, Prentis "was 
surprised by her passivity and by the way her body became something 
offered up completely to me. I suppose that is what happens in love: you bare 
your breast and say, I am in your hands" (150). That is, Marian is in his 
hands. 
Quinn, however, more clearly challenges Prentis's preconceptions and 
his selfhood, vexing Prentis's expectations of systematicality and acces­
sibility: "When I first started in our office I must have accepted these 
anomalies, frustrating, baffling as they were, as part, nonetheless, of a 
'system' . . . But I'm sure now, at any rate, that they are not part of any 
system. They are part of Quinn" (19-20). Almost immediately, though, 
Prentis questions his own notions: "Could I be wrong? Could I have mistaken 
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and perverted some quite innocuous truth?" (20). Indeed, recalling an earlier 
meeting with Quinn, Prends relates how "as often happens when I'm face to 
face with Quinn, I found myself hurriedly, and for no apparent reason, 
revising my impression of him" (30). This is probably the most overtly 
Levinasian moment of the novel: the face-to-face challenges Prentis with an 
immediacy and opacity that he can only translate as "no apparent reason", but 
which nonetheless causes his renegotiation of the other. Final knowledge of 
the other is impossible; as Quinn stresses, "Good heavens, limited in­
formation is why we're here, Prentis" (31). All of which only serves to 
deepen Prentis's suspicion and paranoia: "Today (Monday) it struck me that 
Quinn could be inventing everything. Those inquiries. Supposing they are all 
in some extraordinary way figments of his i magination? How am I to know 
what's true and what isn't and what really stems from an official directive?" 
(85). The C9 inquiry, the case Prentis is working on, and which concerns a 
blackmailing case involving persons vaguely connected to Dad, is "a pattern 
in which there were large holes and gaps where items were missing from 
files—so perhaps not a pattern at all" (86). Particularly, File E, which Prentis 
suspects of holding the key to the whole affair and Dad's implication in it, is 
wholly missing. 
Dad himself is of course most radically other and inscrutable, as he 
refrains from both speech and gesture; he is "this silent shell" (40), and all 
Prentis "ever see[s] in his eyes is a filmy gaze, fixed on the distance, which 
now and then settles on me as on some curious object" (41). Dad is thus both 
saying and said, both challenge and stasis, both infinite and bounded. Indeed, 
his code-name as an agent was "Shuttlecock" (49): never at rest, always 
moving back and forth between two poles. And such is his memoir, the text 
Prentis has to resort to in the face of his father's loss of face: suspended 
between fact and fiction, true and false, occupying the excluded middle, like 
Schrödinger's cat. This elusive quality dawns upon Prentis as he begins to 
scrutinize his father's narrative, sensing its internal contradictions and its 
instabilities: "I must have read it a dozen times, and each time I read it, it 
seems to get not more familiar but more elusive and remote" (51-52). 
Interestingly, the crucial issue for Prentis in this matter is feelings: "Because 
Dad doesn't write about his feelings; he describes events, and where his 
feelings come into it he conveys them in a bluff, light-hearted way, as in 
some made-up adventure story; so that sometimes this book which is all fact 
seems to me like fiction, like something that never really took place" (52). 
Once again, though, there is a peculiar essentialist reversal: the reason Prentis 
gives for his renewed interest in Dad's memoir is that 
for the first time I realize that Dad is in that book . He's in there 
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somewhere. It's not some other man, in those pages, with a 
code-name, Shuttlecock. It's a former consultant engineer, a golf 
player, a widower, the victim of a mental breakdown. I want to 
put the two together. Or —put it another way —the book is Dad. 
It's more Dad than that empty effigy I sit beside at the hospital. 
When I pick it up I still possess Dad, I hold him, even though 
he's gone away into unbreakable silence. (52) 
As with Sammy, then, Prentis's desire is for possession, and as with Marian, 
he posits an immutable essence and origin: the Dad who wrote the memoir, 
the Dad whom Dad wrote about in the memoir, and the Dad of latter years 
are not only reconcilable, but interchangeable, ultimately self-same. Dad has 
also entered the hyperreal: the representation of Dad is Dad, is even more 
Dad than Dad. The more-Dad-than-Dad of course adheres to the modem code 
of repeatability: "[t]here are two copies of it in our house" (51). Yet this 
dissemination of self-same copies also makes possible individual re-
inscriptions and amendments: only one of the copies has Prentis's "name in it 
and 'From your loving father' in Dad's writing—bold and slanting—and the 
date, September 1957". This difference is not without importance: "I read 
from either of the two copies indiscriminately, picking up which ever is to 
hand, but naturally the one I value more is the one inscribed by Dad himself' 
(57). Indeed, Prentis's waning control over the text/Dad is somewhat far­
cically illustrated by the following scene: "I keep [Dad's inscribed copy] in 
our bedroom. That is, usually. For as I sit down now to read the copy from 
the living-room I discover that at some time or other I have got the two 
muddled up. The one I have opened has Dad's words in it. '. . . From your 
loving Father. September 1957" (57-58). The mix-up is evidently significant 
and unnerving enough to demand mentioning, and it illustrates both the 
sentimental importance of the inscription and the rupturing of Dad's self-
sameness. 
Mix-ups notwithstanding, Prentis senses inconsistencies and 
conspicuous absences in Dad's text, especially in the last two chapters, which 
narrate Dad's capture by the Gestapo and his subsequent escape: "For one 
thing, there are the gaps, the hazy areas in those eight days at the Château 
Martine. . . . [I]t is about the goings-on in that interrogation room, and other, 
sinister rooms, that Dad is silent, or circumspect. The picture clouds over: a 
few vague allusions, a hint of the inarticulable ('Here description must be 
blurred'), a few chilly motifs" (105). At the same time, "[t]hese pages are 
more vivid, more real, more believable than any other part of the book. And 
yet, strangely enough, this is because the style of Dad's writing 
becomes—how shall I put it?—more imaginative, more literary, more 
speculative" (106-107). Thus, Prentis must "struggle to make it real, to wrest 
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it out of the story-book realm into the realm of fact" (146). Once again, 
though, there is a swift reversal: "And yet in these last chapters there is more 
of the flavour or reality, because there is also more mystery—and more 
misery" (146). As we can see, there is an unsettling, ever-shifting relation 
between fact and fiction, between what constitutes the convincing and what 
constitutes the unconvincing. Chapters 29 and 31 of Prentis's Shuttlecock 
consist entirely of excerpts from Dad's Shuttlecock, without Prentis's 
commentary, thrusting the reader into Dad's narrative (a perfect pastiche, on 
Swift's part, of the suspense novel), leaving the reader to ponder on his/her 
own the narrative's consistency or lack thereof, as well as the relation 
between the two Shuttlecocks. Chapter 31 is notably the last segment of 
Dad's memoir we get to read, and it narrates Dad's escape and, as Dad 
himself puts it, "miraculous" rescue from pursuing German soldiers by the 
American Seventh Army (170). This chapter is immediately followed by 
Prentis's account of his own escape and rescue under the auspices of Quinn, 
an escape that takes the form of an embrace of unknowing, a realization of 
the liberation found in turn ing away from the incessant search for truth to the 
clearing of a space for harmony. 
Indeed, it is when Prentis finally confronts Quinn with his suspicions 
about the C9 inquiry that Quinn articulates the ethical and pragmatic problem 
of knowledge: "Is it better to know things or not to know them? Wouldn't we 
sometimes be happier not knowing them?" (118). Then, after some vague 
hints as to what his agenda in confusing Prentis has been, he makes a 
surprising invitation: "You want to know—everything, don't you? Would 
you care to come and see me, one evening after work—at my home?" (120). 
Unlike the unforgiving persona he puts forward in the urban office, Quinn is 
quite amiable in his semi-rural home, receiving Prentis as he tends to "some 
pots of geraniums on the ledge of the basement window" (172).23 Quinn also 
has "a confession—of a kind" to make (174): "I've had File E all along, and I 
nearly destroyed it. And it's not the only one" (175). Quinn has, as Prentis 
now concludes, "been withholding—or destroying—information so as to 
spare people—needless painful knowledge" (176). He has also been testing 
Prentis: Quinn is going to retire and has suggested that Prentis be promoted 
to his position, but he has also taken the opportunity to test Prentis to see 
whether he has the ethics of knowledge required for the job. And so Quinn 
voices his creed that "if you have any imagination at all . . . the best, the 
securest position to be in is not to know. But once you do know, you can't do 
anything about it. You can't get rid of knowledge" (176). The point is not lost 
23 In this respect, the character of Quinn obviously owes a g reat deal to Wemmick in Great 
Expectations', Dickens's novel has a wider intertextual echo in Waterland, though, which takes 
one of its epigraphs from it. 
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on Prentis, who goes through a swift turn of redemption: "I thought of 
Marian—Marian like a stranger in the same bed. All those nights seeking 
enlightenment" (176). What Quinn proceeds to unravel, however, is some­
thing far more complex than the mere question of wanting or not wanting, of 
being able or not to cope with, truth: as Quinn and Prentis go through the 
evidence of C9, Quinn demonstrates how the evidence—the truth—itself may 
be unreliable and/or yield to multiple and conflicting narratives.24 Quinn 
cautions Prentis: "Look I want to say at the beginning that what we're 
dealing with isn't necessarily one hundred per cent proven truth" (182). What 
Prentis already knows is that C9 concerns the blackmail by X of Y and Z; X 
died while undergoing trial for this blackmail and both Y and Z were 
exonerated. What File E reveals is that X, who, it turns out, had been at 
Château Martine at roughly the same time as Dad, had also prepared and 
possibly sent a b lackmail letter to Dad: "The gist of the blackmail was this: 
that your father did not escape from the Germans ... He succumbed under 
interrogation, betrayed several resistance units and the whereabouts of three 
British agents operating in . . . France; and in return for this the Germans 
'allowed him to escape'" (182-83). Upon hearing this, Prentis has "this 
strange feeling of release. I had escaped; I was free" (183); the evidence of 
Dad's fraudulence, which he had sought, is at hand. However, Quinn warns 
him again: "[D]on't jump to conclusions. . . . [EJven supposing your father 
did receive the letter and his breakdown was a consequence, it may have been 
a reaction to a vicious, sudden, but still false allegation" (184). Consequently, 
Quinn and Prentis spend some time pitting a number of possible truths 
against each other. When Quinn, prompted by Prentis, furthermore reveals 
that X's letter to Y contained the allegation that Dad had an affair with Y's 
wife, another round of guesswork follows.25 This leads Quinn to conclude 
that "[p]erhaps uncertainty is always better than either certainty or ignorance" 
(197), and to propose that they destroy File E. And so they move to the 
incinerator at the end of the garden, where Prentis has one last doubt: 
"[S]upposing, in some extraordinary way, that everything Quinn told me was 
concocted, was an elaborate hoax—if I never looked in the file, I wo uld 
never know. I read the code letters over and over again. C9/E . . . And then 
suddenly I knew I wanted to be uncertain, I wanted to be in the dark" (199). 
When Quinn asks him one final time whether he considers Quinn's actions 
just and correct, he replies: "'I don't know' ... it seemed to me this was an 
:4 And thus Shuttlecock obviously becomes a piece of historiographie metafiction. 
25 Thus, Prentis and Quinn get together like Quentin and Shreve in chapter 8 of Absalom, 
Absalom! and spur each other on in filling in the gaps of history with fiction. Indeed, that episode 
from Faulkner's masterpiece is McHale's example of the postmodernist shift in modernism, from 
truth-seeking to truth-making. See Postmodernist Fiction 8-11. 
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answer I would give, boldly, over and over again for the rest of my life" 
(200). Prentis has escaped the cognitive imperative; he can return home a 
redeemed man, to tell Marian the good news that he will be promoted to 
Quinn's position. 
Thus, Prentis leaves the downward spiral of suspicion and violation. In 
the subsequent chapter, six months have passed, and Prentis returns to his 
memoir-in-process to record his impressions of his new life. At the office, 
Prentis emulates Quinn perfectly, but he now knows the limits of the 
position: observing Eric, who now occupies Prentis's former position, he 
considers "how little he knows if he thinks in h is bewilderment, beset by all 
those misleading files, those gaps in the shelves . . . that the confusions cease, 
the mysteries stop, when promotion lifts you up into the rarefied air" (209). 
Thus, Prentis has stopped tormenting his family not because of some new­
found sense of power, but because he has learnt to live with ambivalence and 
vulnerability: "[W]hen [Martin] looks at me . . . [h]e doesn't see a man with 
power; he sees the same old weakling. The only difference is that I no longer 
conceal it. And this brings into Martin's eyes . . . the slightest hint of per­
plexity. For this is something he cannot understand. But I don 7 attempt to 
enlighten him, or to iron out the differences which exist between us" (210; 
emphasis mine). Breaking out of modernity, Prentis even seems open to the 
embrace of myth and magic, as is evidenced by the last chapter but one of 
Prentis's narrative, which consists entirely of Prentis's question to his wife: 
"Marian ... do you believe in the pathetic fallacy? That it's really a fallacy, 1 
mean?" (215). (In his memoir, recollecting hiding in the woods, Dad reveals 
that "[s]ince then I have come to believe—a blatant case of the pathetic 
fallacy, no doubt—that the woods and the trees are always on the side of the 
fugitive and the victim, never on the side of the oppressor" (164).) 
Having paved the way for a less troubled sentimentality, in the last 
chapter, Prentis takes his family on an outing to Camber Sands: "Why 
Camber Sands? There are other parts of the coast which are shorter and easier 
drives from our part of London. Sentimental reasons. Tt was h ere that Marian 
and I used to come when Martin was scarcely beyond the crawling age ... to 
spread a blanket and make warm, airy outdoor love" (215-16; emphasis 
mine). Yet, Prentis's sentimentality is now not one of prelapsarian origins: 
Don't ask me why, knowing that this spot must be even more 
spoilt, even more strewn with seaside junk since Marian and 1 
last saw it, I should determine on going there—I who have this 
hankering for untouched countryside and have often harangued 
my family with conservationist lectures. Perhaps certain things 
are inside us and we don't have to go searching for the 
appropriate setting in o rder to find them. Or if they aren't inside 
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us, then—perhaps we should admit it—they aren't anywhere. 
(217) 
Prentis may seem to return to subjectivism and interiority here, but we must 
note that he speaks of "certain things", a phrase we are invited to construe as 
denoting precisely immutable essences and an originary logos, and concludes 
that those things may not be anywhere. 
However, the novel ends on a false and contrived note, as Prentis 
relates how he and Marian make love once again among the dunes: 
We had to be quick, quick as sparrows . . . Need for haste; but 
none for hinting or persuasion, nor for pointless sophistication. 
All those laborious bedroom antics, to return at last to burrowing 
in the sand. The beach-grass waved; the gulls floated, white 
fragments in the blue above. But this would have been Marian's 
view. My view was filled with sand, a miniature dune-
scape . . . bleached and smooth-contoured . . . And then these 
same soft-gold hues and gentle contours made me think of the 
pale, furred creature who was the cause of my beginning these 
pages, and I remembered the magical words Mr Forster had 
spoken when I w as a boy (Peter's age): "a piece of nature". (219-
20) 
Prentis offers us a vision of harmony and oneness with nature, a quite 
prelapsarian tableau after all; but neither the ending nor the novel as a whole 
is "a piece of nature", but a contrived artifice. In typical postmodernist 
fashion, the ending sends us right back to the beginning of the novel, to 
Sammy and to the situation of Prentis's "beginning these pages". Thus, we 
are all but recommended to re-read or rethink the novel. The first thing one 
realizes in such a rethinking is that Prentis has foregone the order of events in 
order to put a harmonic end to things; right before the recollection of love-
making among the dunes we get the "actual", more ambivalent, and thus 
"truer", ending: 
Peter: "What are those rusty metal things over there, Dad?" 
Dad: "Oh, they're something left over from the war." 
(As Dad and Peter . . . walk out again ... to the water's 
edge . . . and Dad thinks, almost for the first time, that day, of his 
own Dad.) 
Peter: "Oh." (Unenlightened, unwilling to display ignorance 
by asking further questions, but just a little bit af raid, gripping 
his father's hand, that the rusty metal things might still be 
dangerous. . . . ) 
But this was later. After lunch, after trips for ice-
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creams . . . and after . . . Marian and I m ade love in the sand. 
(219; emphasis mine) 
Shuttlecock, then, is a novel that feigns closure. Like Pamela, Prends is 
ultimately a Shamela. 
Furthermore, not only does Shuttlecock constitute a postmodernist 
loop; it also contains quite an elaborate instance of what Brian McHale 
considers a prominent postmodernist device: the mise-en-abyme, an e nclosed 
narrative that reflects the framing narrative.26 Dad's memoir's function as 
mise-en-abyme is of course made obvious by the fact that the two narratives 
share the same title.27 The similarities go further, however; as Prentis notes: 
"I can imagine myself in that dark cell, in those passage ways, that court­
yard. ... So that sometimes in m y mind ... it almost seems that Dad and I 
are one too" (146). Indeed, just like Dad, Prentis is imprisoned below ground 
(in the offices), but also, as Donald P. Kaczvinsky observes, in his own 
Château Martine: "Martin's house", to go by the name of his elder son 
(Kaczvinsky 9); and like Dad he is looking for an escape (from Quinn's 
torture—but also from his own role as torturer and interrogator; importantly, 
this is h is true escape). But, as one may begin to suspect, Prentis's narrative 
also shares the inconsistencies and contradictions of Dad's. Like Dowell in 
The Good Soldier, Prentis is a deeply unreliable narrator. In fact, Prentis's is 
so unreliable a narrative as to be self-erasing; it erases itself as it writes.28 
Peculiarly, at the same time as Prentis tries to preclude any deeper scrutiny 
on the part of the reader, he invites such scrutiny, just like a master criminal 
leaving clues in a kind of death wish or paradoxical wish to be found out; the 
very last thing he writes before the grand denouement of the last two chapters 
is: "How much of a book is in the words and how much is behind or in 
between the lines? Perhaps it is best not to probe too deeply into those 
invisible regions, but to accept on trust what is there on the page as the best 
26 This is how McHale explains the use and meaning of the te rm: "A true mise-en-abyme is 
determined by three criteria: first, it is a nested or embedded representation, occupying a 
narrative level inferior to that of the primary, diegetic narrative world; secondly, this nested 
representation resembles . . . something at the level o f the primary diegetic world; and thirdly, 
this 'something' that it r esembles must constitute some salient and continuous aspect of the 
primary world . . . The effect of mise-en-abyme, Gabriel Josipovici writes, 'is to rob events of 
their solidity'" (Postmodernist Fiction 124-25; emphasis in original). 
27 The cover of the 1997 Picador edition of the novel accentuates this aspect by displaying a 
rendition of the cover of George Prentis's Shuttlecock. The cover is thus a d ouble cover, or the 
simultaneous cover of two different books. 
28 Admittedly, it does this m ore subtly than, for instance, Beckett's Mol/oy, in which the second 
part begins, "It is midnight. The rain is beating on the w indows" (99), only to end: "Then I went 
back in to the house and wrote, It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not 
midnight. It was not raining" (189). 
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showing the author could make. And the same is true perhaps of this book . . . 
Once you have read it, it may be better not to peer too hard beneath the 
surface of what it says" (214). 
If we do peer, however, we find a number of inconsistencies and 
destabilizing factors. For example, Prentis is disturbed by the gaps in Dad's 
narrative ("Here description must be blurred"), but if one looks carefully at 
his own narrative, it has just these gaps and signals: "[L]et me tell you what 
passed between us before Quinn mentioned my promotion. We were dis­
cussing the report I had brought in, which merely required his approval 
before being sent off. I won't bore you with details" (28; emphasis mine). As 
Kaczvinsky shows, just as Dad's narrative may be a cover-up for a less 
flattering truth, so may Prentis's. The reason for producing such a cover-up 
story is given by Quinn when he and Prentis discuss the reliability of a 
witness in C9: "A story, Prentis. Why not? We all know that the best way to 
hide one guilty secret is seemingly to confess to another" (87). As Quinn 
further notes about Dad's narrative, given that it is a fabrication, it may be 
that "in writing it he is actually torn between the desire to construct a saving 
lie and an instinct not to falsify himself completely—to be, somehow, honest. 
So behind all the 'authentication' of his prison experiences and of the escape, 
he puts down little hints, little clues" (188). The truth may be that just as Dad 
blurs description in the case of the interrogations because what they actually 
produced were negotiations and betrayals, so Prentis chooses not to bore us 
with details because what actually passed between him and Quinn were 
negotiations following Prentis's threat to expose Quinn's manipulation of 
files; Prentis's promotion may be the direct result of those negotiations. 
Indeed, Prentis himself concedes that "now I sit behind a big desk, with a 
salary to match, promoted by an extraordinary stroke of luck (or, some say, 
secret machination) to a senior rank in my early thirties" (208; emphases 
mine). 
Moreover, there are hints that Quinn may be involved in some way in 
Dad's fate: as Quinn reveals, he was in Caen at about the time of Dad's 
escape. This may be taken as a simple coincidence, but when one considers 
Dad's favoured pastime, at the local golf club, the following observation of 
Prentis's fuels suspicion: "I noticed that in [Quinn's] conservatory, amongst a 
collection of various outdoor garments and implements . . . was a bag of golf-
clubs" (173). 
Thus, Shuttlecock sinks into a quagmire of indeterminacy. The novel 
makes a very complex proposition; I count eight possible truths, neither of 
which one can ultimately settle for.29 The Prentis who concludes the narrative 
2
" If w e lei D=Dad's statement, Q=Quinn's statement and P=Prentis's statement, then Shuttle­
cock makes the following proposition, logically formalized: (Dt & Qt & Pt) V (Df & Qt & Pt) V 
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may well still be the cruel manipulator we encounter in the earlier parts of the 
novel, his sense of vulnerability a fabrication. And thus, whatever intimations 
of the sentimentum the novel has worked up to are pretty much gorged by an 
absolute irony. As we have furthermore seen, even if we choose to trust 
Prentis's narrative, it does not ultimately adhere to the sentimentum, but slips 
back, in the end, into the unreflected, unreflexive sentimentality of its 
beginning. While the sentimentum follows postmodernism in discarding the 
quest for Truth and in r esiding in a kind of openended scepticist dialogic, it 
also follows postmodernism in the belief that you cannot escape the other, 
responsibility, the tug of the past and the Real, how ever unknowable those 
are. Prentis, conversely, avoids the reality of his anxiety and the impingement 
of the other by placing his romantic vision as finality. 
And so we leave him in that "shifting and rippling Sahara that was 
forming and reforming round our blanket" (220). It is fitting that the first of 
the two novels to which I now turn, and which constitute a further move 
toward the voicing of the sentimentum and an aesthetics of vulnerability, 
contrastingly takes place in a waterland. 
(Df & Qf & Pt) V (Df & Qf & Pf) V (Df & Qt & Pf) V (Dt & Qf & Pt) V (Dt & Qf & Pf) V (Dt 
& Qt & Pf). (t=true, f=false, V=or.) Add to this the further embedded propositions (Dad did or 
did not have an affair with Z's wife, for instance), and the proposition becomes almost 
impossible to disentangle. 
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"This Strange New Element": Toward the Sentimentum in 
Waterland and Out of this World 
Still, the postmodern condition is as much 
a stranger to disenchantment as it is to the 
blind positivity of delegitimation. 
—Jean-François Lyotard 
Perhaps we should have stopped this 
hemhorrhage of value. Enough of this 
terrorist radicalism; enough simulacra—let 
us have a rebirth of morality, belief and 
meaning. Down with twilight analyses! 
—Jean Baudrillard 
"And now", Shreve said, "we're going to 
talk about love." 
—Absalom, Absalom!, William Faulkner 
In Waterland and Out of This World, the postmodern condition and 
postmodernist aesthetics are brought more to the fore than in Swift's two 
previous novels. The postmodem condition is present quite explicitly on the 
thematic level in Waterland's adoption of phrases such as "the Grand 
Narrative" and "the end of history", and in Out of This World's discussions of 
the simulacrum and the hyperreal. Waterland signals by its very title its 
implication in the postmodern condition: the connotations of the title are 
hybridity and paradox, a solid form of liquidity; indeterminacy lodged in 
immanence, Hassan's "indetermanence". This doubleness is also aesthetic: as 
a seminal piece of historiographie metafiction, Waterland mixes realist 
aesthetics with postmodernist destabilization. The aesthetically postmodernist 
also comes through in both novels in an infatuation with language, which 
makes the narratives follow the logic of puns, by way of homonymy (both 
lexical and metaphorical) and analogy. In other words, not only do lexical 
homonyms serve as the vehicles for what is, ultimately, a ruse of cohesion, 
but any given metaphor may serve as the vehicle, simultaneously, of different 
and even incongruous ideas. In this way, Waterland and Out of This World 
lay bare the device of language itself, showing that its internal logic, its 
infatuation with itself, pretty much precludes any aim at clear-cut 
referentiality. In Waterland, this preclusion is heightened by an elaborate 
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intertextuality that makes one wonder whether the novel is anything but an 
amalgam of previous texts.1 The two novels may thus be seen as quite 
sophisticated echo chambers, or halls of mirrors, of the postmodernist kind. 
Yet, the novels move "beyond mere felicity of language", as Linda 
Gray Sexton puts it in her review of Out of This World (Sexton, Online). 
There are none of the explicit historical anomalies or the violations of 
ontological boundaries found in many other postmodernist novels, such as 
Doctorow's Ragtime or Thomas's The White Hotel. The postmodern realist 
ethos that I have suggested is integral to the sentimentum is thus maintained. 
It is hence possible to engage in the two novels, or let oneself be engaged by 
them, quite in the way one would in more traditional narratives that remain 
true to a realist naïveté. And it is hence also possible to yield to the 
sentimental moments of the two novels. There is a new kind of tension and 
vacillation in the novels between irony and sentimentality, between 
scepticism and belief, between apathy and pathos. The structure of my 
readings of the novels inevitably mimics this vacillation—a vacillation 
through which the sentimentum in all its aspects becomes more pronounced 
than in Swift's first two novels. 
Waterland: Remedy and Redemption at the End of History 
Originally published in 1983, Waterland is a novel of nuclear anxiety and of 
a crumbling Thatcherite Britain.2 The narrator, Tom Crick, has lost his job as 
a history teacher due to cut-backs in favour of subjects of "practical relevance 
to today's real world" (22). He has also lost his beloved wife, Mary, to 
schizophrenia. The scandal of Mary's kidnapping a child at a supermarket, in 
the belief that the child is a gift from God, is perceived by Tom as a second 
reason for his being laid off. Before this happens, Tom, challenged by the 
somewhat eccentric student Price, who believes in imminent nuclear apoca­
lypse and also questions the underlying assumptions of historiography, has 
begun to shift his history lessons from the topic of the French Revolution to 
the narration of his own life story, in an attempt to explain his wife's 
breakdown according to a causal logic. The focus of his story is the events 
leading up to and following upon the murder of his friend Freddie Parr in 
1943, a murder committed by Tom's mentally challenged brother Dick in a 
' Among the novel's clearly identifiable intertexts are Moby Dick, Great Expectations, Hereward 
the Wake, Absalom, Absalom!, The Sound and the Fury and Tess of the d'Urbervilles. In a way, 
Waterland cancels itself out in t his elaborate intertextual play, making one wonder what if 
anything constitutes originality in the novel. 
2 A revised edition of the novel was published in 1992. My reading here is of that revised edition, 
which I have taken to be the authoritative text. 
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fit of jealousy after Dick finds out that Mary, whom Dick has been wooing, is 
pregnant. Tom blames himself for the murder, since, apparently being the 
cause of the pregnancy, but fearing the rage of his smitten brother, he tells 
Dick that Freddie is the father. Following the murder, Mary, sensing the 
scandal that would result from her prospective adolescent motherhood, goes 
through a horrible abortion at the hands of the local "witch", Martha Clay. It 
is this abortion, and Mary's consequent infertility, that Tom identifies as the 
cause for her breakdown some four decades later. 
In the process of establishing a causal chain, however, Tom reaches 
further back, into the history of his ancestors, in a non-linear narrative that 
merges here and now and then and there in a Proustian fashion. As Tom 
proceeds, his aspirations to causal linking and panoramic grasp are in­
creasingly undermined. Waterland thus turns into an exercise in in-
determinability and pluralism. Its narrator presents several different, con­
flicting views of the nature of history and the nature of reality. The novel 
seems to settle, though, for a view of the reality of past and present as always 
yielding to fiction, or as so much approximating a sublime nothingness that 
they require fiction in order not to equal disappearance or naked terror. 
Accordingly, one of the underlying questions of the novel is which is worse: 
the subjection of the singular event to the patterns of fiction and to the 
selectivity of representation, or the opening of oneself, in vulnerability, to 
wounding by the unexpected event, the saying. Related to this question is the 
question of whether one in fact can escape representation: Tom comes to 
realize that there is no history, but that there are histories, each one formed 
through selection and exclusion and dependent on its particular point of view. 
From a view of history as linear progression, he turns to a view of history as 
a directionless, multidimensional structure. 
This is also to a large extent the structure of his narrative, which 
constitutes the novel. Consequently, Waterland may be seen as an ap­
proximation of a rhizomatic novel—as rhizomatic as a novel can be, that is. 
We should note that Deleuze and Guattari, in their account of rhizomatics, do 
not rule out literature for being inherently linear and hierarchic—on the 
contrary, they seem to view literature as a potentially potent mode of 
rhizome-making: "American literature, and already English literature, 
manifest this rhizomatic direction . . . they know how to move between 
things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with 
foundations, nullify endings and beginnings" (A Thousand Plateaus 25). 
Waterland does precisely these things. It follows the "[principles of 
connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to 
anything other, and must be" (Plateaus 7). The novel relates what in the 
rhizome is no longer points or positions, but various flows and lines of flight, 
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of "history", of "society", of "the self. It follows the "[principle of 
asignifying rupture" (9), which still means that although it "may be broken, 
shattered at a given spot... it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on 
new lines" (9). If Tom Crick is trying to trace a genealogy, he quickly finds 
out that "[t]he rhizome is an anti-genealogy" (Plateaus 11): history is not 
reducible to linear schemas, nor is it readable as separate and fixed points—it 
is a vast flow, liquid and dissolving rather than solid and divisible (a water-
land). The same goes for the self, which indeed is the site of the narration of 
Waterland: Tom Crick's self (which is not to be singlehandedly equated with 
the "I" that enunciates) is the flow of the narrative, is the site of the lines of 
flight, of multiplication, of the rhizome. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, 
" t h e  f a b r i c  o f  t h e  r h i z o m e  i s  t h e  c o n j u n c t i o n ,  ' a n d  .  .  .  a n d  .  .  .  a n d  . . ( 2 5 ) .  
Indeed, for all of Tom Crick's attempts to resolve disparate events and 
entities in a totalizing "whole story", to trace back, his narrative is one of 
parataxis rather than hypotaxis; it mocks the pretensions of psychoanalysis 
and dialectics to root, universalize and totalize. 
However, this does not mean that radical relativism and nihilism take 
hold. There is still room for tentative and partial truths, or rather effects, 
whether of history, of therapy, of sentimentality or of ethics and perhaps even 
morality. Indeed, Waterland immediately sets itself apart from Swift's earlier 
writings by commencing with a moral—if not " the moral of the story", then 
the moral of a story: 
"And don't forget", my father would say, as if he expected me at 
any moment to up and leave to seek my fortune in the wide 
world, "whatever you learn about people, however bad they turn 
out, each one of them has a heart, and each one of them was 
once a tiny baby sucking his mother's milk . . ." (1) 
It is a thoroughly sentimental maxim Tom Crick's father presents, but while 
its discourse of origin and fundament may be perceived as naively 
sentimentalizing, what it brings attention to is ultimately an ethics of alterity: 
the judgement of the other should be forever postponed, the other's infinity 
always projected onto the canvas of engagement. Still, as Tom is quick to 
point out, those are "[fjairy-tale words; fairy-tale advice" (1). However, 
immediately after saying this, Tom shifts perspective once again, conceding: 
"But we lived in a fairy-tale place". Thus, Waterland reveals on the veiy first 
page what the experience of reading it is going to be like: a dialogical 
movement between fairy-tale and realism, between belief and scepticism, 
between sentimentality and nihilism. Waterland is an e xploded fairy-tale; it 
inscribes fairy-tale and story in order to subvert them—at the same time, by 
the peculiar logic of postmodernist double coding, the subversion is imploded 
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and sucked into that very fairy-taleness it seems to want to discard. Thus, the 
novel also places responsibility and choice with the reader: the novel 
provides no stable categories, no ultimate words on any issue. If it begs 
anything of the reader, it is perhaps that s/he tries to keep in the same critical 
view both fairy-tale sentimentality and realist "sobriety", not opting for either 
but for both. 
Here is the appropriate point at which to note that while Waterland 
inevitably carries the traces of a more classical sentimentality in its pastiche 
of Victorian novels as it narrates the fates of Tom Crick's ancestors, those 
traces are not what will interest me here. Rather, I am interested in the 
contemporary moment of the novel, what the novel constructs as the now of a 
postmodern complication that the main characters (the narrator and his wife 
above all) live through, or in. I am interested in perceiving how senti­
mentality takes place, and takes time, at "the end of history" and particularly 
at the end of the novel, which, quite importantly, is not the end of its fabula. 
It transpires that it is precisely in the postmodern, in all its aspects, and 
perhaps particularly in that most radical aspect posed at the end of the novel, 
that sentimentality truly accrues and stands the ultimate test. 
Indeed, the sentimental opening of the novel also constitutes the first of 
the novel's innumerable postmodernist textual appropriations; it rewrites the 
opening of a classic novel penned some sixty years earlier: The Great 
Gatsby. For this is how Nick Carraway begins his narrative: 
In my younger and more vulnerable years my father gave me 
some advice that I've been turning over in my mind ever since. 
"Whenever you feel like criticizing anyone", he told me, 
"just remember that all the people in this world haven't had the 
advantages that you've had." (1) 
The intertextual reference here is of some importance: compared to Nick's 
father's somewhat snobbish observation of fundamental inequality, Tom's 
father's is a humble observation of fundamental equality.3 In other words, 
Swift rewrites Fitzgerald in a mode of communal or intersubjective senti­
mentality. Thus, there is immediately displayed in the novel both an elaborate 
intertextuality and an irreducible particularity. The novel hence also begs of 
the reader to keep in the same critical view both intertextual ruse and 
individual artistic ambition. 
Waterland is thus a text that asks for a vigilant reader. Consequently, 
3 Indeed, Nick say s that "I am s till a little afraid of missing something if I forget that, as my 
father snobbishly suggested, and I snobbishly repeat, a sense of the fun damental decencies is 
parcelled out unequally at birth" (1 ; emphases mine). 
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the reader him/herself becomes involved in a central theme of the narrative: 
the responsibility for and careful engagement with the other, the ideal of 
watchfulness or vigilance. On the intrinsic plane of the novel, those duties of 
engagement are very much neglected by the characters; the tragedy of 
Waterland is the tragedy of neglect, the failure of connection. The words 
"vigilant" and "vigilance" recur throughout the novel as a subtle pointer as to 
what is actually lacking in the characters. In a terse kind of irony, the words 
are quite often attributed not to people, but to inanimate objects or to people 
who have all but lost their senses: Tom's ancestor Sarah Atkinson, who 
"knocked her head against ... a walnut writing-table" and "never again re­
covered her wits" (77), still "retainfs] the paradoxical pose of one who keeps 
watch—but over nothing" (78) and lives to be "so old yet so vigilant" (94); 
Tom's wife Mary, having been registered at a mental hospital as she suffers 
from schizophrenia, "stares, vigilantly and knowingly" (330); on Greenwich 
Hill, "perched on a plinth, becloaked and tricorned, stands General Wolfe, in 
bronze" with a "vigilant pose" (128); Tom's half-brother Dick's Velocette 
motor-cycle is seen "keeping sentinel" as Dick tends to the eel-traps (249), 
and in the last chapter "keeps guard" over the dredger from which Dick is 
about to make his suicidal dive (348). Most intriguingly, the novel ends, after 
Dick has made his dive, never to surface again, and confusion and despair 
has taken hold of the other characters present, with the sentence: "On the 
bank in the thickening dusk, in the will-o'-the-wisp dusk, abandoned but 
vigilant, a motor-cycle" (358; emphasis mine). I shall return to this intriguing 
ending, but now I will turn to the instances of human vigilance, or lack 
thereof, in the novel. 
However, I would first like to note that Waterland complicates the 
issue of vigilance by playing on the ambiguity of the word: vigilance may 
denote the act of watching for the event in order to embrace it and stay open 
to it, but it may also denote the act of keeping watch in or der to prevent the 
event from occurring. The character most thoroughly associated with the 
latter kind of vigilance, it turns out, is Tom's father, Henry Crick, the lock-
keeper. Vigilance of course goes quite with the territory if one is a lock-
keeper. However, in the metaphorical scheme of Waterland, lock-keeping has 
a more far-reaching significance. In its portrayal of the history of drainage 
and land reclamation, the novel establishes water as a metaphor of the 
devious depths of amnesia and terror, and land as a metaphor of the solid 
ground of history and civilization, always about to sink; Tom, the history 
teacher, describes the "progress" of civilization as "[a] dogged, vigilant 
business" (336). Metaphorically, then, the lock-keeper has the rather 
important duty of tending to the water-levels in order to avoid the flooding of 
what in more archaic times was called "evil". This is, as Bauman points out, 
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the very vigilance necessitated by the modern project: "The practice 
stemming from a conviction that order can only be man-made, that it is 
bound to remain an artificial imposition on the unruly natural state of things 
and humans, that for this reason it will forever remain vulnerable and in need 
of constant supervision and policing, is the main (and, indeed, unique) 
distinguishing mark of modernity. From now on, there would be no moment 
of respite, no relaxing of vigilance" (Intimations of Postmodemity xv). 
Accordingly, when the flooding does come, Henry Crick keeps 
"tenaciously, vigilantly, in a half submerged cottage, to his post of lock-
keeper" (122). After the appearance of the corpse of Freddie Parr in his 
sluice, Henry walks up and down his tow-path, "[a]nd on his face, as he 
stares from flat river to flat fields, is imprinted an expression of exaggerated 
vigilance" (111). Subsequently, when the murder of Freddie Pan- leads to the 
abortion of the fetus that was the cause of the murder, the abortion in its turn 
leading to the estrangement of Mary, Henry scolds himself: "Trouble upon 
trouble. First Freddie. And now. But it's a punishment, that's what it is. A 
punishment for non-vigilance. For neglect of duty" (317). And the flooding 
that eventually causes Henry's death from broncho-pneumonia is also "his 
fault. ('His fault for not getting out when he should've', scowls the sergeant.) 
If he'd taken more care, if he'd been more watchful. He might have saved the 
sluice. He might have saved the world" (341). Henry's is a defensive, 
guarded vigilance; he is keeping guard so that the full truth of the murder of 
Freddie Parr will not surface, which in turn means keeping guard over a 
whole host of related secrets. Thus, Henry's sin is also really neglect,4 his 
failure to be vigilant in the sense of being responsible for and open to the 
other and to the event. 
This kind of vigilance is more or less lacking in all of the characters in 
Waterland; a vigilance that takes heed of one of the meanings of the root of 
the word, "vigil": a devotional watching. Indeed, what Tom is doing through 
his narrative is keeping a vigil over his ancestors, over his dead family, over 
his mentally departed wife and perhaps over his and Mary's unborn child. It 
is, however, a vigil that is "better late than never". And a v igil too can be a 
way of avoiding the responsibility of the situation at hand, as when, after the 
trauma of her abortion and the local scandal it causes, Mary decides "to 
withdraw from the world and devote herself to a life of solitude, atone­
ment ... [a] lonely vigil" (41). However, whereas Mary's is a vigil of si­
lence, Tom's is a vigil of overflowing language. 
Thus, Waterland stresses the importance of telling, of putting into 
words, of the talking cure—the sin of non-vigilance is also the sin of non-
4 My use of religious terminology here is partly motivated by the theological subtext established 
in the novel. See Schad for a thorough discussion of this aspect of Waterland. 
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communication. Suffering demands expression, sentiments must be voiced 
and offered to the other. Crisis occasions narrative as a means of healing. 
When things go wrong, Tom argues, from his vantage point late in his 
traumatic life, human beings have a need for "receptacles for their stock of 
fairy-tales, of listening ears on which to unload those most unbelievable yet 
haunting of fairy-tales, their own lives" (7). In fact, the very condition of 
Tom's narrative is that of a therapy session: in the words of Paul Connerton, 
psychoanalytic therapy "sets up 'an intermediate realm between illness and 
real life through which the transition from the one to the other is made'. This 
intermediate realm consists to a very large extent of narrative activity: the 
analysands tell of their past, of their present life outside the analysis, of their 
life within the analysis" (26). In Waterland, Tom first creates a situation of 
transference in the classroom, where his pupils serve as a mostly passive 
audience. Later, Tom "repeats the stories he's told in class" (331), speaking 
"to an audience he is forced to imagine" (63). He tells of his past, of his 
present l ife outside the analysis and of his life within the analysis; now and 
then he reflects upon the narrative itself, or, as we just saw, upon the 
circumstances under which his analysis takes place. This psychoanalytic 
condition accounts to a large extent for the rambling, stuttering, spirally 
repetitive structure of the narrative too: "the psychoanalytic dialogue seeks to 
uncover the analysand's efforts to maintain in existence a particular kind of 
narrative discontinuity. The point of this narrative discontinuity is to block 
out parts of a personal past" (Connerton 26). Indeed, Tom admits that he is 
"[ajvoiding in these memory-jogging journeys . . . many no-go areas and 
emergency zones (you see, when it comes to it, your history teacher is afraid 
to tread the minefield of the past)" (330). However, Tom's discontinuous plot 
gradually forms a comprehensible story by returning to and giving explicit 
accounts of events that are originally related in a more or less vague and 
summaiy fashion. This is precisely the method used in psychoanalysis: 
In order to discard this radical discontinuity, psycho-analysis 
works in a temporal circle: analyst and analysand work 
backwards from what is told about the autobiographical present 
in order to reconstruct a coherent account of the past; while, at 
the same time, they work forwards from various tellings about 
the autobiographical past in order to reconstitute the account of 
the present which it is sought to understand and explain . . . 
[T]he analyst [directs] attention to the past when the analysand 
insists upon the present, and [looks] for present material when 
the analysand dwells on the past. One set of narratives is 
deployed to generate questions about another set of narratives. 
(Connerton 26) 
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In the way that Connerton describes it, the structure of the psychoanalytic 
session bears a startling resemblance to the narrative structure of Waterland. 
The novel's very structure is thus the structure of the remedy of suffering. It 
is the structure of a narrative process which has as its goal the reconciliation 
of seemingly disparate events: "To remember, then, is precisely not to recall 
events as isolated; it is to become capable of forming meaningful narrative 
sequences . . . [A]n attempt is made to integrate isolated or alien phenomena 
into a single unified process" (Connerton 26). 
Tom does indeed find himself in a situation that calls for narrative 
remedy and redemption: telling his stories he "sits alone because his wife of 
over thirty years who no longer knows him, nor he her, has been taken away, 
and because his schoolchildren, his children, who once—ever reminding him 
of the future—came to his history lessons, are no longer there" (63). Having 
lost his job, and hence his pupils, his substitute children, he is also forced to 
face the fact that he is probably the end of the family line, and hence quite 
literally the end of history as far as both the Cricks and the Atkinsons are 
concerned. So it is understandable that the pupil Price's remark that "[t]he 
only important thing about history ... is that it's got to the point where it's 
probably about to end" (7) is what triggers off Tom's therapeutic story-telling 
sessions; as Tom puts it, "your astounded and forsaken history teacher, 
prompted as he was by the challenging remarks of a student called Price, 
ceased to teach history and started to offer you, instead, these . . . Tales of the 
Fens" (42). 
Tom's narrative is also prompted by the media presentation of the local 
scandal of Mary's kidnapping a baby at a Safeways store, a scandal which 
has led, in connection with his increasingly unorthodox history lessons, to his 
being asked to retire. Countering the superficial p lay of media narratives with 
his own more profound and complex narrative thus becomes Tom's 
objective, and Waterland thus prefigures the more explicitly Baudrillardean 
theme of Out of This World.5 It is in this countering that the major ethical 
move of the novel lies: Tom's narrative is the attempt to account for the 
infinity of that other which is the past, and to be true to the saying in the face 
of the said by bearing witness to the complexity and plasticity of past and 
present truths. At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, Tom is attempting 
to establish the said by explaining, by reaching the centre and the halt of the 
issue, the logos. In the course of his narration, however, he realizes, 
3 In thi s sense the novel also brings to mind Paul A uster's Leviathan, in which the n arrator 
attempts to give his fullest possible account of the life of his now deceased terrorist friend; the 
novel ends with the narrator handing over the pages of Leviathan to an FBI-agent. In Waterland, 
Tom's narrative is similarly prompted by the questions of the police off icers at the site of the 
kidnapping and afterwards. 
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maddeningly, that this is not possible: 
But he alr eady kn ows—though he carrie s on, in defia nce of his 
professional superio rs, risking, indeed , his whole career —that 
it's not expla ining he's doing. Because he's already reached the 
limits of his power to explain, just as his wife (a once dogged 
and patient woman) has ceased to be realistic —has ceased to 
belong to reality. Because it's the inexplic able that keeps him 
jabbering on nineteen to the dozen like this and scurrying further 
and further into the pa st. . . . Because his ch ildren . . . suddenly 
want to listen, and although he 's trying to explain he's really 
only telling a— (108-109) 
The situation at hand and the events leading up to it have, as we can see from 
the passage just quoted, also made Mary unbearably other to Tom, and his 
narrative is for that reason also an attempt to reclaim her, to recover a point at 
which he at least thought he knew her meaning. Sitting at the bench in 
Greenwich Park with Mary after she has revealed that God will give her a 
child, Tom "is constrained to hug his wife as though to confirm she is still 
there. For in the twilight it seems that, without moving, she is receding, 
fading, becoming ghostly. ... He doesn't know how to play this crazy game 
she is playing" (148). A few paragraphs earlier, Tom notes that "[s]he is 
leaving him; she is forsaking him. . . . But this is no ordinary separation" 
(147; emphasis mine). Faced with Mary's radical o therness, Tom rehearses 
the said: "He believes: this is Mary; this is a bench; this is a dog. The last 
thing he wants to believe is that he's in fairy-land". 
Swift sets up the scene in which Mary reveals her otherness (thus 
revealing the impossibility of revelation) with wonderful irony: the bench is 
placed "some fifty yards from the line of zero longitude" (146), that is, in a 
sense, pretty much at the centre of the measured world, and furthermore close 
to the Observatory, with its "locked-up collections of antique chronometers, 
astrolabes, sextants, telescopes—instruments for measuring the universe" 
(147). However, the instruments for measuring the universe are notably 
locked-up, and what is more Tom significantly keeps noting that "the park 
[is] soon to close" (146); "[t]he park must close soon. Soon, everyone must 
be gone" (147). In other words, the instruments of universality have been 
discarded and the centre must be evacuated, as Tom cannot even begin to 
measure the single being sitting next to him. However, what ensues is not a 
careful engagement with Mary as other, but a withdrawal from her. 
It turns out, in fact, that Tom's and Mary's life together (or, more 
accurately, lives together) has been a constant evasion of engagement with 
the other, at least from the moment when Mary brings home the fact that 
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Dick has killed Freddie Parr out of jealousy, thus shattering Tom's dream of 
innocence: "He couldn't bring himself to face the face which faced him" 
(132), Tom observes about himself, making himself an other in a statement 
that echoes both Prufrock and the Levinasian face-to-face. He retreats into 
subjective sentimentalism, "[a]s if it were all some trick against him". Even at 
this early point in his and Mary's relationship, "he's alone. She's alone. He's 
blustery-raging alone; and she's rooted, patient alone". And there begins 
Tom's mistake of perceiving Mary as rooted and patient, of fixing her as a 
finite moment and space. Looking back, Tom reflects: "But she made do (so 
he thought) with nothing. . . . And whereas he had to keep going back every 
day to school, there was always this grown-up woman to return to, who was 
stronger than him (he believed) at facing the way things must be" (126; 
emphases mine). 
However, this misconception of Mary is not wholly Tom's respon­
sibility; at the same time as Tom withdraws into his interiority, there is a 
negligence on the part of Mary, as she does not offer the gift of her suffering 
as utterance to Tom: "She won't ever tell about the time when—" (341). 
Mary's silence is fatal; as a consequence of her reticence, she acts out her 
trauma. Waterland thus illustrates the "two contrasting ways of bringing the 
past into the present: acting out and remembering" (Connerton 25). When an 
individual refuses or is unable to remember, the "compulsion to repeat 
[replaces] the capacity to remember". As a result of this compulsion, 
individuals "deliberately place themselves in distressing situations: in this 
way repeating an old experience". Refusing to remember, Mary becomes 
again the Mother of God she cried out for and identified herself with during 
the abortion: "HolyMaryMotherofGodHolyMaryMotherofGodHolyMary-
Motherof—" (308). She places herself in the distressing situation of 
kidnapping a baby that at least part of her knows she will not be allowed to 
keep, thus repeating the experience of losing her child. 
Waterland shows, then, that history, which is usually—certainly in the 
doctrine of modernity—made other, made what we are not, what we have 
surpassed, is inescapable: we are in history, continually becoming history, 
always haunted by history, always suffering from history and suffering in 
history. The fates of Tom and Mary show that, pace Jameson, there still is a 
subject of/in h istory and "a self present to do the feeling", to do the suffering. 
And Waterland is, as we have now seen, about suffering vis-à-vis narrative, 
about narrative as remedy, narrative as therapy.6 This notion of narrative is 
most explicitly expressed by Tom's mother, Helen: "[S]he believes in stories. 
She believes that they're a way of bearing what won't go away, a way of 
6 This is true of Out of This World too, where the relation becomes explicit in Sophie's therapy 
sessions with Doctor Klein. 
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making sense of madness. . . . No, don't forget. Don't erase it. You can't 
erase it. But make it into a story" (225). Tom's father, on the other hand, 
traumatized by serving in World War One, becomes the main example, 
besides Mary, of the consequences of not telling one's story: "Henry Crick 
forgets. He says: I remember nothing. But that's just a trick of the brain. . . . 
Because it doesn't take much or long . . . and [he is] crying out again for 
treatment. . . . [He] comes home from a long walk one October afternoon, a 
mass of twitches, trembles, shakes and jitters, unable to speak a sensible 
word" (222-23). Indeed, it is under the auspices of his future wife, who 
believes in the talking cure, that he finally recovers. Importantly, the remedy 
lies not in explaining, not in uncovering truth, but in the telling itself; this 
view is supported by psychoanalytical theory: "[Psychotherapists who other­
wise disagree claim that worrying about the objective truth of memories 
serves no useful purpose, since it is only the patient's subjective belief in the 
truth of often error-prone and partially fabricated memories that needs to be 
heeded" (Ross vii-viii).7 
As we have seen, though, Tom, who has learnt the value of narrative 
remembrance from his parents, is never quite able to rid himself of the 
historian's ambition to explain. We may note that he concedes only with 
great pain that the past is irreclaimable and the other inscrutable: "he's really 
only telling a—he says, incapable of uttering the word "story", as if that 
word was in itself traumatic. Tom has to struggle to accept fiction. When his 
mother told him bedside stories when he was a young boy lying ill, he tells 
us, "he strove to cleave a passage through to a mother who was becoming 
less and less real, more and more besieged by fiction", and increasingly felt 
"that he himself was in danger of becoming—a figment" (272). Tom thus 
shirks before fiction, which is here revealed to have the power of re­
presenting the world and oneself as other than what has been said, opting 
instead for facts and explanation, for "the Grand Narrative, the filler of 
vacuums, the dispeller of fears of the dark" (62). 
Tom's belief in explanation is, however, countered by Price's astute 
remark that "explaining's a way of avoiding the facts as you pretend to get 
near to them" (167). Put next to that remark, Tom's reaching beyond the 
point of his own birth, back to the beginning of recorded history, in order to 
7 Harold Schweizer similarly points out that the "authority [of the talking cure] lies in its 
exchange, which is to admit also the indeterminacy of what constitutes that authority. The truth, 
like the authority of the analyst's constructions, is thus a self-conscious, interminable textual 
'edition' of the past, a story always under revision, always in transition between reader and text 
or between analyst and patient" (51). And further: "Freud's narrative theory implies the 
importance of present (and this means interminable) social interactions. These must now replace 
both the final cure (as well as its religious or ideological analogues) as well as the truth of the 
past" (53). 
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explain his current situation is deeply parodie. In his incessant insistence on 
explaining, Tom is ignoring, or avoiding, what the novel implies is much 
more urgent: engaging; engaging, that is, with the other. At the same time as 
his vigil over the past is a kind of ethical engagement, then, it constitutes, 
inevitably perhaps, a violation; like the signified always becomes signifier, 
the saying always risks becoming the said. Yet, even in his classes on the 
Grand Narrative of the French Revolution, Tom begins, again challenged by 
Price, to observe not only the limits, but the violence of explanation: "As you 
try to define the revolution you imitate precisely the action of the revolution 
itself—eliminating with a mental guillotine those who do not fit some 
impossibly absolute notion of revolution" (139). 
Consequently, Crick's main narrative objective, which, lest we forget, 
is the reclamation of love, is put under a lot of strain by his awakening 
postmodern consciousness, which, importantly, has its own internal 
contradictions: at the same time as this consciousness strives to do as little 
violence as possible to the other and to recount experience in its singularity, it 
also recognizes that all narrative representation is immediately and in­
escapably caught up in a pre-existing system of tropes and, what is more, that 
experience itself is structured by internalized codes of perception and by 
conventionalized attitudes. Hence, all but the earliest recollections of his and 
Mary's relationship are ironized. For instance, their adolescent rendezvous in 
the disused windmill are described in idyllic, sentimental terms: 
Within the windmill by the Hockwell Lode curiosity and 
innocence held hands. . . . Within its stunted, wooden walls we 
first used those magic, those spell-binding words which make 
the empty world seem full, just as surely as a thing fits inside a 
hole: I love—I love—Love, love . . . And perhaps the windmill 
itself, empty and abandoned . . . found in our presence a new­
found windmill-purpose. (52; second ellipsis in the original) 
Only a few pages later, however, irony enters Tom's lover's discourse, as he 
relates the nature of Mary's and his relationship following the death of 
Freddie Parr: "A simple but edifying scene in w hich Mary and I embrace to 
confirm the power of our love in the face of the unforeseen perils of the 
world and the frailty of flesh, as witness the death of a mutual friend. Not to 
be. Mary doesn't unclasp her shins" (56). Similarly, after Mary has decided 
to end her three year vigil and Tom has finished his military service, he 
"makes his journey home in the guise of the returning Prince ready to pluck 
aside briars and cobwebs and kiss his Princess out of whatever trance has 
possessed her for the last three years" (120). Having met at Gildsey station, 
Tom and Mary sit at a nearby tea room "in a scene evoking for the outsider 
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but not for the protagonists certain cinema-screen reunions" (121). Tom's 
narrative, notably increasingly third-person, is thus fraught with distancing 
evocations of ancient and modern myths: fairy-tales, movies. His and Mary's 
whole life together, it turns out, is a kind of acting-routine, a play of surfaces: 
they learn "[t]o withstand, behind all the stage-props of their marriage, the 
empty space of reality" (126). Still, Tom notes in passing, as he often notes 
things of import and poignancy, that Mary is the person "whom he needed 
indeed, when it came to it, more than he needed all the wisdom and solace of 
history" (126-27). 
Importantly, however, in the final analysis irony heightens the 
emotional impact of Tom's narrative, as irony is precisely the simultaneous 
evasion and acknowledgement of suffering. Irony is a mode that allows one 
to get near the fact of suffering as one avoids it , and thus has as its effect a 
kind of sublimity. This is perhaps most evident in the following passage, 
which, narrating the moment at which Mary reveals that she is a latter-day 
successor to her Biblical namesake, moves from ironized melodrama to senti­
mental poignancy: 
The experienced observer of park-bench lovers' tiffs might say 
that the w oman has had something to confess. ... Is this that 
familiar drama, the "It's time we broke it off, the "It's time we 
never met again" drama? Or is it that equally much-repeated 
scene, the "You see—there's another" routine? That outrage on 
his part; that hand-waving, question-firing . . . The passer-by 
might catch the words "doctor—you must go to a doctor". So 
then, it is that other well-known amorous crisis: the "Darling, I 
think I'm—" crisis. But these words of his are not spoken with 
their usual air of masculine bluster . . . but with a kind of 
desperation—can it be that our park-bench gallant is g oing to 
weep?—with the kind of anguish with which one begs, one 
prays—(147) 
The suffering of love stifling language, though, Tom breaks off at the very 
point he is about to express the true vulnerability of the situation, about to 
display its open wound. 
However, Tom's narrative is not just about his love of Mary; it is about 
"our love of life, children, our love of life" (205), as Tom puts it in a kind of 
sentimental or melodramatic slippage. And both the love of the more insular 
party of two and the love of the subject for the world depend, Tom insists, on 
curiosity: "Curiosity ... is an ingredient of love" (51); "Children, be curious. 
Nothing is worse (I know it) than when curiosity stops. Nothing is more 
repressive than the repression of curiosity. Curiosity begets love. It weds us 
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to the world. It's part of our perverse, madcap love for this impossible planet 
we inhabit. People die when curiosity goes" (206). Waterland portrays the 
complication of love that resides in its having, in order to endure, to 
simultaneously accept alterity and try to surmount it. In order to endure, love 
must learn that the mystery of the other will never yield to curiosity, but that 
curiosity must not for that reason succumb to indifference. In this, Waterland 
brings to mind Bauman's analysis of love in Postmodern Ethics: 
[T]he "pathos of love" acknowledges the duality of being as 
more than a temporary failure, more than what thus-far-has-
remained-unsurmounted; it accepts the duality as in­
surmountable. And yet it cannot give expression to that 
acceptance in any other way but by attempting, from the 
beginning and as long as love lasts, to deny what it has 
assumed—to surmount the insurmountable: to make the 
partner's suffering one's own, to "suck in" the partner's 
sentiments, to partake of the partner's being . . . Without that 
codicil which demands that the duality should be lived as a 
challenge . . . love would not be love, but alterity pure and sim­
ple. Dropping the codicil; this is how love wilts, fades and 
dies. . . . [T]he pathos of love feeds on mystery. But the mystery 
it feeds on is one it hopes to crack. Curiosity is the hope of 
knowledge—and when the hope wanes, curiosity gives way to 
indifference. (94-95) 
The failure of Tom's and Mary's love is put in precisely these terms: when 
the murder of Freddie Parr, paired with Mary's pregnancy, puts pressure on 
their relationship, Tom notes, "something's gone from her face. Curiosity's 
gone" (57); "But Mary's not interested. Her face is white and clammy. Her 
eyes clench. She's not interested in stories. Not curious" (296). And when 
Tom comes home one day, some thirty years later, to find Mary sitting in the 
sofa with her kidnapped Son of God, while his propensity for curiosity is 
greater than Mary's, he does not engage with her mystery in the terms of 
gentle curiosity. He notes the radical alterity of the situation—"That's your 
wife over there; you know, Mary, the one you though you knew. But maybe 
this is unknown country"—"[b]ut he does not stoop before the blanket-
wrapped bundle . . . , kneel down, place palms together and let his eyes fill 
with wondering reverence" (265-66). Instead of engaging in a devotional, 
curious watching, he tries to drag Mary into sameness, peppering her with 
demands: "Mary, you'd better explain"; "That— That's utter nonsense"; 
"You've got to tell me"; "You've got to explain" (266); "Mary, explain—"; 
"How? Why? Why?" (268). The sudden eruption of otherness—the 
event—shatters the Levinasian ideal of careful engagement and gives way 
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instead to a violent melodramatism: 
Observe your history teacher in ac tion. Yes—for all hi s droning 
on, for all his talk-and- chalk—in spontaneous actio n. Observe 
him locked in elemental violence . . . cast now in the ro le not o f 
an amazed shepherd bu t of a ruthle ss Hero d . . . The golden re­
triever, left out of things, nuzzles its head on the sofa; yaps, 
growls. Your history teacher gives it a sharp, a sudden, a 
ferocious kick. (266-68) 
We can tell from Tom's language in narrating this event that he is indicting 
himself for coming up short, for not being open to the event: he is "a ruthless 
Herod", who "for all his talk-and-chalk" is "locked in elemental violence". 
At the same time, this passage illustrates the difficulty of heeding Wyscho-
grod's call for a "radical saintly generosity" and "a desire on behalf of the 
Other" (xxiv); faced with a traumatic now, with the sudden disruption of the 
said, we all risk turning from "amazed shepherd" to "ruthless Herod", turning 
from patience to offence, from the vigilant to the violent. But as in the case of 
Tom and Mary, what results is a failure: a failure of patience, of generosity, 
of curiosity, of love. 
However, the final failure of Mary's and his love is seemingly what 
makes Tom capable of imbibing the truth of love, of realizing the value of 
gentle curiosity; but as their love is a failure, Tom must turn elsewhere to 
engage his new-found sense of love. He must opt instead for the "perverse, 
madcap love for this impossible planet we inhabit". As Tom suggests, "the 
world is so arranged that when all things are learnt, when curiosity is 
exhausted (so, long live curiosity), that is when the world shall have come to 
its end" (204). The relationship of the subject to the world is thus the same as 
that of the subject to the other of what Bauman calls "the moral party of 
two". 
At the same time, subject and world do not easily form a party—our 
madcap love for the world may turn out to be unrequited, and the other of 
(hu)man may turn out to be menacingly indifferent. The resulting 
decentrement of (hu)man and dehumanization of the world might seem to 
effect an eclipse of sentimentality. However, as it turns out, this is not the 
case. Crucially, it is in his engagement with the non-human or not-quite-
human realms of the world that Tom begins to accept that the world is elusive 
and tantalizingly seductive and will not yield a final "how" or "why", thus 
reaching a heightened sense of the spiritual and of a sentimental relation to 
any other. The world ceases to be the docile, petrified object of modern 
instrumentality, and becomes curiously personified, yielding to the pathetic 
fallacy, the fallaciousness of which we saw Prentis question in Shuttlecock. 
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The world is like a will-o'-the-wisp, that rare marsh gas phenomenon that 
Tom's father was once blessed with encountering: 
It ripples, twinkles, now in, n ow out of the water, now mingling 
with the reeds ; it twirls, whirl s, flashes, flutters, flames, grows 
dim the n bright again , skips, ho vers, dodges, zips and seem s to 
be saying all the time, "Look at me—do I have your full 
attention? Yes, I see I have your full attention." For one instant it 
seems to take on the flickering sha pe of a woman. Then as it 
reaches the barrier of the sluice, it vanishes. (232) 
The intentionality and the seductive powers of the phenomenon are of course 
made explicit in quite parodie terms by its taking on the shape of a woman. 
Waterland thus elicits a decentrement of human consciousness, although its 
terms for evoking extra-human consciousness are inescapably anthropo­
morphic. In this decentrement, the novel corresponds to what Hassan writes 
of "dehumanization" in "POSTmodernlSM": 
There is m ore to "dehumanization" than "another idea of man" ; 
there is also an in cipient revulsion against the human, sometimes 
a renewal of the sense of the superhuma n. Rilke's "Angels". 
Lawrence's "Fish": 
And my heart accused itself 
Thinking: I am not the measure of creation 
This is beyond me, this fish. 
His God stands outside my God. (36)s 
We may compare Hassan's (and Lawrence's) notions here to Tom Crick's 
observation that the not-quite-human Dick, who notably has "the dull, vacant 
stare of a fish" (242) and is "a sort of machine . . . can give the impression 
that he looks down from his lofty and lucid mindlessness, half in contempt 
and half in pity at a world blinded by its own glut of imagination. That he 
knows something we don't" (38). Like Prentis's father in Shuttlecock, Dick is 
an emblem of the inscrutability of the other: "The eyelids alone registered 
emotion. But although they registered emotion it was impossible to tell 
merely from their movement what emotion was being signalled" (27). The 
greatest irony of Dick is perhaps that, in keeping with the ironic ascription of 
vigilance mentioned earlier, he is the only character in the novel who 
spontaneously assumes responsibility and begs for excuse, not even knowing 
quite what is wrong: "S-s-sorry, Tom. S-s-sorry" (323); of course, Dick is the 
one character in the novel whom no one would hold accountable. The 
8 For the sake of clarity and space, I have altered the original layout of this passage. 
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machine-man, the semi-object, then, and not the subject, assumes 
responsibility. The human is dehumanized and the non-human is 
humanized—to use an anthropocentric vocabulary that belies the precise 
point of the novel's vision here. Not only do both the powers of seduction 
and the impetus of responsibility move from the human to the non-human 
realm, but the focus on the other that is preeminently human in Levinas—the 
other is an other human being, who has a face—is refocalized onto the other 
of human being. 
From the amphibian, not-quite-human fish-man Dick, though, 
Waterland extends its exposition of otherness and its simultaneous 
personification to not only other species but to inanimate objects.9 For 
instance, besides its obvious, slightly parodie, reference to the survey chapter 
on whales in Moby Dick, the chapter "About the Eel" in Waterland mainly 
serves to point out that eels lead an existence quite unknown to us, something 
our ontologies will not cover. Neither will our epistemologies, as the point of 
the chapter very much is that not only is no full knowledge of the eel per se 
possible, but neither is any of the phenomenon of the eel. The eel takes on 
mystical, spiritual meanings that go beyond but also through (hu)man, 
decentring him/her: when the chapter arrives at the time of the First World 
War, Tom notes with relativist irony that "yet it must be said that this 
catastrophic interval, to which such dread words as apocalypse, cataclysm, 
Armageddon have not unjustly been applied, does not interrupt the life cycle 
of the eel" (201). Later in the novel, the eel Dick offers Mary as a token of 
love is described as having "little glimmering amber eyes which, for all o ne 
knows, could be the windows of a tiny eel-soul. It has little panting gills and, 
behind them, delicate whirring pectoral fins not unreminiscent of Dick's 
whirring eye-lashes . . (253). Thus, the assumption of (hu)man as sole 
bearer of soul, of consciousness, of rights, is questioned. 
Similarly, when Tom narrates, in a way, the Dawn of Man by telling of 
the first men who came to settle by the river Ouse, he suggests that 
how the Ouse regarded (for let us adopt the notion of these 
primitive peo ples who ver y probably thought of the Ouse as a 
God, a sentient Being) these two-legged intruders who by daring 
to transmute thing s into sound we re uncon sciously forging the 
' Considering that Levinas, in Otherwise than Being, uses the term "amphibology" for the 
coexistence within language of both the saying and the said, or, in Eaglestone's words, the 
"interdependency of the saying and the said, the amphibology of language" ( 149). we might read 
Dick as an emblem of the eruption of otherness within the same. If we do so, Waterland offers 
little hope for difference, for the unpresentable, as the unpresentable seemingly recognizes its 
own ex-centricity and erases itself: realizing his "monstrosity", Dick dives into the water never 
to return. 
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phenomenon known as History, we can say readily: with 
indifference. For what did such a new-fangled invention matter 
to a river which flowed on, oozed on, just as before. What did 
the three Stone Ages, the Beaker Folk, the Bronze Age, Iron 
Age, the Belgic Tribes and all their flints, pots, axes, brooches 
and burial customs signify to a river which possessed as no man 
did, or does, the secret capacity to move yet remain? (143) 
The Ouse thus shows, if not r evulsion, then indifference to t he human, but 
also decentres humanity and all its pretensions; still it does this precisely In 
the human imagination, becoming a kind of othering-object, a site for 
imagining Being as different, for imagining the somehow different within 
one's self-sameness—and conversely a disruption from within through the 
projection of one's same onto that which should be other, which then invades 
one in tum.10 
Most fascinating in this respect, however, is, as I mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, Dick's motor-cycle. The Velocette is not only 
Dick's closest friend, but perhaps even his lover: Dick "talks, for solace, to 
his motor-b ike, more than he talks to any living thing . And ... it has even 
been said . . . that Dick is so fond of his motor-bike that he sometimes rides it 
to secluded spots, gets down with it on the grass and . . ." (381. There is also 
"the tuneless wail, t he wordless, endless song of love to his motor-cycle that 
Dick always sings as he rides" (134). Consequently, when Dick has wooed 
Mary for the first time, he comes back "to his abandoned and—who 
knows?—jealousy-smitten motor-bike" (254). Those passages may have been 
passed off as instances of poetic liberty, though, were it not for the ending of 
the novel, which highlights precisely the motor-cycle, "abandoned but 
vigilant" (358). With that ending, all the instances of decentrement of man in 
the novel come into focus and assume a central significance. And thus the 
novel's engagement of the sentimental, of the subject that does the feeling, is, 
10 This conundrum of othering from within is touched upon by Deleuze and Guattari, as they 
discuss the "percept" and the "affect": "The landscape sees. Generally speaking, what great 
writer has not been able to create these beings of sensation, which preserve in themselves the 
hour of a day, a moment's degree of warmth (Faulkner's hills, Tolstoy's or Chekhov's steppes)? 
The percept is the landscape before man, in the absence of man. But why do we say this, since in 
all these cases the landscape is not independent of the supposed perceptions of the characters 
and, through them, of the author's perceptions and memories?" ( What Is Philosophy? 169). And 
further on: "André Dhotel knew how to place his characters in strange plant-becomings, 
becoming tree or aster: this is not the transformation of one into the other, he says, but something 
passing from one to the other. ... It is a zone of indétermination, of indiscemibility, as if things, 
beasts, and persons (Ahab and Moby Dick, Penthesilea and the bitch) endlessly reach that point 
that immediately precedes their natural differentiation" (173). We may also think of Ted 
Hughes's animals, always inescapably anthromorphized, yet dually othering: animal becoming 
man, man becoming animal. 
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at least in the structural terms of Tom's narrative, swallowed up by a kind of 
irony of the object in the vein of Baudrillard. Indeed, Baudrillard's Les 
Stratégies Fatales, which sings "the supremacy of the object", was published 
in the same year as Waterland (but not translated into English until 1990). 
As it turns out, however, on closer inspection Waterlancl resists the 
twilight analyses of Baudrillard. Baudrillard claims that "everything is 
inverted if one passes on to the thought of seduction . . . [where] it's no 
longer the subject which desires, it's the object that seduces" (cf. the will-o'-
the-wisp) and concludes that "the subject is fragile and can only desire, 
whereas the object gets on very well even when desire is absent" (Fatal 
Strategies 111). However, the object at the end of history in Waterland is 
notably "abandoned", that is, lacking the subject it depends on, but 
"vigilant", that is, awaiting the return of the subject that gives it meaning.11 
Even if Waterland seems to yield finally to all possible postmodern ironies, it 
still smuggles in the reciprocity of love in its very last words, albeit a highly 
mysterious kind of reciprocity and a quite uncommon realm of love. Paying a 
postmodern tol l, the novel actually ends by sentimentalizing both subject and 
object, affirming the value of both man and his other and establishing their 
spiritual relation. In its very final moment, then, the novel engages the 
sentimentum, orchestrating sentimental impulses under quite some ironic 
strain. 
My reference to Baudrillard provides a fitting transition to my 
discussion of Out of This World. Waterland was published two years after 
Baudrillard's Simulacre et Simulation, and in the same year that the key 
essay of that volume was published in English translation as "The Precession 
of Simulacra", together with another brief essay, under the title Simulations. 
Considering that Baudrillard speaks in that essay of "the desert of the real", 
that is, the last remnants of reality not yet sucked into the hyperreal, it ma y 
seem like a conscious irony that Swift chose for his setting a place that is on 
the contrary sinking in water, but still as flat and devoid of stimulation as a 
desert: "The great flat monotony of reality; the wide empty space of reality" 
( Waterland 17). The connection is made even more explicit when Tom notes 
that the American servicemen who join in the vain attempt at preventing 
Dick's watery suicide have a Ford with "[t]he legend, in turquoise: 'Arizona: 
Queen of the Desert'" (352). Swift's waterland is i ndeed, like Baudrillard's 
desert, the place in which the last remnants of the real reside and traumatize 
whoever is confronted with them; the real, it turns out, is the absence of 
" John Sc had offers a similar reading, albeit cast in somewhat different terms: "[W]hat might 
distinguish the end of Waterland from Baudrillard's metaphysic is that the material object, the 
vigilant motorcycle, still owns some faint trace of dependence on God a nd man f or its value, 
both semiotic and economic" (916-17). 
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event: "reality is that nothing happens" (40). Life is "this terrible combination 
of emptiness and responsibility" (114). In Out of This World, this state of 
things is re iterated, although with a clearer focus on the simulacrum and the 
hyperreal, as well as on their effect on and relation to ethics, spirit, 
love—sentimentality. 
Out of This World: The Simulacrum and Forgotten Tenderness 
After the four years that consecutively yielded The Sweet Shop Owner, 
Shuttlecock, Learning to Swim and Waterland, there was a five year gap 
before Out of This World arrived. If this gap raised expectations of a weighty 
tome of a book to match Waterland in breadth, scope and complexity, those 
expectations were surely thwarted by the apparent slimness and sharp 
concentration of Out of This World. However, on closer look, the novel 
yields both complexity and range, as it shifts between different voices and 
points of view and kaleidoscopically shifts the layers of time. More 
importantly, though, it would seem that those five years made for a 
sentimental turn. True, it may be said that Out of This World deals with a 
starker, more relentlessly disenchanted world than does Waterland. Whereas 
in Waterland the realm of fairy-tale is brought into sharp focus, in Out of 
This World it figures as spectre or trace. Yet that trace upsets the numb white 
daze of trauma; if not a romance, Out of This World is a traumance.12 The 
first signal of this interplay of disillusion and affirmation is the title: "out of 
this world" connotes both t he yearning to escape the "terrible combination of 
emptiness and responsibility" and a more positive sense of transcending a 
world of disillusion; besides this, it is of course the idiomatic expression for 
something spectacular or magical or wonderful. The epigraph of the novel is 
ambiguous too: "What the eye sees not, the heart rues not". The novel 
contests at least one of the interpretations of this proverb: that what we do not 
have before us does not touch us, that is, that by escaping the face of the 
other we can escape the demand of the other. And thus it contests, as well, 
the earlier Levinas, to whom the actuality of the face-to-face relation seems 
to be very much the be-all-and-end-all of ethics. 
Still, as in Waterland, there is a failure of connection on the part of the 
characters, a failure of heeding the demand of the other; there is a lot of 
"blame" and "guilt"—those phrases recur, like "vigilance" in Waterland, 
throughout the novel—but no real dialogue. Thus, the emotional mode of 
12 It may be, as Poole argues, that "Out of this World is the grimmest of Swift's novels in th e 
images of violence and destruction it invokes. But it is also the most wilfully optimistic about the 
possibilities of healing, reparation and revival for the damaged male figure" (160). (Poole's 
discussion focuses upon the crisis of male identity as it is portrayed in Swift.) 
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most of the novel is one of wilfulness and subdued suffering. 
Connected with this issue of ethics is the continuation of what may be 
construed as a dialogue with Baudrillard begun in Waterland: Out of This 
World displays the seemingly all-consuming play of simulacra and of 
surfaces only to reveal the precession of the real and of depth, at least in the 
form of traces (and so we may say that novel "dis-plays" the play of 
simulacra). Notably, the novel is partially set in an America very similar to 
the one Baudrillard made an emblem of his philosophy in America, a book 
published in French two years before Out of This World, and in English in the 
very same year as Swift's novel (1988). 
The issues of ethics and of the hyperreal are, as I mentioned above, 
related in the novel. The two main narrators of the novel, the former photo-
journalist Harry Beech and his daughter Sophie, have tried to escape the face-
to-face and the responsibility of the real precisely by seeking refuge in the 
hyperreal: Sophie has moved to America, the land of which Baudrillard 
writes that it "is neither dream nor reality. It is a hyperreality" (28), and 
Harry has left his long life of making simulacra of the troubles of the world 
only to become an aerial photographer in the service of an archaeologist, thus 
radicalizing his detachment from the world, like Tom Crick avoiding it as he 
pretends to get near it. Their reason for escaping in this fashion is their 
having experienced together what was simultaneously the shock of the real 
and the shock of the simulacrum, namely the bomb explosion that killed 
Harry's father, Sophie's grandfather, the arms manufacturer Robert Beech. 
The explosion itself was of course traumatic enough, but the crucial trauma is 
the one that ensues, and which Sophie tells her psychiatrist, Doctor Klein, 
about: 
You see, that's when I believed. That's when I knew it's all one 
territory and everywhere, everywhere can be a target and there 
aren't any safe, separate places anymore. I've never told anyone. 
I've kept so quiet about it that sometimes I actually think it 
was—what would you call it?—a "hallucination under extreme 
stress". I saw him first, then he saw me. He was like a man 
caught sleep-walking, not knowing how he could be doing what 
he was doing, as if it were all part of some deep, ingrained 
reflex. But just for a moment I saw this look on his face of 
deadly concentration. He hadn't seen me first because he'd been 
looking elsewhere, and his eyes had been jammed up against a 
camera. (111-12) 
In this passage, Sophie narrates the moment at which the terror of the 
simulacrum and the incommensurable otherness of her father simultaneously 
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became evident to her. The fact that a terrorist car bomb has just blown up 
her grandfather and his chauffeur at the secluded Beech country house is of 
course evidence that "everywhere can be a target" and that there are no "safe, 
separate places anymore". But that act of terrorism is not what Sophie is 
referring to. She is referring to the precession of the simulacrum, the logic 
whereby her father abides in reaching, the moment after he hears the 
explosion, for his camera in order to take a picture of his practically 
disintegrated father. Not only is the camera linked, through this scene, to 
terrorist actions, but Sophie also explicitly equals the camera to a gun: "You 
can shoot with both. Y ou can load and aim with both. With both you can find 
your target and the rest of the world goes black" (77). The horror of his 
action is not lost on Harry himself, though: pretty much there and then he 
puts away his camera, ending his photo-journalist career. Later, he is to 
observe of his professional start, as a war-photographer during the Second 
World War, that "I was sent to London where I was taught the parts and use 
of a camera in much the same manner as rifle drill" (49). 
Nonetheless, the event occasioned by her grandfather's disintegration 
(which is mirrored aesthetically by the disintegration of the narrative, which 
shifts between narrators and perspectives) makes Sophie break all 
communication with her father; at the same time, having realized that there is 
no longer any territory safe from the terror of the simulacrum, she decides to 
move with her husband Joe to the centre of the hyperreal world: America. "I 
guess I belong to the new world now", Sophie begins her narrative. This new 
world is "[t]he land of cancelled memories. The land without a past" (16). 
This lack of a past is precisely what makes the land the perfect birth-place of 
the hyperreal, according to Baudrillard: the Americans are "Anabaptists: 
having missed out on the original baptism, they dream of baptizing 
everything a second time and only accord value to this later sacrament which 
is, as we know, a repeat performance of the first, but its repetition as 
something more real. And this indeed is the perfect definition of the 
simulacrum" {America 41).13 The hyperreal is the world of appearance 
without depth, of perfect transparency: "This is the only country which gives 
you the opportunity to be so brutally naive: things, faces, skies, and deserts 
are expected to be simply what they are. This is the land of the 'just as it is'" 
(28). Indeed, Sophie observes (albeit questioningly) about her new homeland 
13 This view is shared by Umberto Eco, who notes that in America "[t]he . . . philosophy is not, 
'We are giving you the reproduction so you will want the original', but rather, 'We are giving 
you the reproduction so you will no longer feel any need for the original'" (Travels 19). And 
later: "The pleasure of imitation, as the ancients knew, is one of the more innate in the human 
spirit; but here we not only enjoy a perfect imitation, we also enjoy the conviction that imitation 
has reached its apex and afterwards reality will always be inferior to it" (46). 
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that "[tjhere's a sort of comfort, a sort of security, isn't there, in the absence 
of disguise, in knowing the way things really are?" (17). The plumber Nick, 
whom Sophie commits adultery with, offers the following, similar, 
assessment: "I bin t o Europe . . . They got a lot o f pretty things over there. 
But I prefer New York. You know what I think? . . . Europe is like a broad all 
dressed up. You don't know what's underneath. But New York is like a 
broad without any clothes. She may not be a princess, but she's naked and 
she sure as hell is real" (18). Sexual innuendo aside, Nick is practically a 
ventriloquist's doll for Baudrillard.'4 
Harry, for his part, has spent most of his life even prior to the 
explosion escaping earlier traumas by hiding behind a lens; his being in the 
stronghold of the hyperreal is what causes the action that so traumatizes 
Sophie. Although that action makes him abandon photography "almost 
overnight, it seems" (118), he comes out of the shock later the same year, 
opting for a more detached, safe realm of the simulacrum: "I surfaced 
again—or rather, took to the air. And didn't entirely jettison my camera. . . . 
In 1973 I ... set up shop as an aerial photographer" (37). Indeed, aerial 
photography is a combination of the detachment of the camera and the 
detachment from the very earth, the very world: "I have always loved flying. 
Never . . . lost the magic of it. That release from the ground" (38). Thus, 
Harry has entered the realm of the super-ficial. 
However, whereas Sophie is only just beginning to realize that there is 
no refuge in hyperreality, Harry has had a critical relation to it for decades. 
Beginning his narrative by recalling the night he and his father sat up 
watching the first moon-landing, he digresses: "The first rule of photography: 
that you must catch things unawares. That the camera doesn't manufacture. 
But that night was the first time perhaps that I t hought: No, times changed 
since then. The camera first, then the event. The whole world is waiting just 
to get turned into film. And not just the world but the goddam moon as well" 
(13). A few years earlier, photographing the Vietnam war, he thinks: "I'm 
bound up with this thing, hooked on it now, it's rubbed off on me so much 
there's nothing much left of me any more. Just the eyes" (81). Occasionally, 
he waxes Baudrillardean indeed: "When did it h appen? That imperceptible 
inversion. As if the camera no longer recorded but conferred reality. As if the 
world were the lost property of the camera. As if the world wanted to be 
claimed and possessed by the camera. To translate itself, as if afraid it might 
otherwise vanish, into the new myth of its own authentic-synthetic 
photographic memory" (189). He even ventures to suggest that "it's no 
longer easy to distinguish the real from the fake, or the world on the screen 
14 Many more parallels can be drawn between Sophie's musings over New York and those of 
Baudrillard., but the ones drawn here will suffice for my discussion. 
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from the world off it" (188). 
Thus, just like Tom Crick is vacillating between his earlier positivist 
historiographie sensibility and his new postmodern consciousness, Harry is 
beginning to lose his faith in photography, discarding his objectivist credo. 
"Someone has to be a witness", he maintains (49); "[wjithout the camera the 
world might start to disbelieve" (107). However, recalling a picture he took 
of "a marine throwing a grenade at Hoi An" (119), he notes that a photograph 
is a free-floating signifier, and as such lends itself to perpetual reification and 
dissemination: 
[The marine's] right arm is stretched back, his whole body 
flexed, beneath the helmet you can see the profile of a handsome 
face. It's pure Greek statue, pure Hollywood, pure charisma. 
And it's how it was. It must have been. Because the camera 
showed it. A second later, that marine took a round in t he chest 
and I took two more shots and then some more as they got him 
clear. I wanted the whole sequence to be printed. But you can 
guess—you know—which single shot they took. This was '65. 
And that picture got syndicated everywhere, and even got 
transferred, with or without my knowledge, but never with my 
consent, on to posters, bookjackets, propaganda hand-outs, even 
t-shirts, till no one remembered any more, if they had ever 
known, that this was a picture of a real man, who'd died seconds 
afterwards . . . 
What is a photograph? It's an object. ... It becomes an 
icon, a totem, a curio. A photo is a piece of reality? A fragment 
of the truth? (120) 
The photograph, then, is as much in the service of ideology as any old 
myth or narrative. However, against such reification and mystification Harry 
sets a view that holds that, more radically, perhaps the photograph in itself 
says nothing, or rather is the saying and not the said: "Every picture tells a 
story—worth two columns of words. But supposing it doesn't tell a story? 
Supposing it shows only unaccommodatable fact? Supposing it shows the 
point at which the story breaks down. The point at which narrative goes 
dumb" (92). In this view, the photograph is absolute otherness, incom­
mensurable and unspeakable. Having reached this point in his analysis, Harry 
cannot but renounce, albeit gradually, his belief in transparency. His 
conclusion is, like Tom Crick's in Waterland, that the mind cannot bear the 
silence of naked reality: "I used to believe that ours was the age in which we 
would say farewell to myths and legends . . . and we would see ourselves 
clearly only as what we are. I thought the camera was the key to this process. 
But I think the world cannot bear to be only what it is" (187). In other words, 
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the saying is unbearable and must be circumscribed by means of proper 
narratives. Paired with the mirrorworld of postmodernity, this circum­
scription seems to all but preclude the saying. 
Consequently, the task rather becomes one of doing as little violence as 
possible, or the best kind of violence possible, to the other in one's narratives. 
As in Waterland, "the answer to the problem is to learn how to tell", as 
Sophie's psychoanalyst Doctor Klein puts it (74). Indeed, Harry's and 
Sophie's narratives commence at the point when they are beginning to 
reconstruct their relation, realizing that they cannot escape their responsibility 
for each other through distance and silence. "Out of sight, out of mind. Isn't 
that the way?", Sophie asks (34). She comes to realize, though, that it is not: 
"Out of sight, out of— But Doctor Klein . . . says that's the oldest lie in the 
world" (140); "[a]nd time heals. That's ... the other big lie. Let some years 
go by. Oh, five, ten years. Then rub your finger over the place where the old 
wound was. See? Hardly feel a thing" (184). Sophie learns that time and 
distance do not heal when she is traumatized again, this time, ironically, by a 
toy gun her sons have brought into the house. A simulacrum of what her 
grandfather was trading in, and of what she likens the camera to, is what 
makes her act out her earlier trauma and what shakes her slowly back into the 
reality of responsibility again; she begins to tell, and so is slowly redeemed. 
In Sophie's and Harry's process(es) of reconciliation and healing, then, 
the discourse on the simulacrum takes on a more poignant nature, a more 
ethico-sentimental nature, swinging more in the direction of Barthes's 
meditations on photography in Camera Lucida: "As Spectator", Barthes 
writes, "I was interested in Photography only for 'sentimental' reasons; I 
wanted to explore it not as a question (a theme) but as a wound: I see, I feel, 
hence I notice, I observe, I th ink" (21). The photograph, the simulacrum par 
excellence, is also the sentimental object par excellence. However, it need not 
be the object of sentimental reiflcation. Rather, it may open up to us the 
irreducibility of the other in a more poignant revelatory fashion. While it may 
seem the perfection of the frozen time of the said, the photograph may upset 
the said. As Barthes shows, there may also emerge from within the fixedness 
of the photograph what Barthes calls the punctum, which is that element in 
the photograph that pierces what Barthes calls the studium, which is my 
general, casual interest in the photograph. In a way, then, there is a plane of 
the saying that may pierce a plane of the said in the photograph: "A 
photograph's punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, 
is poignant to me)" (Camera 27). Both the photograph's disruption of the 
said and the punctum of the photograph are illustrated in a passage of Out of 
This World where Robert has showed Sophie a picture of himself as a young 
man, before he lost an arm in the Great War: "And the strangest thing about 
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the photograph wasn't that it was Grandad, taken years and years before, or 
that in it he had two arms—there it was, his real right arm, holding up a 
cigarette. The strangest thing was the face. The face was alive. Compared to 
the face of the Grandad I knew, that I was looking at r ight then, the face in 
the photograph was alive" (62). 
Photographs, then, are haunting fragments of the past, and may bring 
us face to face with others who no longer walk among us. Indeed, what 
animates Barthes's meditations in the second part of Camera Lucida is his 
discovery of a photo of his mother, who has died recently. In Out of This 
World there is a similar scene where Harry, nine years old, discovers a photo 
of his mother, only the scene is more radically fraught with otherness since 
Harry's mother died giving birth to him: 
Fact or phantom? Truth or mirage? I used to believe—to profess, 
in my professional days—that a photo is truth positive, fact 
incarnate and incontrovertible. And yet: explain to me that 
glimpse into unreality. 
How can it b e? How can it be that an instant which occurs 
once and once only, remains permanently visible? How could it 
be that a woman whom I had never known or seen be­
fore—though I had no doubt who she was—could be staring up 
at me from the brown surface of a piece of paper? (205) 
Here, rather than being truth incarnate, the photograph is ghostly, unreal; but 
it is unreal precisely because what has been constituted as real is in fact 
steeped in narrative, in explanation, in the said. Unreality resides in what one 
brings to the photograph, that is, one's expectation that the real be said; the 
photograph itself is it, the saying, the challenge, as Barthes suggests: 
In the Photograph, the event is never transcended for the sake of 
something else: the Photograph always leads the corpus I ne ed 
back to the body I see; it is the absolute Particular, the sovereign 
Contingency, matte and somehow stupid, the This (this photo­
graph, and not Photography), in short, what Lacan calls the 
Tuché, the Occasion, the Encounter, the Real, in its indefatigable 
expression. (Camera 4) 
In fact, the photograph is always, even when it is of the living, an 
apparition of the dead; even the photograph of oneself confronts one with 
oneself as dead, oneself as other: "[T]he Photograph is the advent of myself 
as other" (12); "the Photograph . . . represents that very subtle moment when, 
to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is 
becoming an object: I then experience a micro-version of death (of paren-
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thesis): I am truly becoming a spectre" (14). The photograph, whatever it is 
of, then, says: this is no more, this moment, this person has fled; which is 
why the view of the photograph is "immediately steeped in desire, repulsion, 
nostalgia, euphoria" (21), all at once. 
Consequently, it i s quite intriguing that there is no mention in Out of 
This World of Harry's ever taking a picture of anyone close to him, and that 
neither he nor Sophie mention any pictures of themselves. Significantly, 
Harry states that "[w]hen you put something on record, when you make a 
simulacrum of it, you have already partly decided you will lose it" (55), and 
notes about his fiancée Jenny that "I have never taken a photograph of her" 
(56). Harry is afraid of putting Jenny to death, of petrifying her. However, at 
the same time, he admits that "[w]hen I am not with Jenny ... I play the 
game of trying to imagine exactly how she looks. I never can. When I see 
her, she is always so much better than the picture in my head. But I don 7 
know if this is good or bad. If it's good that reality outshines the image, or if 
the fact that I can't imagine her means that I don't know her" (55; emphases 
mine). Of course, Harry does not know her, cannot know her; but that insight 
does not quite accrue with him: though he does not want to photograph her, 
he seems to insist on the possibility of possessing, in a mental image, the full 
truth of Jenny. 
The insight that the other cannot be possessed is rather left to the 
reader. The lead-in to a portrait-cum-interview television show Harry agrees 
to appear on asks: "But what of the . . . mind behind the lens ... ?" (113). 
That question may be construed as: "What of the mind behind the lens of the 
eye". Out of This World illustrates that while we would like to know that 
mind, we cannot. The novel does this by juxtaposing the different narrators 
and revealing their misconstructions of each other, revealing the clashes of 
the saying and the said. The novel's major narrative mode is thus one of 
dramatic irony, a mode which reserves "full" insight for the reader. Although 
the four narrators (Sophie's husband Joe and Harry's dead wife Anna narrate 
one chapter each) address their soliloquies to each other, the addresses are 
imaginary. In the case of Sophie, they are also directed, most of the time, to 
the faceless Doctor Klein, to whom her talk means nothing, instead of to her 
father, to whom her talk would mean everything. This "incommunication" 
turns out to have been the narrators' modus operandi throughout their lives, 
and not unexpectedly turns out to have lead to a number of fatal 
misunderstandings; in other words, instead of engaging with the other as 
saying, they have leapt headlong into the said. For instance, when Sophie 
recalls the time she told her father, who was passing through England from 
one job to the next, that she was pregnant, this is the assessment she makes: 
"I just said, 'I'm pregnant.' And do you know what his very first reaction was 
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to those words—the very first, brief look in his eyes? I'd swear it was alarm, 
I'd swear it was something almost like fright. He was passing through, all 
right" (68). The reader knows, however, that what Harry is expressing is 
genuine concern (in every meaning of the word) and love; some thirty pages 
earlier, Harry has recalled his emotional response to Sophie's birth: 
It must be one of the commonest experiences. But I had never 
imagined what it was like to be a parent. I became afraid. I had 
never reckoned on this fear. ... I never expected such fear and 
such terrible, crashing love. When I held her in my arms 1 never 
wanted to let go, because of the risks. It was as though only my 
arms were protecting Sophie from the world. (31 ) 
Moreover, Sophie blames her father for never being there, but as we 
learn from his narrative he has some reasons for retreating from his family. 
First, his mother died giving birth to him, and this is something his father is 
never able to forgive him for: "He might have loved me with a double, a 
compound love. He chose instead to blatne me, to see me as the instrument of 
his wife's death" (29). As if this was not enough, not long before his beloved 
wife Anna dies, seven years into their marriage, in a plane crash, Harry 
painfully becomes the witness of her committing adultery with his friend 
Frank at a seaside hotel: 
1 pushed the door an inch open with one finger. The head of the 
bed was hidden by the corner of a wardrobe. Was that luck of a 
kind? I d idn't want to see her face. You have to see, but some 
things you can't look at. Her legs were round him. The curtains 
were drawn. Frank's arse, absurdly white where his swimming 
trunks went, was bucking up and down. . . . 
Then I turned. Then I crept down the passage. Past other 
rooms. Past our room. Our room? . . . And I was thinking all the 
time: This wasn't me. I'd left me behind. I ha d left my heart in a 
hotel in Cornwall. ... Locked it up and walked away. (167-68) 
Not telling Sophie or Anna any of this, he estranges both of them and 
estranges himself from both of them. 
Anna, in her turn, has kept the story of her sorrow away from Harry, 
just like Mary in Waterland keeps hers away from Tom. Seemingly speaking 
from beyond the grave, or from that Greek mountain where her plane 
crashed, she says: 
[Y]ou never knew how often, in t hat room where we found so 
much joy, I had wept ... for the fate of Anna Vouatsis, orphan 
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and virgin of one-and-twenty, who had made her way all 
alone . . . from the country of her birth, where (but this was her 
secret) she never intended to return. . . . [Y]ou never quite 
understood—with all your keen-sightedness, with all your 
professional interest in the world's troubles—how your Anna, 
your very own Anna, was one of the earth's walking wounded. 
(173-74) 
However, she adds: "Not that I blame you. How can I do that? I am the one 
to blame. I am the one to blame" (174). She is also eager to make it clear that 
"[w]ith Frank it wasn't happiness. It was a tactical affair. A tactical 
desertion" (174). But Anna realizes the tragedy of silence too late; even if the 
appearance of her voice suggests some kind of afterlife where reconciliation 
might be possible, or an afterimage carrying the promise of reconciliation, 
Harry can hear her as little in death as he did in life. 
Still, Out of This World does end up with the promise of reconciliation 
and engagement in life. In the course of Harry's and Sophie's narratives the 
silence is broken and a dialogue seems about to be re-established: Harry, 
about to marry Jenny, sends Sophie a letter asking her if she would consider 
being present at the wedding, and Sophie decides, in the end, to go. The two 
brief passages revealing the sending and the reception of the letter also reveal 
the intense emotion involved on both sides; both passages are at the very end 
of their respective chapters, and both break down into the stutters and dashes 
that signify the stifling of language by emotion: 
Dear Sophie. How can I tell you? How can I sa y this? Your 
father, who you haven't seen for ten years ... is going to get 
married. . . . And though we haven't told anyone yet, and we 
haven't fixed a day, I was wondering, we were wondering— I 
was hoping— If, after all this time—? If—? (82) 
I haven't seen Harry since that time I said goodbye to him ten 
years ago. And he hasn't seen me. ... He tried to get close to 
certain things. Certain facts of life. It's just that he wasn't much 
good at closeness. And I wouldn't have to tell you these things. 
Why should I ever have to tell you these things? I really meant 
it, you see: Goodbye for ever. But now he writes me this 
letter . . . and in the letter he says— (140) 
It is, indeed, the power of love that has begun to heal Harry, re-
enchanting the world for him, and that power is now beginning to work on 
Sophie too. Harry is actually happy, and what is more he is the first of 
Swift's characters to be so. As one reviewer of Learning to Swim pointed out, 
the characters of Swift's earlier fictions seem to be "distrustful of happiness" 
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(Caless, Online). Consequently, in his hypertext thesis on Swift written in 
1989, when Out of This World was Swift's most recent novel, Barry Fishman 
cannot but ask: "Why is Harry so happy, and how does he fit into Graham 
Swift's world?"; "How is it possible for Harry to be happy?". Fishman goes 
on to conclude that "Harry Beech has accomplished the impossible for a 
Swift character—he has actually achieved happiness" (Fishman, Online). "I 
am happy", Harry says; "in spite of everything (and at my age!) I am 
actually—" (21). The reason for his happiness is Jenny. For all his cynicism 
and scepticism, Harry cannot escape being romanticized by Jenny: "When 
she turns fully to catch my glance and smile, secret pods of joy burst inside 
me. . . . She's beautiful. She's incredible. She's out of this world" (36); "She 
makes me feel—hell, she makes me feel that I'm half my age, that everything 
is possible. She makes me sing, unapologetically . . . She makes me feel that 
the world is never so black with memories, so grey with age, that it cannot be 
re-coloured with the magic paint-box of the heart" (141). 
Let me recall, from the introduction to this study, that those are the 
passages that made Peter Widdowson wonder: "Is this just a slip in stylistic 
decorum on the part of a most poised writer, or is the mawkish and 
meretricious language of sentiment here a sign of authorial disavowal?" (16). 
My answer is that it is neither: Out of This World actually wishes to show 
that when people reach out and try to connect and offer each other the gift of 
trust, then the world may become an enchanted place the only proper 
language for which is what we call "sentimentality"—albeit with a dif­
ference: that of irony, of a double-bind. The saying, the rupture, thus be­
comes one of romance, and the said one of disillusion. Both Harry and 
Sophie end up being able to suspend disbelief, albeit with some cautious 
sense of irony; as Harry puts it, 
[m]iracles shouldn't happen. Picture-books aren't real. The fairy­
tales all got discredited long ago, didn't they? There shouldn't be 
thatched cottages still, tucked away among green hills. You 
shouldn't be able to advertise in the local papers for an assistant 
and fall in love with the very first candidate who comes along. I 
should have gone on, in fairness, to consider Applicant Two and 
Applicant Three . . . But I found out that, after all, I was still 
human. (79) 
Speaking to Doctor Klein, Sophie puts her newfound expectations in 
similar terms: 
The truth is I want it to be wonderful. Wonderful. I wan t to go. 
Can you believe that? ... 1 want him, and her, whoever she is 
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(but I hope she's as lovely as a princess), to be waiting at the 
airport. 1 want to throw my arms around him and feel his arms 
around mine. Harry Dad Father. . . . And 1 want to hug her too 
and kiss her like a sister . . . and say, 1 hope you'll be happy with 
him, because I never was. Shit, I know this is pure theatre, I 
know this is like a bad movie, like the way it i sn't. But what's 
the point of life, and what's the point of goddam movies, if now 
and then you can't discover that the way you thought it i sn't, the 
way you thought it only ever is in movies, really is the way it is? 
(145) 
Sophie, then, manages to break out of her cynicism and scepticism, to discard 
the cultural code that maintains that sentimentality and happiness are only 
manufactured by the entertainment or image industry. Breaking out of her 
forced independence, she is able to rediscover the force of interdependence: 
"He's going to get married. He's going to get fucking married. To some 
fucking girl. And he wants me to— He'd like me— He wants me" (99). 
Thus, Out of This World is as much about suspending belief as about 
suspending disbelief: about breaking out of roles, daring to renounce the said 
(one's belief, one's self) and take heed of the saying (the other that upsets 
one's belief; one's other self). While Harry and Sophie are finally able to do 
this, the other characters in the novel are not. Interestingly, though, Harry 
notes about one of the times his father was scolding him for not wanting to 
take over the family business that "just for an instant \ thought his eyes were 
no longer fierce. They were saying: Harry, get me out of this, get me out of 
this person" (71). Harry has been offered a brief glimpse of infinity: the other 
is not the mask, the persona, the said that has been offered to it; his father is 
not Robert Beech, arms manufacturer, patriot, patron. In a later passage, 
Harry recalls another occasion when he was forced to admit that maybe "that 
picture I ha d drawn ... of my father . . . [was] an illusion" (143). 
As for Joe, the chapter he narrates only serves to tell that he is content 
with acting the happy-go-lucky guy everyone thinks he is. Joe is perhaps the 
saddest character of the novel, as he professes a kind of self-eradication, a 
contented residing in the said. In existentialist terms, he is an aesthete. Hence, 
he is a reprise of Willy Chapman in The Sweet Shop Owner, as is evident in 
the following statements of Joe's: 
Well, if you ask me, I know there was never any big thing going 
for me, no plan, no special assignments. I was what you call an 
"accident", or an almost-accident. A visitor, that's all. An extra 
guest at the party. (147) 
I'm a surface person. I like it to sparkle and ripple. "Buoyant" is 
the word they use. I float ea sy. And you can go on floating even 
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when you're way out of your depth. (149) 
Just like Willy, then, Joe is a "dummy", avoiding confrontation and assuming 
no responsibility. Somewhat fittingly—and ironically, considering his wife's 
life story—he sells package tours to Great Britain, offering visions of a merry 
old England that never existed in the desert of the real. In other words, 
whereas Sophie has tried to escape into hyperreality from an England that 
was the site of the eruption of the real in her life, Joe is a kind of hyperrealist 
neo-colonizer of her home country who champions a kind of "Britainism" (as 
in "Orientalism") and is seeking to make England yield to American 
simulacral rule. In other words, Joe is entirely in superficiality, in simulation, 
in acting. 
Harry and Sophie have had their share of acting, too. Consider, for 
instance, the following passage, where Sophie remembers the reception after 
Robert's funeral: 
We came face to face in t he drawing-room as the whole thing 
was winding up. People were leaving, moving to their cars, and 
Frank was saying, "Go now, Sophie. You're exhausted. You've 
been marvellous." (Never performed better.) ... He looked 
stranded. So what's the matter, Harry, no home to go to? He held 
his arms outwards, like a pair of useless wings. I know what he 
wanted. He wanted to embrace me. So it would look right, there 
in front of everyone. Life is an act, isn't it? Life is a real act. (88) 
It is against the backdrop of this cynical sense of numb simulation that the 
sentimental moments of the novel gain force and credibility. 
Still, the prevalent sense in the novel that reality is either nothing or 
simply gone, that is, the sense of the precession of simulacra, does put a lot of 
strain on those sentimental moments. One may get the feeling, in the end, that 
Out of This World represents the last gasp of romance in a world tending 
more and more toward simulation. Toward the end of the novel, Harry 
reveals that, in his cottage in Wiltshire, he has "a stash of nine artificial arms" 
(199), left to him by his father. The arms constitute a history of the perfection 
of the simulacrum, the perfection of simulation: 
The earlier ones are shapely, useless bits of sculpture that 
gradually lose their anthropomorphic wishfulness and their 
aesthetic pretensions; the later ones look like nothing human, but 
actually simulate the function of an arm. 
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They are like an index of the twentieth century. (200)b 
Thus, at least in a second reading, there is something eerie about Robert's 
jokes: "I make a good robot, don't I?" (67); or, having had a pacemaker 
installed: "Soon I will be all spare parts" (91). Robert may be seen as a 
harbinger of hyperreality, in which distinctions between nature and artifice, 
original and copy, truth and falsity no longer hold. As Harry notes, with some 
emotion and with reference to his father: "My God! My God, Jenny! My 
God, Sophie! How terrible to die, how terrible to be dying and not to know, 
at the end of it all, what is true and what is false" (72). 
However, even if life may be an act, it is still, as Sophie somewhat 
unwittingly observes, "a real act" (emphasis mine), involving others who call 
one to be called to one's careful attention. The point Out of This World drives 
home is: you cannot escape the other, the past, or emotions.16 The novel ends 
with Harry's childhood memory of flying back to England from France with 
his father: 
I can see now that throughout that homeward journey his feet 
must have been, so to speak, s till on the ground, still caught in 
the mud. And 1 was being lifted up and away, out of this world, 
out of the age of mud, out of that brown, obscure age, into the 
age of air. (208) 
In Out of This World, we are lifted out of the age of mud (which is water-
land, the sticky substance composed of depth and surface) into the age of air 
(which is perfect transparency, the medium of light and hence the medium of 
the reflections of surfaces). But the ending is ironic, Harry's childhood 
revelation an illusion; he cannot get out of this world, out of the mud of 
memory and responsibility. As Malcolm Bradbury puts it, "Beech too is in 
history, and not out of this world", and the novel is about "the 'bomb 
damage' we somehow can no longer escape, however high we try to fly 'out 
of this world'" (Modem 434). 
There is thus a difference between Out of This World and The Sweet 
Shop Owner, the former gives the promise of communication and recon­
ciliation. There is a difference, as well, between Shuttlecock and Out of This 
15 This assessment is identical to that of Baudrillard in "The Orders of Simulacra", 92-96. Under 
the heading "The Automation of the Robot", Baudrillard writes that the robot, the perfect 
mechanical simulation of man, "is radically opposed to the principle of theatrical i llusion. No 
more resemblance, of God, or human being, but an imminent logic of the operational principle" 
(95). 
16 Cf. Lyotard in his preface to Postmodern Fables'. "You're not done living because you chalk it 
up to artifice" (vii). 
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World: like Shuttlecock, Out of This World suggests that you can discard 
notions of absolute truth and transparent reality, but whereas Prentis avoids 
the tug of the real by placing his dreamworld as finality, the latter novel also 
emphasizes that you cannot escape the other, responsibility, the tug of the 
real. 
That lesson, the lesson of both Waterland and Out of This World, is 
recast in Swift's last two novels, Ever After and Last Orders, in a mutation of 
the postmodernist form: a kind of postmodernism that bites its own tail of 
radical play, thus neutralizing the terms of its incessant scepticism and 
allowing for a new configuration of faith. It is to this mutation, to those two 
novels, that I now turn. 
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4 
"All His Own": Toward an Aesthetics of Vulnerability in 
Ever After and Last Orders 
"Gentlemen were romantic . . . then." 
—The French Lieutenant's Woman, John 
Fowles 
If a person very close to us is dying, there 
is something in the months to come that 
we dimly apprehend—much as we should 
have liked to share it with him—could 
only happen through his absence. We greet 
him at the last in a language that he no 
longer understands. 
—Walter Benjamin 
My father said that the reason for living is 
getting ready to stay dead. 
—As I Lay Dying, William Faulkner 
In Ever After and Last Orders, the promise of a less guarded sentimentality 
that is discernible in Out of This World is fulfilled. While Ever After is still a 
very ironic novel both formally and thematically, in the execution of the final 
chapter it d iscards to a large extent what could be called its ironic alibi and 
thus enters a more "vulnerable" dimension of the sentimentum. The final 
chapter of Ever After, like much of the novel as a whole, leads the way into 
Last Orders, in which the ironic skin seems shed altogether, and the play of 
sentiment, spirit and ethics involved in the sentimentum is brought out in full 
resolve. Still, this fuller pronunciation of the sentimentum depends on irony, 
on metafictional devices and on relativizations; the discarding of irony and of 
markers of self-consciousness may take place locally in the narrative, but not 
in the narrative as a whole. 
The fuller pronunciation of the sentimentum is also, it turns out, 
allowed by a stronger focus on, or centring around, death and dying. Whereas 
The Sweet Shop Owner is a third person narrative, albeit adopting inner 
monologue and free indirect narration, about the events of the last day in the 
main character's life, leading up to his suicide, Ever After is the first person 
narrative of a man who has attempted suicide—but failed. Last Orders 
stretches the motif of death even further, by including a brief chapter narrated 
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by Jack Dodge, whose ashes are being carried to the sea throughout the 
novel. True, the voice of a dead character is present in Out of This World too, 
bat because of that novel's somewhat kaleidoscopic character, it is not clear 
whether this is actually a voice from beyond the grave, or just a fragment of 
the past. 
From The Sweet Shop Owner to Last Orders, then, we witness a 
reversal: from death as finality to death as beginning. Ever After and Last-
Orders are without question the most emphatic of Swift's novels as far as the 
death motif goes, a fact signalled by their epigraphs: the former has as its 
epigraph a few words from Virgil's Aeneid, ". . . et mentem mortalia tangunt" 
(trans.: "mortal sorrows touch the heart"), the latter two lines from Browne's 
Urn Burial: "But man is a Noble Animal, splendid in ashes / And pompous in 
the grave". 
Ever After: A Life in Plastic or Divine Love? 
Ever After weds two fairly recent genres: the campus novel (most famously 
and successfully employed by David Lodge) and the literary mystery novel 
(the most immediate example of which would be A.S. Byatt's Possession). 
The novel is narrated by Bill Unwin, a Cambridge professor of literature who 
sits in the Fellows' Garden of his college taking stock of his life following 
the suicide of his terminally ill wife and his own subsequent failed suicide 
attempt. As if his wife's death was not enough, he has also recently lost both 
his mother and his stepfather. On the death of his mother, he has come into 
the possession of the notebooks of one of his maternal ancestors, a troubled 
Victorian by the name of Matthew Pearce. The notebooks offer little comfort, 
as they are the record of Matthew's falling under the spell of Darwinism, 
renouncing Christianity and consequently being forced to leave his wife, the 
daughter of a Rector. 
However, despite all this loss and heartbreak, in Ever After we are back 
in fairy-tale land, in the land of make-believe. Significantly, whereas in 
Waterland the fairy-tale may seem like a Bataillean reworking of the brothers 
Grimm, and the fairy-tale quality of all knowledge is maddening and 
alienating, in Ever After the fairy-tale is more properly romantic, and "make-
belief', as the narrator calls it, is seen as a positive and potentially enabling 
force. Thus, Ever After develops the sense of enchantment harboured by 
Harry Beech in Out of This World. The novel also presents the most 
unabashedly spiritual and sentimental land constructed by Swift to date: the 
phrases "divine" and "amor vincit omnia" recur throughout the novel l ike a 
heavenly chorus. The title is of course the first signal of a fairy-tale aesthetic: 
"ever after", that trusty old formula, usually preceded by "And then they 
148 
4 Toward an Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
lived happily". This formula is both upheld and, not unexpectedly, dispelled 
(or dis-spelled) in the novel: it is a narrative told after the "ever after", after 
the "and then", that is, told after the long life of love has ended. Or has been 
ended, for both the narrator's wife and the narrator himself have put an end to 
their lives. Whereas the fairy-tale formula does not seem to acknowledge 
death even as a possibility—"they lived happily ever after"—Ever After 
poses the question (and forges an answer): how can one die happily? And can 
one live happily ever after dying? 
This question and the process of answering it are made possible be­
cause the narrator's attempted suicide has failed; being a semi-ghost, an "un-
dead", he is thus able to encounter himself as another; to encounter, as an­
other, himself.1 Indeed, Unwin finds it necessary to stress that the tone of his 
semi-ghostly narrative is foreign to him: 
[TJhese words, or rather the tone, the pitch, the style of them and 
consequently of the thoughts that underlie them, are not mine. I 
have penned in my time—long ago—a thesis and an academic 
paper or two, but 1 have never begun to write anything 
as—personal—as this. Yet this way in which I write is surely not 
me. What would you call it? A little crabbed and sardonic? A 
little wry? A tendency to the flippant and cynical? Underneath it 
all, something careless, heartless? Is this how I am? (4) 
Accordingly, one of the central questions of the novel is whether academic 
life and interminable reflection and analysis numb one's spiritual and emo­
tional faculties. That it may do so is exemplified by the fate of Matthew 
Pearce, Unwin's Victorian Darwinist scepticist ancestor; a man whose belief 
in the truth imperative led to incessant quarrels about Darwinism between 
him and his father-in-law, the Rector, and consequently to the separation of 
him and his wife. Another example the novel offers of spiritual drainage 
through intellectual strife is the fate of Charles Darwin himself, who, 
allegedly, gradually lost his appetite for all things artistic and poetic: "There 
is a passage in [the Autobiography] where [Darwin] laments the gradual loss 
of all taste for poetry, likewise, virtually, for music, painting, and fine 
scenery ... Is he trying to tell us something?" (225).2 
Most importantly, when one scrutinizes Unwin's self-questioning 
musings quoted above it s eems that Unwin himself is yet another victim of 
the plights of academe: he has written academic papers, notably as a literary 
1 I am leaning here, again, on Paul Ricoeur's Oneself As Another. 
2 In Ever After, then, Swift seems to question what J.G. Wood wrote in Nature's Teachings in 
1877: "It is therefore, partially, true that science does destroy romance. But, though she destroys, 
she creates, and she gives infinitely more than she takes away" (qtd. in Beer 71). 
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scholar, but never anything personal, and now that he tries to do the latter, he 
finds himself in the stronghold of the sardonic and the cynical. However, he 
strives to maintain a sense of enchantment, and the beliefs he expresses in the 
process are uncannily like the views that Frank Lentricchia surprised us with 
four years after Swift's novel was published, in his "Last Will and Testament 
of an Ex-Literary Critic". In that essay, Lentricchia observed with some 
disdain that "those who (when teenagers) spent the days and nights of their 
lives with their noses buried in imaginative literature now believe that they 
must look elsewhere, to academic disciplines, for the understanding and 
values of their happiness" (64). There is a resemblance to Lentricchia's views 
here in Unwin's statement that 
what has put the learned noses out of joint is the so-deemed 
simplicity of my actual views on literature. . . . Apparently, word 
has got out that in those tutorials of mine ... I have been doing 
little more than urging my students to acknowledge that li­
terature is beautiful—yes, the thing about a poem is that it's 
beautiful, beautiful!—and other such crude, sentimental and un­
schooled tosh. (70; emphasis mine) 
In these views, Unwin is also a precursor of the Hassan of "Confessions of a 
Reluctant Critic", published one year after Ever After: "As Gertrude Stein 
once said to an obtuse interviewer, 'But after all you must enjoy my writing 
and if you enjoy it you understand it. If you do not enjoy it why do you make 
a fuss about it?' That is why I finally became a teacher of literature, to live in 
the vicinity of that joy" (164-65). There are further similarities, as Unwin 
continues his "extemporary lecture" by noting about literature that 
the most tired and worn (and bitterest) thoughts . . . return to us, 
in another's words, like some redeeming balm. . . . [T]he words 
hold us with their poise, their gravity—their beauty. They catch 
us up and speak to us in their eloquence and equilibrium, and 
just for a little moment (are you listening, my fine Fellows, my 
prize pedants?), the obvious is luminous, darkness is matched 
with light and life is reconciled with death. 
I rest my case. (71) 
Compare this to Hassan and note the similarity in tone: 
[Wjhat precisely did I, does anyone, expect to find in li terature? 
Beauty and truth, really? . . . Balm for loneliness, for loss? An 
endless vision going endlessly awry? . . . Occult knowledge? The 
redemption of reality? A mirror in the roadway, a pie in the sky? 
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All these and none: simply a way to make a living? 
On some days—they are rare—I suspect that literature 
touches the mysterium tremendum et fascinons (Rudolf Otto). 
(153)3 
Ever After, then, in a sense, charts Unwin's attempts to be himself, or to be 
his sentimental self, which almost succeed in the final chapter. There is of 
course much to be said about the very premises of such an attempt in these 
deconstructionist times, and Unwin does acknowledge this: "I am not me. 
Therefore was I ever me?" (4); there are similar reflections on the fuzziness 
of personality and identity scattered throughout the novel. 
Yet the attempt is there in earnest; as earnest as one can be living in the 
"as if. As always in Swift, the uncertainty the characters face does not 
shatter their selves the way it does in the works of, say, Beckett or Acker, but 
rather instigates the elaborate construction of a self out of the debris of the 
past and the conundrums of the present—or vice versa. Once again, crisis 
occasions narrative as a means of healing. And there is no want of crises in 
Ever After. Unwin's wife has committed suicide to escape the pain of her last 
months with cancer and his mother and subsequently his stepfather have died. 
What is more, the stepfather dies shortly after he reveals to Unwin that 
Unwin's real father, whose suicide has so determined Unwin's inner conflict, 
was not his real father after all. On top of this, Unwin conceives of his 
conflict in t erms of Hamlet (his father the old King, his stepfather Claudius, 
his mother Gertrude, and his wife lurking as Ophelia). The set-up is, as we 
can see, quite melodramatic. 
However, the melodramatic and sentimental impulses that might result 
from this set-up, and which are quite evident in Unwin's Hamletian 
conception, are kept in check by the fact that the set-up is revealed gradually 
in a non-linear narrative tinged with irony.4 More decisively, those impulses 
J Brooks, in his discussion of the "moral occult" and "the Sacred", makes a similar observation 
about literature as a site for the mysterium tremendum etfascinans. See Brooks 17-18. As Calvin 
O. Schräg explains, in O tto the experience of the mysterium tremendum, or the Holy, "is a matter 
of encounter rather than of inference, informed by the self-disclosure of an alterity that invades 
the intentional structure of intramundane perception and evaluation. . . . The experience of the 
Holy is qualified as little as possible by everyday forms of consciousness. Its status as a marker 
ofthat which is wholly other is determined by the uniqueness of religious experience rather than 
by the outcome of a metaphysical argument" (115-16). 
4 Brooks enumerates the following characteristics of melodrama: "the indulgence of strong 
emotionalism; moral polarization and schematization; extreme states of being, situations, 
actions; overt villainy, persecution of the good, and final reward of virtue; inflated and 
extravagant expression; dark plottings, suspense, breathtaking peripety" (11-12). All these may 
be found, at least in covert, subtle or suppressed form, in Ever After. However, a non-linear 
narrative of course serves to short-circuit the suspense of the moment (which is the melodramatic 
mode of suspense par excellence), the breathtaking peripety and the finality of the reward of 
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are kept in check by a scepticist imagination. In the maze of others (wife, 
mother, "father", stepfather, Pearce, etc.) in which Unwin finds himself, he 
also finds himself lost—and left, left with his narratives about others, 
including himself, as he now sees himself as an other. Aware that they are 
narratives, Unwin realizes that there are parallel or possible narratives that 
are in conflict. In the course of the novel, he even doubts whether his wife 
was always faithful to him, as he observes the promiscuous air of the acting 
life. The scepticism cuts both ways, however: Unwin offers several possible 
reasons for his father's suicide, and when he leams that his father was not his 
father, he is still not sure whether what he learns is necessarily true, and, if it 
is true, whether it rules out any of the reasons for the suicide: 
1 told myself , of course: it doesn't matter. What should I do? 
Nothing. What should I say? Nothing. How am I changed? In no 
way. The fiction of my life (if that is what it is) may as well 
serve as the fact. I am my fath er's son, meaning my father-
whom-I-once-knew-as-my-father* s son, by whos e death my life 
has been so irreversibly moulded. I am who I am. I am Bill 
Unwin (there, I declare my self!). I am Hamlet the Dane. (159-
60) 
Thus, Unwin is stuck in a locked groove, or in a maddening hermeneutical 
spiral, which complicates his sentimental engagement and his projection of a 
self. 
Moreover, besides the more tangible crises in his own life, Unwin has 
to come to terms with how a Victorian gentleman, Matthew Pearce, could 
leave his wife and children, both of whom meant the world to him, for 
"Truth". "I don't understand him", Unwin says, "I never sought him out, I 
could do without him. But there he is, washed up before me: I have to revive 
him" (132). Unwin feels that he has to—an ethical imperative seems to be 
involved here. At one point, Unwin even ventures: "He wrote the Notebooks 
for me?" (213). It is precisely because Matthew is so different to Unwin that 
Unwin has to seek to understand him, to respect him. As in the thought of 
Levinas, the other is infinite and insurmountable, and hence mobilizes ethics 
as careful engagement with the other: "a nonviolent relationship to the 
infinite as infinitely other, to the Other", as Derrida puts it ("Violence" 83). 
Significantly, Unwin poses the conundrum of engagement with the same 
reference to Hamlet that Levinas makes in Otherwise than Being: "What is 
virtue. Cf. Herget's discussion of the rhetoric of sentimentality, especially p. 5. 
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Matthew to me? 'What's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba?'" (EA 143).5  
Unwin furthermore faces an historical other, which adds an historiographie 
dimension to the difficulties of engagement. Not only is the other infinite, in 
this case the other also comes to the same in the form of manuscripts, in the 
form of a text necessarily marked by absence—not in the form of the 
presence of the face, which is so decisive to Levinas. 
It is thus in the case of Pearce that scepticism threatens Unwin's 
melodramatic or sentimental imagination the most. He wants the story of 
Matthew Pearce to be the story of two young, lovely people who loved each 
other without reservations until Pearce's truth imperative separated him and 
his wife—although the two went on loving each other. It is, however, 
precisely a kind of truth imperative that serves to undermine that story, as 
Unwin himself cannot help acting the scholar: "Elizabeth obtained a divorce, 
on grounds of desertion. I am w orking now from data outside the Notebooks 
(I have done my background research), which stopped with Matthew's 
departure. Elizabeth married James Neale in November 1862" (211). This 
discovery makes Unwin's romantic concoction turn sour: "Let's read 
between the lines. Let's be bru tal and modern and take apart these precious 
Notebooks—this precious marriage of Matthew and Lizzie. . . . And while 
we're about it, we may as well ask the big question: which came first—the 
failed marriage or the ideological anguish?" (211-12). Consequently, Unwin 
has to ask himself: 
So, have I got it all wrong? 1 invent. I imagine. I want them to 
have been happy. How do I know they were ever happy? 1 make 
them fall in love at the very first meeting on a day full of radiant 
summer sunshine. How do 1 know it was ever like that? How do 
1 know that the Notebooks, while they offer ample evidence for 
the collapse of Matthew's marriage, were not also a desperate 
attempt to keep alive its myth, and that, even when he seems 
most honest, Matthew, with much display of fine feeling, tender 
conscience and wishful thinking, only beats about the bush of an 
old, old story? (212) 
We may note the subtle, "embedded" metafiction: Unwin scrutinizes his 
story about Matthew, rather than Swift scrutinizing his story about Unwin, 
but the passage resembles Fowles's authorial interventions in The French 
5: Levinas asks, "[w]hy does the other concern me? What i s H ecuba to me? Am I my brother's 
keeper?", and quickly adds that "[t]hese questions have meaning only if one has already 
supposed that the ego is concerned only with itself, is only a concern for itself' (Otherwise 117). 
6 Or if walls have ears can leaves have eyes? If you stare long enough into the text, will you find 
that the text stares back at you? 
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Lieutenant's Woman. Especially in this passage, for all of Unwin's claims 
that he does not understand Pearce, the documents relating to Pearce also 
function as a mise-en-abyme: if those documents are conflicting or unreliable, 
then so too are Unwin's own narratives. If Unwin picks Pearce's Notebooks 
to pieces, why should we not pick Unwin's narrative to pieces? If there are 
doubts about Matthew's marriage, why should there not be doubts about 
Unwin's? But also: like Unwin wants Matthew and Lizzie to have been 
happy, the reader probably wants Bill and Ruth to have been happy. And why 
not pick the picking-to-pieces to pieces? 
Indeed, Unwin goes to great lengths to salvage his life of romance. It is 
in this respect that Ever After is unquestionably brave and fascinating: it ends 
up, in the last chapter, with a truly sentimental and romantic point of view. 
The last chapter begins with a negotiation in which the sentimental and the 
melodramatic get the upper hand: "It's not the end of the world. It i s. Life 
goes on. It doesn 7" (249; emphases mine). Subsequently, Hamlet enters as an 
emblem of the assumption of importance and responsibility: "Why seems it 
so particular with thee?" (249; qtd. from Ham. 1.2.75). Things are important; 
there are responsibilities; there is responsibility—this is Unwin's stance. 
After this reiteration of earnestness and poignancy, Unwin goes on to 
tell the story of Ruth's and his first consummation of their love and the 
arrangements preceding it. The two lovers are embraced by love, embracing 
in love, embracing everything in love: "And she was enamoured of the stage, 
and I was enamoured of poetry, and we were both enamoured of each other. 
Too happy, too busy being happy, to worry about the Bomb" (249). 
Happiness being suspect, doubt rears its head again, but is duly made to hang 
it in shame: "But what sort of a plea, what sort of an excuse, is happiness? 
Perhaps it's the only plea. Why march with banners of protest unless to save 
a world in which happiness can exist?" (249).7 Subsequently, the ques­
tioning) of art is also settled: "And what are these things: the theatre, poetry? 
Bubbles, toys. It doesn't take a bomb to shatter them. They only tell us what 
is in our hearts. They are only mirrors for our lost, discredited souls" (249). 
And then comes the exclamation that shatters, in its audacious jocularity and 
loveliness, the book of doubt and paves the way for the book of love and life: 
"O Mayflower Road! O garrets under the stars! O vie Bohème\ O Mimi! O 
Rodolfo!" (250).8 
I cannot cite the whole chapter here, although that would be necessary 
to convey its (sentimental) impact. I can only refer the reader to it and 
provide a brief quote to illustrate the tone and the air of it: 
7 We may recall Kiernan Ryan's words: "sometimes [sentimentality] is the only piece of 
wreckage left to cling to" (217). 
8 Unwin's reference here is of course to Puccini'sia Bohème. 
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How many taxi rides? How many shillings on the meter? How 
many journeys, all too quick, through the emptied streets, 
through the small, shy hours of love, before we even dared to 
speak the magic words? Perhaps love is more than the sum of 
two people. Perhaps love is a third thing, mysteriously bestowed, 
precious and fragile, like some rare, warm egg. We wished and 
feared to hasten it. We took it into our care like diligent trustees, 
waiting our charge's coming of age. (250) 
Thus, Unwin paints the picture of a world in which "[l]ove makes of its 
initiates bold undercover agents in the hostile territory of mundanity and 
propriety" (252). 
When Unwin pauses in his romantic narrative to reflect with hindsight, 
to speak again from the vantage point of loss, it is to conclude that 
nothing else will do. No simulations, fabrications, biographical 
conjurations. . . . Surely you are lucky—lucky. The films, the 
videotapes, the hundreds and hundreds of photo­
graphs—publicity shots, rehearsal shots. You can turn a page, 
push a button, press a cassette into its slot, and there will be 
Ruth—moving, talking, breathing—before you. 
But how can I explain i t? The pictures mock me. They are, 
they are not Ruth. 1 can't bear to look at them. (255-56) 
As we can see, the critique of the simulacrum carried out in Out of This 
World lingers on in Ever After, Unwin may find himself at the end of history, 
where people experience "the nostalgia for the nostalgia of nostalgia" (81), 
but he still believes he has found the real thing, and he maintains that 
simulacra and substitutes will not do, will never be the same: "They say I 
should write her biography. . . . The life of Ruth Vaughan, actress. . . . But it 
seems to me it w ould be an impossibility, a falsehood, a sham. It's not the 
life, is it, but the life? The life"' (253). 
Unwin's stepfather, the owner of Ellison Plastics, on the other hand, 
represents both sexual promiscuity and the Baudrillardean view: "You gotta 
accept it, pal, . . . the real stuff is running out, it's used up, it's blown away, 
or it costs too much. You gotta have substitoots" (7).9 As so often in Swift's 
stories, the child has refused to join the father's business, and Unwin has 
done so "in the conviction that the real stuff of life lay elsewhere" (7). Indeed 
9 This is what Baudrillard says about plastic in "The Orders of Simulacra": "Is it not man's 
miracle to have invented, with plastic, a non-degradabie material, interrupting thus the cycle 
which, by corruption and death, turns all the earth's substances ceaselessly one into another? . . . 
There is something incredible about it, this simulacrum where you can see in a condensed form 
the ambition of a universal semiotic . . . the fantasy of a closed mental substance" (91-92). 
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he proclaims: "You see, I think I found the real stuff, the true real stuff' (9).10  
"The real stuff can refer to nothing else but Ruth, the love of his life, his life 
of love. Nothing else will do. Therefore, the loss is absolute: 
And nothing is left but this imposs ible absence . This space at 
your side the size of a woma n, the size of a life —of the worl d. 
Ah yes, the monstrosity, the iniquity of love—that another 
person should be the world. What does it matter if the world (out 
there) is lost, doomed, if there is no sense, purpose, rhyme or 
reason to the schemeless scheme of things, so long as — But 
when she is gone, you indict the universe. (256) 
Looking at this passage, especially out of context, we may find the 
observations and sentiments expressed in it common, banal even. In the 
Hamletian terms invoked by the novel, the (unsentimental) reader may say to 
Unwin what the Queen of Denmark, Hamlet's mother, says to Hamlet: "Thou 
know'st 'tis common,—all that live must die, / Passing through nature to 
eternity" {Ham. 1.2). And Hamlet answers: "Ay, madam, it is common". The 
reader asks in turn: "If it be, / Why seems it so particular with thee?". Having 
been drawn into Unwin's world, into him, and having encountered the 
struggle in him between dis-belief and make-belief, however, the reader will 
realize the urgency and poignancy of the passage. And the reader may 
understand Hamlet's answer: "Seems, madam! nay, it is; I know not seems". 
The final chapter of Ever After, then, seems to tell the reader that no 
double coding, no ironic alibi, is needed; tell it like it was: the first weekend 
you spent in bed with your lover was a magical, seminal event, laced with 
secrecy and comedy, and the first night, you told each other the stories of 
your lives, the gist of yours being that your father took his life. That is how 
the novel ends: "He took his life, he took his life" (261); the repetition of the 
phrase brings to mind a melodramatic exclamation, but for the want of 
precisely an exclamation mark. 
Still, maybe all is not perfectly well that ends well. And maybe the 
novel does not end perfectly well—at least not as far as unabashed 
sentimentality is concerned. That last chapter cannot help but have a tone of 
irony, and its effect—the success of its effect—relies on the very fact that it 
is preceded by so much doubt and confusion. Self-conscious tension is still 
integral to the accomplished contemporary novel—and to the text of the 
sentimentum. What Ever After shows, however, is how one can try to reverse 
the polarity and let faith subvert scepticism instead of the other way around. 
10 We may compare Unwin, then, to Willy Chapman, who "never believed you could have the 
real thing" (Sweet Shop 184). 
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Ever After, then, is something other than the typical double coded, 
deconstructive and ironic postmodern novel. Its simultaneous inscription and 
subversion is not quite of the kind described so elaborately by Linda 
Hutcheon: a par odie re-inscription, a reciting and resiting, of existing genres, 
texts or discourses motivated by gender, cultural identity or class politics.11 In 
fact, it seems to be, and even more clearly so than in Waterland and Out of 
This World, the postmodern itself that is inscribed and subverted; the very 
devices or acts of deconstruction and irony are inscribed, but then subverted 
in the name of sentimentality. One may however argue that it is precisely in 
the postmodern state of instability and uncertainty that the sentimental and 
romantic views finally become tenable. Throughout the history of 
philosophy, though, uncertainty has typically led to scepticism, or even 
nihilism. But as William James knew, scepticism itself constitutes a peculiar 
leap of faith: the sceptic believes in scepticism.12 And as Nietzsche 
understood, nihilism must eventually yield affirmation, as the nihilist 
ultimately says "No" to his "No". In similar fashion, Ever After contests the 
hegemony of scepticism, setting sentimentality against nihilism, setting love 
against truth: "I would believe or not believe anything, swallow any old 
make-belief, in order to have Ruth back. Whereas Matthew— Whereas this 
Pearce guy— " (256). 
In fact, Ever After elaborately inscribes and contests a number of 
postmodernist idées reçues. I will illustrate this move of inscription and 
contestation by re-approaching the question of the title and the question of 
death. Those questions have a bearing not only on the particular issue of the 
sentimentum, but also on the issue of postmodernism in general. Notably, the 
first sentence of the novel carries on the deathly speech of the epigraph, as 
Unwin states: "These are, I should warn you, the words of a dead man" (1). 
The sentence makes up a paragraph of its own, adding density to its already 
momentous air. Now, being (over)educated readers who know a thing or two 
about the French scene of the last three or four decades and its broader 
impact, what are we, really, to make of a novel, published in 1992, that 
begins in that way? The novel is, once again, called Ever After, and the 
meanings that phrase acquires in the course of the novel is "ever after 
Darwin"'1', "ever after Einstein"—and "ever after Barthes", (in)famous 
announcer of "the death of the author".14 After Barthes, the opening sentence 
11 See, for instance, The Politics of Postmodernism 101-107. 
12 See James's The Will to Believe, e.g. 1-31. 
13 
"Life after Darwin: As You Like It, or What You Will", as Unwin puts it (233). 
14 See "The Death of the Author". Barthes argues that "it is language which speaks, not the 
author; to write is to reach, through a preliminary impersonality . . . that point where not 'I' but 
only language functions, 'performs'" (50). Similar observations are made by Foucault in "What 
Is an Author?". 
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of Ever After is prankish rather than momentous and unsettling; these are the 
words of a dead man, indeed—taken metafictionally, the statement is trivial. 
Why state the obvious? 
One reason for stating the obvious is of course to subject it to re­
negotiation. Paraphrasing the quip answering Nietzsche's "God is dead" with 
"No, Nietzsche is dead", one may answer Barthes's "The author is dead" 
with, of course, "No, Barthes is dead"—with all due respect. For how does 
the next paragraph of the novel begin, how does the next sentence of the 
novel go? It goes: "Or they are at least—the warning stands—nothing more 
than the ramblings of a prematurely aged one". What ease, what swiftness, in 
dealing with that paradoxical birthmark of postmodernism—the death of the 
author, the transition from work to text.15 A fe w pages into Ever After, such 
post-mortemism is contested by Unwin, the literary scholar: "Literature, 
which despite its failure to save lives, including, I s uppose I m ust say, my 
own, and despite its being, in a place like this, forever chopped up and flung 
into preservatives as if it were the subject of an autopsy, I still believe in. I 
still believe it is the speech, the voice of the heart. (Say things like that round 
here and see what happens.)" (5). These musings continue the dialogue with 
Barthes, who writes at the end of "To Write: An Intransitive Verb?" that 
"literature itself is a science—no longer of the 'human heart', but of human 
discourse" (21). At the same time, Ever After follows the Barthes of the 
Fragments in giving voice to the "unwarranted discourse" of sentimental 
love. 
Thus, Ever After sets the stage much more clearly than Waterland or 
Out of This World, the troubled anti-hero of this drama, which continually 
and explicitly refers to Hamlet, is postmodernism, asking itself, not whether 
to be or not, but how to be.16 There is another troubled anti-hero under 
scrutiny in the novel: Hamlet himself, quite simply. As Unwin conceives his 
life and its major conflict in terms of Shakespeare's play, he is implicitly 
asking: Can one be Hamlet at the end of the twentieth century? Can one be 
Hamlet in a postmodernist novel? T.S. Eliot would seem to have settled the 
question as far as modernism goes, as he let Prufrock exclaim: "No! I am not 
Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be", as Prufrock famously exclaimed. The 
rest of that stanza of "Prufrock" is a fitting description of Unwin too: 
15 See "From Work to Text". To paraphrase Barthes's argument: because there is no originary 
authorial subject and all utterances are tangled up in an intertextual web, the so-called author's 
product can no longer be called a "work", but must be considered but one thread in that wide 
web: a "text", "entirely woven of quotations, references, echoes: cultural languages . . . 
antecedent or contemporary, which traverse it through and through, in a vast stereophony" (60). 
16 The opening words of Ever After themselves are thus made to allude to the appearance, and 
later the words, of Hamlet's dead father in the first act of the play. 
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Am an attendant lord, one that will do 
To swell a progress start a scene or two, 
Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool, 
Deferential, glad to be of use, 
Politic, cautious and meticulous; 
Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse; 
At times, indeed, almost ridiculous— 
Almost, at times, the fool. 
In other words, the Prufrockian man has warmed up since Willy Chapman in 
The Sweet Shop Owner. Indeed, Unwin had dreams in his youth of taking to 
the stage, but became instead a recluse literary student, financing his studies 
by working at a night club, meeting there his wife-to-be, the rising actress 
star Ruth Vaughan, to whom he eventually became a manager of sorts, 
lurking forever in the shadows; deferential and glad to be of use. 
One can see further intertextual echoes of Eliot's poem in Ever After. 
Unwin's first words may remind us of Prufrock's "I am Lazarus, come from 
the dead, / Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you all". They may also 
remind us of the epigraph to Eliot's poem, taken from Dante: "If I thought 
that my reply would be to one who would return to the world, this flame 
would stay without further movement; but since none has returned alive from 
this depth, if what I hear is true, I answer you without fear of infamy" (Dante, 
Inferno 27.61-66, trans, in Abrams 2504, n.2). Ever After also leads us back 
to Dante, by way of its own epigraph, taken from Virgil's Aeneid (Virgil of 
course being Dante's guide in Divina Commedia, as well as the poet who 
penned the words "amor vincit omnia", in Eclogues): "... et mentem 
mortalia tangunt". These connections to Dante's epic offer us a hint as to why 
we should be warned that we are about to hear the words of a dead man; that 
we are in fact hearing them means that we are not quite in the place we 
should be—or, with reference to Hamlet again, that the dead man only speaks 
to us in order to ask something of us, to rock the boat and upset the applecart. 
What is the boat then? It is, once again, postmodernism. What we would 
seem to be warned about is the fact that Unwin has come back from the dead, 
from the realm of the dead author and the literature of exhaustion, come back 
to tell us all that Literature and Romance are alive and well—or at worst only 
prematurely aged. 
The applecart carrying Hamlet, however, does not seem to be so upset 
after all. We may note that the question of Hamlet operates the other way 
around too: If one is Hamlet, or if one can maintain the casting of oneself in 
that role with some seriousness, then how can one continue to be post­
modern? For even if the great (postmodern) irony of the novel is that the 
whole Hamletian conflict turns out be a chimera, based on inaccurate 
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suppositions, the perception of that conflict is, at least as long as it seems to 
be fully actual, to Unwin quite earnest and poignant. Unwin is not, then, the 
modernist alienation casualty that Prufrock has become an emblem of; he 
manages to invest his reality with romance and a tinge of melodrama, and 
does so without much of a sneer: 
In Paris my mother first took me to the opera. A matinée of La 
Bohème—a Parisian tale. And there, in Act One, behind 
Rodolfo's garret window, and again, in Act Four, as poor Mimi 
lay melodiously dying, was a painted vista of Paris rooftops just 
like any you could actually see, and perhaps still can, around 
Sacré Coeur or Montparnasse. It had never struck me before that 
Reality and Romance could so poignantly collude with each 
other... (13) 
Unwin even suggests that he was born under a particularly romantic star: "I 
was born in December 1936, in the very week that a King of England gave up 
his crown in order to marry the woman he loved. ... I have always felt that 
the timing of my arrival imbued my life, for better or worse, with a sort of 
fairy-tale propensity" (57). Significantly, it is only with hindsight that Unwin 
begins to ironize overtly about his earlier perceptions, and even then those 
perceptions maintain their status as basis for vivid propositions precisely 
because the very terms in which the merciless deconstruction of those earlier 
perceptions are made allow for the subsequent re-reversal or neutralization of 
the conflicting propositions, rendering the earlier perceptions once again 
possible truths. The discussion of Ever After thus becomes, as Derrida notes 
about deconstruction itself, "a question of explicitly and systematically 
posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a 
heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself' 
("Structure" 282). 
Posing this problem, though, Ever After maintains a kind of 
postmodernist irony that threatens to tip the novel into the quicksand of 
undecidability. Once again it makes quite some sense to relate the novel to 
Eliot's work, and once again we may note that Hamlet serves as a nexus for 
the two: Ever After may be seen as a reversal of Eliot's poetic project, 
defined not least in his essay on Hamlet, and of the outcome of that project. 
As Victor Strandberg reminds us, 
Eliot developed four basic stratagems to accomplish [the] escape 
from feeling and selfhood. The first was his adoption of masks 
or personae behind which to hide his authorial personality; the 
second was his . . . use of image and symbol as a device for ob-
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jectifying feelings (the objective correlative); the third was his 
pervasive use of irony and sarcasm as mechanism of emotional 
control; and the fourth was his abundant use of allusion to other 
writings to achieve a classical l evel of urbanity. But in the end, 
all of these tactics failed. Despite his theories and efforts to the 
contrary, Eliot's feelings and personality came to form so 
dominant a presence in his poetry as to repeat in some degree the 
Shakespearean error that made Hamlet an "artistic failure". (172) 
We may compare Eliot's professed aesthetics to Swift's aesthetics of 
vulnerability, in which various formal devices should not, in a sense, hide the 
author, "like somebody putting on a suit of armor to keep in the things that 
matter rather than to show them" ("Interview" 229); to Swift, "feeling seems 
at least to stand in opposition to form: form is to do with control and 
discipline, and feeling is to do with liberation and release" (228). The 
strongest statement of this aesthetics by Swift is when he says: "I am 
desperate to avoid a sense of the power derived from form" (229). 
However, what happens in Ever After is that, whereas Eliot could not 
ultimately suppress superfluous emotion by means of formal devices, Swift 
cannot keep formal devices from controlling and disciplining feeling; and 
these formal devices are precisely the mask or persona (Unwin and Pearce), 
irony and sarcasm (as Unwin himself notes) and allusions to other writings 
(Hamlet, the Aeneid, La Bohème, "Prufrock", The French Lieutenant's 
Woman1). The one thing Swift (or Unwin) maybe violates—but this is 
difficult to decide, and Eliot himself would have to be the final ju dge—is the 
objective correlative; in that case, what was Eliot's failure is Swift's 
17 For instance, the following passage from Fowles's novel could easily have been pasted into 
Swift's, apropos Pearce's debates with his father-in-law: 
"1 confess your worthy father and 1 had a small philosophical 
disagreement." 
"That is very wicked of you." 
"I meant it to be very honest of me." 
"And what was the subject of your conversation?" 
"Your father ventured the opinion that Mr Darwin should be exhibited 
in a cage in the zoological gardens. In the monkey-house. I tried to 
explain some of the scientific arguments behind the Darwinian position. 
1 was unsuccessful. Et voilà tout." 
"How could you—when you know Papa's views!" 
"I was most respectful." 
"Which means you were most hateful." (11) 
For an extensive catalogue of the intertextual instances in Ever After, see Jacobmeyer, appendix 
one. Jacobmeyer does, however, not note the subtler intertexts of Eliot and Fowles. 
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success—a success, that is, in terms of the sentimentum. 
The structure of this section has ideally served to convey to the reader 
the sensation one has when reading Ever After: passages of illumination are 
interspersed with passages of profound undecidability; just when you think 
the final analysis is at hand, doubt and confusion are reinstated. Indeed, as in 
most of Swift's narratives, there is no closure in Ever After. The last para­
graph of the novel, which is, paradoxically, perhaps the most unabashedly 
sentimental paragraph of the sentimental last chapter, refers us back to the 
beginning of the novel and to its main mysteries: 
How strange, how incomprehensible, that whispered phrase. 
How unreal, even as he sp eaks it. How impossible that either of 
these young people, who se lives, thi s night, have nev er been so 
richly possessed, so richly embraced, should ever come to such a 
pass. He took his life, he took his life. (261) 
We may thus see what sets the novel apart from the romanticism of 
Shuttlecock: Unwin has worked through scepticism, arrived at the choice of 
belief, but ends with a sharp reminder of violence and failure. As Wendy 
Wheeler suggests, "it is precisely this ambivalence associated with art which, 
as it were, resolves by not resolving" (75). Indeed, as Wheeler also argues, 
what comes more to the fore in Ever After than in Swift's earlier novels "is 
the question of the adequate symbolisation of loss itself. In other words. 
Swift's question increasingly becomes one which is concerned with the 
relationship between aesthetic form and ethical content. The form must be 
one which is capable of properly symbolising the trauma of loss" (74). 
Moving on to Last Orders we find a different answer to this question 
of symbolization, with a more affirmative yet still, importantly, tenable, sense 
of closure—tenable because it is partial and is not cast in the terms of 
regression or naïveté. 
Last Orders: A Sentimental Journey 
My reading of Last Orders locates in the novel an affirmative turn that, to my 
mind, is inseparable from an aesthetic turn. Last Orders is a novel that speaks 
to the emotions, that depends on empathy and sympathy, but that also 
reciprocates them. Yet, this speaking to emotions, to empathy and to sym­
pathy is not an end in itself. Rather, as John Banville wrote of the novel in the 
New York Review of Books, it "seeks to reaffirm the values of decency, 
loyalty, love" (Banville, Online). This reaffirmation is also a reaffirmation of 
the communal and intersubjective over and against the individual and 
subjective; in the words of Wendy Wheeler, "the movements of spirit which 
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trace out all the follies and detours of the stages of the encounter with Death 
and mourning [in the novel] turn out, in the end, to be the work of mutual 
recognition and obligation which is love (Caritas) as work in the social and 
political commitments and activities of the day to day" (76). 
Arguably, the novel also seeks to reaffirm the value of narrating "real, 
lived lives" (Banville, Online) as opposed to the intertextually inscribed 
masques we tend to end up with in much postmodernist fiction, including 
Swift's works. At a first glance, the novel seems drained of metaphoricity 
and allusion; it is as actual as fiction can be. It is by such an aesthetic move 
that the sentimentum comes into its most daring fruition. However, as a novel 
of the sentimentum, Last Orders is a novel of enchantment and a novel 
marked by postmodernism. As Wheeler points out, "one of the most 
interesting things [in the novel] is the way in which, beneath the ordinary 
Bermondsey voices and lives, another language surprisingly emerges: the 
symbolic language of the spirit and the soul. No elevated language here, but, 
nonetheless, a glimpse of the sacred and the enchanted" (76-77). Further­
more, as we shall see below, the novel does carry out a postmodernist re­
examination of representation and does constitute a potent installment in the 
genre of historiographie metafiction. 
As I stated in this chapter's introduction, it is also the vivid presence of 
death that allows the sentimentum to be brought out in full resolve. Let us 
remind ourselves why this is so: Death, in its final manifestation of infinity in 
the moment of the final gaze of the other, is also the other par excellence. If, 
as in Levinas, the other is compared to, or indeed is. infinity, then death 
cannot terminate the other; in fact, death rather makes evident the infinitude 
of the other. In their actuality, and contrary to Jameson's notion of "the 
waning of affect", these relations are woven into a tapestry of sentiments and 
sentimentality: longing, suffering, love, bliss. Like Ever After, Last Orders is 
such a tapestry, but instead of being cast in the mould of an ultimately 
monologic postmodern romance, it achieves a more communal vision 
through what could be described as a polyphonic magical social realism. 
In Last Orders, four men undertake a journey to spread the ashes of 
their friend Jack Dodds in the sea at Margate. They embark upon a 
pilgrimage, for the route they take is the same as Chaucer's Canterbury 
pilgrims would have taken. On their journey to Margate, they stop by 
monuments to their shared and personal histories: a war memorial, the place 
of the conception of Jack's estranged daughter, and, of course, Canterbury 
Cathedral. During the journey, the four men reminisce, and their recollections 
are narrated by themselves in chapters attributed to, respectively, Ray, Vince, 
Lenny and Vic. That is not all, however; all in all, the novel musters a seven-
voice polyphony: Jack's widow, Amy, who has declined to join the pilgrim's 
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progress, also narrates a few chapters, and Vince's wife Mandy as well as 
Jack himself speak out in one chapter each. Like those of Chaucer's pilgrims, 
the tales of Swift's characters do not shy away from the outrageous in all its 
senses, but they are also tales of sadness and remorse. As the tales intersect 
and rush back and forth, up and down Memory Lane (a cliché used in the 
novel), and blend with the events of the characters' outing to the sea, a note 
of dignity is struck—"Dignity, that's the word, dignity", the Host of this 
Chaucerian journey, Ray, concludes (75)—and a mode of reconciliation is 
found. Death is made meaningful as the clearing of a space for summation of, 
and reconciliation with, the past and the now. Last Orders may thus be said 
to engage with the question of what Derrida has called "the gift of death", 
moving his discussion ever more into the territory of ethics and of the 
spiritual.18 
Indeed, the four men's beer- and whiskey-soaked journey of intro­
spection and revelation—a case of in vino Veritas—acquires an overtly 
spiritual dimension. The pub in which the men meet before their outing is 
likened in Ray's mind to a church: "There's a shaft of sunlight coming 
through the window, full of specks. Makes you think of a church. . . . The 
bottles racked up like organ pipes" (1). The everyday communion of 
men—and it is very much the story of men—is thus made holy, the downing 
of spirits raises their spirits.1 
Essentially, though, for all its detours and digressions, what takes place 
in Last Orders is a funeral procession. As we saw above, death, if anything. 
18 See The Gift of Death. See also John D. Caputo's The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: 
Religion without Religion, especially 188-212, as well as the collection Religion, co-edited by 
Derrida with Gianni Vattimo. As Caputo explains, "Derrida is . . . exploiting a paradoxical sense 
captured in the English translation 'gift of death', viz., the gift that death gives. 'Giving' seems 
like altogether the wrong word in any language inasmuch as visiting death upon a living thing is 
usually not a g ift but rather an unwelcome destruction; such giving takes everything away. But 
Derrida . . . wants to know whether and when giving death is a good deal, a solid investment that 
promises a good return, and whether there is a giving, indeed a giving death, that represents a 
gift without return" (191). And further: "In every case, Derrida says, life is a kind of 'wake', a 
watchfulness over death ... and dealing in death is a good deal" (191). 
19 By saying that the novel is very much about men, 1 do not wish to downplay the presence of 
women in it. F urthermore, while it is true that the female characters in Swift's novels are often 
marginalized and silent, they do speak out in quite distinct voices now and then, emerging as 
fully rounded characters marked by both bruises and blessings, as for instance Amy in Last 
Orders and Sophie in Out of This World. I do not agree, then, with Pamela Cooper's assessment 
that "Swift's heroines are, in a sense, goddesses. They suggest an archetypal femininity: 
'woman' as a kind of eternal principle . . . [and] blend impressionistically into one: a single force 
of enigmatic womanhood, working variously as perennial of male desire, as mother, as the bearer 
of universal human experience, and as the vessel of harsh wisdom" (29). If this is true, it is as 
true—mutatis mutandis—in the case of many of Swift's male characters, especially the 
mysterious fathers in Shuttlecock, Waterland, Out of This World and Ever After. 
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mobilizes ethical action. As Ray observes, "[w]hat you never know won't 
hurt, but it's different when someone's dying, because i t's not like you can 
say least said soonest mended, because there aint going to be no soonest or 
latest and you won't ever get the chance again to tell or not tell nothing" (98). 
However, "in the face of death" we are also //«mobilized, "we don't know 
left from right", as Vic, the undertaker, notes (79). Last Orders poses the 
mystery: Why do dead people matter? Why do dead people mind? Like the 
recent collection of Derrida's eulogies, The Work of Mourning, the novel 
becomes a meditation on the question of how best to mourn at o ur point in 
history.20 These questions, these mysteries, are rehearsed throughout the 
novel, in which it i s evident that death makes people uneasy, as it s hatters 
sheer materiality and confronts them with an embarrassing spiritual­
ity—embarrassing, that is, in an individualist, secular consumer society. 
"Seems to me the only time a man can get what he asks is when he's dying", 
Vince says as he ponders Jack's last requests and the added bonus of Jack's 
being carried to the sea in "an S-Class Merc, extra long wheelbase, walnut 
dash" (23)—a touching, if not also satirical, blend of ethico-spiritual and 
bluntly materialist gestures. Satire of contemporary society, with its 
monuments and cathedrals raised to industrialism, similarly looms large 
when the four men come to Canterbury and Ray disappointedly reports: "I 
don't see no cathedral. 1 see the gas-holder in front of it, and I see the cars 
zipping along the A2, just ahead, Dover one way, London the other" (192). 
The contemporary complication of mourning also transpires as the four 
men's sentiments in the face of death escape their language; this is especially 
apparent when they sit in a pub in Rochester and their dialogue becomes 
touchingly comical or comically touching: 
Lenny says, "It's a crying shame he aint here", like Jack 
was planning on it but something else came up. 
"He'd've appreciated it", Vince says. 
"He shouldn't've hurried off like he did", I say, entering the 
spirit. 
20 A collection of Derrida's in memoriams on the occasions of the deaths of his philosopher 
friends from 1980 to 1998, The Work of Mourning is both surprisingly sentimental and 
expectedly self-conscious. Hence, 1 would say that it is an intriguing instance of the 
sentimentum. For instance, in his funeral oration on Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida writes, or says: 
"By meditating upon what Emmanuel Levinas wrote about the French word adieu—which I will 
recall in a few moments—I hope to find a sort of encouragement to speak here. And I would like 
to do so with unadorned, naked words, words as childlike and disarmed as my sorrow" (200). 
However, immediately after this there is a self-conscious, searching turn: "Whom is one 
addressing at such a moment? And in whose name would one allow oneself to do so?" (200). 
The oration becomes a meditation on how to speak, at all, how to speak to Levinas, for Levinas, 
and ultimately a meditation on how to meditate. 
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"Daft of him", Lenny says. 
Vic's gone quiet. 
"Crying shame", Lenny says. . . . 
Then Vic says, like it's a truth we're not up to grasping, that 
has to be broke gently, "If he was here, we wouldn't be, would 
we? It's because he's not that we are." . . . 
"If it weren't for him we wouldn't be here", Vince says. 
"We wouldn't be here without him", and he looks sort of 
snagged up by his own words. We're all looking snagged up, 
like everything means one thing and something else at the same 
time. (111) 
In the last paragraph, Ray is unwittingly observing the melodramatic 
imagination at work; one of the characteristics of the melodramatic lies in its 
use of "the things and gestures of the real world, of social life, as kinds of 
metaphors that refer us to the realm of spiritual reality and latent moral 
meanings. Things cease to be merely themselves, gestures cease to be merely 
tokens of social intercourse whose meaning is assigned by a social code; they 
become the vehicles of metaphors whose tenor suggests another kind of 
reality" (Brooks 9). The melodramatic mode exists to articulate "the 'moral 
occult', the domain of spiritual values which is both indicated within and 
masked by the surface of reality" (5). Hence, "everything means one thing 
and something else at the same time", especially in the spiritually pressing 
situation of discussing one's dead companions. 
However, Brooks also draws a conclusion similar to Harold Schwei­
zers: "Words, however unrepressed and pure, however transparent as 
vehicles for the expression of basic relations and verities, appear to be not 
wholly adequate to the representation of meanings, and the melodramatic 
message must be formulated through other registers of the sign" (56). 
Significantly, Last Orders is the first novel of Swift's in which the narrator(s) 
spontaneously burst into tears in the novel's present. As significantly, 
keeping with the discussion of the fate of spirituality and sentimentality in 
contemporary Western society, they find it difficult to do so in public: 
I say, "I've got to take a leak." 
But it's not just to take a leak. I find the Gents and I unzip, 
then I feel my eyes go hot and gluey, so I'm leaking at both 
ends. . . . Some other punter comes in, a young feller, but I don't 
reckon he sees, or thinks twice if he does. Old men get pissy 
eyes. . . . Crying's like pissing. You don't want to get caught 
short, specially on a car journey. (111-12) 
Similarly, when they have visited the war memorial at Chatham, Ray 
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observes that 
[Vince's] face is all fixed and distant as he comes towards us, 
like he wishes we weren't around. 
I'd say he's done blubbing too. We all need our moment. 
(140) 
Suffering is expressed spontaneously by the body when it cannot—as it never 
quite can—find an outlet in language. Indeed, Vic, the undertaker, reveals 
that "[w]hat you learn in this business is how to keep your mouth shut" (213). 
Our specific historical and geographical moment aside, death induces 
more time- and placeless confusions. Always and everywhere, it would seem, 
there are faces, masks, deaths and spirits or ghosts. In fact , it turns out, death 
does not constitute the final gaze of the other, but rather suspends the closing 
of the lids perpetually: throughout the novel the narrators, particularly Vince, 
show uncertainty as to whether Jack is not in fact watching them. When Vic 
claims that Jack would "be none the wiser . . . [i]f they scattered the ashes in 
the cemetery garden", Lenny reminds him that "wishes is wishes" and Vince 
objects: "How do we know he'd be none the wiser?" (29-30). When Lenny 
says he reckons "it was a try-on, just to see if we'd do it", Vince eagerly asks: 
"So you think he does know? You think he can see us?" (31). Similarly, 
when Ray explains his reasons for following his dead father's advice and 
getting a desk job, he claims that "it was partly the memory of him, as if he 
was watching" (38). The persistence of the dead is acknowledged yet again 
when Ray ponders whether his daughter, Susie, would come home from 
Australia to attend his funeral: 
But I aint going to see. It doesn't matter, it's immaterial, because 
I aint going to see. Unless it's true, like Vincey seems to think, 
that they're watching, the dead 'uns, so when I'm dead I'll be 
able to watch my own funeral. And they're watching us, even 
now, the old man, and Charlie Dixon and Vince's mum and dad, 
and Duke, and Jack here, peeping through the cardboard, and all 
the dead 'uns me and Jack and Lenny left behind in the war, 
lying in the desert. . . (77) 
Here is the appropriate point at which to note that my use of the phrase 
"magical social realism" above was not just a quip. That it was, and is, not is 
firstly due to the fact that Jack narrates one chapter in a novel in which the 
chapters are laid out linearly, whether they narrate the events of the now or 
narrate reminiscences. Hence, there is no foundation for viewing Jack's voice 
as anything but the voice of a dead man. Secondly, the more subdued magical 
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realism of Last Orders, in which Jack is seemingly only imagined as sitting 
alive in hi s jar of ashes, serves that same "moral occult" which there is much 
reason to suspect that proper magical realism is meant to tap into. It is also 
unclear where the line between "seeming" and "actual" is to be drawn. For 
instance, when the bartender, Bernie, is presented with the jar of ashes, this is 
how Ray perceives his response: 
"That's Jack?" he says, leaning closer, as if the jar might 
answer back, it might say, "Hello Bernie." 
"Jesus God", Bernie says, "what's he doing here?" (10) 
Likewise, when the four men get out of the car in Rochester to go to the pub, 
Ray has to point out that "|ijl don't seem right just to leave him there on the 
back seat, does it? ... I mean, it don't seem right us going off and just 
leaving him on his own", to which Vince eventually responds, "You're right, 
Ray. He should come with us, shouldn't he?" (108). Later, when Vince and 
Lenny have had a fight over the jar at Wick's Farm, this is how Ray assesses 
the situation: 
It's like the reason we're out here in this field is because the jar's 
gone and made a bolt for it and we've had to run after it and 
catch it. . . . And the jar's sitting there in Vince's hands like it's 
shaking its head at us all, like Jack's inside there peeping out and 
sighing over us, with a bit of him left behind in t he field for the 
sheep to trample on. He didn't expect this, he didn't expect this 
at all. (180) 
Thirdly, throughout Last Orders, not only Jack and other "dead 'uns", but all 
sorts of others, including inanimate objects, assume the power of the gaze 
and the power of initiative. When the four men have mounted the hill in 
Chatham and can finally see the memorial, Ray feels that it is "like it's been 
waiting for us all along, expecting us, sticking up tall and white against the 
sky . . . It's as though the tower of the memorial is pulling us up towards 
it. . . . It looks like it's floating, because you can't see what it's attached to, 
like when you get near it, it might shift off somewhere else" (121-22). Later, 
"Vince looks up at the obelisk, all intent, as if it might do something sudden 
and he don't want to take his eyes off it" (134). When the men arrive in 
Canterbury, Ray concludes that "now we're here, with the cathedral just a 
few streets away hiding somewhere, like it's seen us if we ainl seen it, it's too 
late to back out" (192), and he subsequently describes the cathedral in the 
following way: "It's a big building, long and tall, but it's like it hasn't 
stretched up yet to its full height, it's still growing. It makes the cathedral at 
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Rochester look like any old church and it makes you feel sort of cheap and 
titchy. Like it's looking down at you, saying, I'm Canterbury Cathedral, who 
the hell are you" (194). One is reminded of "Levinas's focus on shame as 
arising in the face of the Other who approaches one from a height" 
(Bernasconi 33). 
For all the "likes" and "as ifs", the language in these passages is highly 
suggestive of some arcane order. Moreover, the language gradually becomes 
one of actuality rather than simile: leaving the cathedral, Ray states a fact: "I 
can feel the cathedral behind me, looking at me" (225). Likewise, when Ray 
recalls Jack's death-bed request that Ray bet a thousand pounds on a horse to 
secure Amy's future, he straightforwardly notes: "I kept not looking at the 
name looking up a t me from the middle of the list for the three five" 232). 
The horse, Miracle Worker, implausibly wins, the odds being thirty-three to 
one; all of which—the horse's name, the odds, and the fact that the name 
looks up at Ray—suggests some sort of divine intervention. Our powers of 
suspending disbelief are thus severely tested, as is our assumption—were we 
under it—that Last Orders is a straightforwardly realist work of literature. 
Importantly, Ray's winning bet is also the first of two instances in the 
novel of a kind of sentimental closure. The second, and ethico-spiritually 
more significant, of these two instances of closure comes at the very end of 
the novel. Indeed, Last Orders is arguably the most traditionally conclusive 
novel of Swift's yet. It ends in a kind of epiphany, an epiphany of the now, 
whereas all five previous novels end in riddle or find an epiphany only in the 
past. If there have always been traces of nihilism and postmodern play in 
Swift's novels, Last Orders is breathtakingly affirmative; it makes no ex­
cuses for itself, it does not provide any clear alibi of irony. The novel ends 
with Ray's realization that Jack is part of the four men on the pier, or that 
they are made of Jack, and that his death has provided a haven for their 
angers, fears and affections: 
Then I th row the last handful and the seagulls come back on a 
second chance and I hold up the jar, shaking it, like I should 
chuck it out to sea too, a message in a bottle, Jack Arthur Dodds, 
save our souls, and the ash that I carried in my hands, which was 
the Jack who once walked around, is carried away by the wind, 
is whirled away by the wind till the ash becomes wind and the 
wind becomes Jack what we're made of. (294-95) 
Notwithstanding the Cockney grammar, the final phrase is mystical and 
tantalizing, graspable on an intuitive and emotional rather than on a rational 
level. It speaks for interconnection with and responsibility for, as well as to, 
169 
An Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
the other—even beyond death, or particularly in death.21 Given the setting, it 
also seems a riposte to T.S. Eliot's famous lines, "On Margate sands. 1 can 
connect / Nothing with nothing" (from The Waste Land). We have moved 
from modernist disillusion to postmodernist re-enchantment, then: Ray is 
rather connecting everything with everything. Intertexts aside, Ray's last 
words—although attributing those words to a single subject somewhat belies 
their meaning—also has affinities with what Winfried Fluck identifies as 
''one of the greatest achievements of sentimental fiction, its successful 
transformation of the conventional view of death as an instance of irre­
versible separation to its redefinition as a promise of a finally indissoluble 
union" (19). This is typical of the deathbed scenes found in the literature that 
Herget and Fluck identify as sentimental, the classical example of which is 
Samuel Richardson's Clarissa. 
In connection with this issue of indissoluble union, 1 would like to 
recall Otto Friedrich Bollnow's contention that "out of an attitude of 'devoted 
absorption' might spring 'other and deeper' ways of cognition" in which "the 
boundaries between subject and object become blurred" (Buchwald 48). This 
is precisely what happens at the end of Last Orders: "The sky and the sea and 
the wind are all mixed up together", says Ray, "but I reckon it wouldn't make 
no difference if they weren't because of the blur in my eyes" (294). As we 
can see, the boundaries between elements in what is conceived as the outside 
world begin to blur. Moments after this, Ray can no longer tell where he and 
the other men on the pier end and Jack begins and vice versa. This moment is 
of course also a moment of suffering, and, as Schweizer argues, the moment 
of suffering also dissolves boundaries. In this moment of devoted absorption 
and suffering, then, like Bollnow, Swift "sets faith against doubt, trust against 
angst, harmony against split, absorption against dominance" (Buchwald 48). 
Importantly, Ray's kenotic moment is not a cosmic moment, but decidedly 
local and, we may suppose, transient; the moment is firmly anchored in the 
sand and sea at Margate and cast in Ray's Cockney tongue: "Jack what we're 
made of'. 
So death—a death—takes on a spiritual and ethical meaning in the 
lives of the Bermondsey people in Last Orders. By way of implication, 
however, in the carrying out of Jack Dodd's last orders that he be scattered in 
the sea, it also takes on a more general spiritual meaning. Geno-
mythologically, death may be envisioned as a return to the primordial ocean. 
Jack is scattered in the sea. When death is made into a return to the ocean, 
21 It may also be seen as a subtle raetafictional moment: indeed, Jack is the occasion of the whole 
narrative, he is what brings the other characters into being. The narrative revolves around his 
ashes, which, enclosed in the jar, provide a centre, and when they are scattered, the centre 
dissolves, and with it the narrative and the characters. 
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whence we all presumably came originally, we are reaching a more grand 
spiritual scale, one that simultaneously relativizes the individual and offers it 
a place in the more abstract community of "mankind" and that thus holds the 
potential of a sentimentalization of human qua human. This grand scale was 
established in Waterland, which ends with Dick Crick diving into the river 
Ouse, "[ojbeying instinct. Returning. The Ouse flows to the sea . . ." (357). 
Indeed, when they arrive at Margate and step out of the car, Ray gathers that 
the air "smells like something you remember, like the seaside you remember, 
except I never got taken to no seaside. ... It smells like memory itself. . " 
(287; emphasis mine).22 If one was tempted, then, to read Ray's final, kenotic 
moment in the Kristevan terms of regression to a pre-linguistic, infant state 
"of bodily drives, pulsations, and integration with the mother and the world" 
(Noble 69), Ray's musings on the seaside rather suggest a reading in Jungian 
terms of the archetypal and the collective unconscious, and perhaps also in 
Deleuze-Guattarian, anti-Oedipal terms of not the pre-individual and its 
mother—which all the same inscribes individuality and self-sameness into 
the matrix of psychological being—but of multiplicity, the many rather than 
the one.23 Thus, Last Orders brings both particular and universal spiritualities 
and sentimentalities into play, neither questioning nor endorsing them, but 
displaying them with but the slightest trace of irony—and then not the irony 
of knowing, but the irony of not knowing, of unknowing. 
Lest we forget, Last Orders is also about life and the living, and the 
mode, or mood, of the sentimentum finds its way into that sphere too. 
Interestingly, while Jack's death provides a space for reconciliation and 
meaning and Jack himself even narrates a chapter seemingly from beyond the 
grave, emphasizing his "life-in-death",24 the life of one of the other characters 
in the novel is "death-in-life" and this character never utters one word. This 
character is Jack's and Amy's daughter, June, a child with a dysfunctional 
brain and a child of silence. We may thus compare Last Orders to Jenny 
Diski's novel Like Mother, where we find a child without a brain but with a 
voice. Such Diskian improbabilities, such ontological play, are foreign to 
Swift, and quite foreign to the aesthetics of the sentimentum, which finally 
22 The significance of the sea in the novel is emphasized by the second reference of the novel's 
epigraph: "1 Do Like to Be Beside the Seaside", the popular song penned by John A. Glover-
Kind in 1909. 
23 Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari bring attention to the question of the one and the many as a bone 
of contention between Freud and Jung, as they recount how "[o]nce Jung had a d ream about 
bones and skulls. A bone or a skull is never alone. Bones are a multiplicity. But Freud wants the 
dream to signify the death of someone. 'Jung was surprised and pointed out that there were 
several skulls, not just one. Yet Freud still . . (Plateaus 30; the quote is from E.A. Bennet, 
What Jung Really Said (New York: Schocken), 74). 
24 Cf. Unwin in Ever After. 
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relies on a certain degree of realism. Nevertheless, June's nothingness, her 
silence, plays a sentimental part, for it is the silence of affection. It is 
affection, if it is there to begin with, holding its tongue. What June 
specifically does not say, what her mother is longing to hear her say, is 
"Mum" (274)—only once, as a co mmunication of affection and some sense 
of connection; in effect, "I love you", that most bleached, worn out utterance, 
the precise statement that Umberto Eco argues requires irony and 
circumstance to be possible in our time. Love and affection are also fraught 
with suffering, which, if we follow Schweizer's reasoning, would give an 
alternative explanation for the need for circumstance. Indeed, June's silence 
of affection even makes it impossible for Jack to visit her in the nursing 
home; "Best thing we can do, A me. is forget all about her", he tells his wife 
(253). In the end, Amy too visits June for the very last time, saying 
"Goodbye" (278). It would seem that in Levinasian or Derridean 
terms—indeed in any terms—Amy commits an unethical act when she turns 
her back on June only because June is incapable of reciprocating any actions 
or feelings; the ethical act would consist precisely in giving without 
expecting reciprocation. Still, i f an act is only truly ethical when directed at 
someone we do not expect anything back from, that order of things depends 
on the potential of reciprocation. With June, there is no such potential. 
Loving June perhaps cannot be ethical, since one knows that she will give 
nothing back. And June perhaps cannot be an ethical being, since she cannot 
give. All the same. Amy's act is profoundly ««sentimental. 
However, Jack's final act, as we learn from Amy's recollections, is 
deeply sentimental, constituting a strange kind of atonement. The reason for 
Jack's wanting his ashes to be thrown off the pier at Margate is that once, 
when June was young, he threw a teddy bear, which although it may not have 
been directly meant for her inescapably brought her to his mind, into the sea 
off the Jetty. Having won the teddy bear at a game of pot-shots, Amy and 
Jack walk out to the end of the Jetty (which has s ince disappeared), and as 
Amy stoops down to fix a strap on her new shoes, she hands the teddy bear to 
Jack: 
And I think even as 1 handed it to him I knew what he was going 
to do. There he was for a moment, a grown man, on the end of a 
pier, holding a teddy bear, a man on the end of a pier. He looked 
at it for an instant like he didn't know why he was holding it, 
like he didn't know what it had to do with him. Then he stepped 
nearer the railings. And then there wasn't any teddy bear, there 
was just Jack. Goodbye Jack. (255) 
The words "Goodbye Jack" imply that Jack's action provoked a romantic 
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separation, but they also instantly connect the event to Jack's own farewell 
gesture. That gesture can, however, not mean anything to June, but it does 
show that June meant something to Jack. And perhaps it is this 
acknowledgement on the part of Jack that releases Amy from fifty years of 
solitary responsibility, that releases her from her own prolonged and 
somehow pointless acknowledgement. 
We may pursue the significance (or in-significance) of June further by 
noting that she is an exemplar of one of the stock characters of melodrama: 
the mute.25 Like Prentis's father in Shuttlecock and Sarah Atkinson in 
Waterland, to name but two obvious examples from Swift's oeuvre, June 
mocks the expectations of literature in general and of melodrama in 
particular: the expectations of expression. Having been born deprived of not 
only speech, but mind as well, June most clearly belongs to those characters 
"whose very physical presence evokes the extremism and hyperbole of 
ethical conflict and manichaeistic straggle" (Brooks 56). Of all Swift's 
characters, June is perhaps the most troubling: a sound- and gestureless, and 
hence seemingly soulless, body, she induces a kind of gnostic dread, and all 
the more so for her being the daughter of a butcher in a narrative the 
epicentre of which is the Smithfield meat market. She is a being, and she 
does have a face, though, and therefore she is also the riddle of the other 
incarnate; perhaps the riddle of Being incarnate; even the void that stares 
back at you. In the most overtly Levinasian moment of the novel, Vic the 
undertaker explains that to him, who deals with the dead every day, "it's the 
living who are strangers, it's the living whose shapes you can't ever guess" 
(216). June is the hyperbolic illustration of this point. She does not ask 
anything. You cannot ask her anything. Yet she is there; or is there. Without 
voice, without body language, without signification; yet with significance: 
signifying precisely nothing. Whereas the silences of Prentis's father in 
Shuttlecock and of Sarah Atkinson in Waterland never cease to be cast in the 
sentimental terms of the hope of revelation—and not just any revelation, but 
that of the actual truth of the past and that of the future, respectively—June is 
finally beyond the hope of utterance as invested with deliverance and 
redemption. If twentieth century philosophies of language have taught us that 
all that there may be is vox, et. praeterea nihil, then June is plain 
nihil—nothing, nothingness. She is t he black hole that threatens to swallow 
25 
"The mute role is remarkably prevalent in melodrama", according to Brooks (56). Brooks 
makes the following, very illuminating, observation: "[T]he different kinds of drama have their 
corresponding sense deprivations: for tragedy, blindness, since tragedy is about insight and 
illumination; for comedy, deafness, since comedy is concerned with problems in communication, 
misunderstandings and their consequences; and for melodrama, muteness, since melodrama is 
about expression" (57). 
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the sentimental light of the novel, and hence also a most radical device for 
keeping the sentimental imagination in check.26 
We begin now to perceive a tension in Last Orders: the sentimental 
and melodramatic impulses must be balanced; the sentimentum can only 
prosper under the auspices of a postmodern imagination. In this tension, form 
expectedly also plays a major part. As 1 have already signalled, there is an 
important difference in Last Orders to Swift's other novels. This difference 
has the form of a conspicuous absence: there is no overt double-bind, no 
ironic alibi. Thus, the promises of the final chapter of Ever After, in which 
postmodern devices were marginalized, are fulfilled. In Last Orders Swift 
puts into unashamed practice the poetics Unwin elaborated in Ever After. 
"[T]he most tired and worn (and bitterest) thoughts . . . return to us, in 
another's words, like some redeeming balm" (EA 71). The vernacular prose 
of Last Orders has more in common with the poetry of Wordsworth or 
Robert Burns than that of Unwin's presumed ancestor Walter Raleigh, 
though. It is prose, however, and as such it compares better with the 
vernacular tours deforce of the great American modernist, William Faulkner, 
than with romanticist verse, be it urban or rural. 
Formally, Last Orders is on the surface a very typical modernist text. 
As mentioned above, it has a number of different first-person narrators 
narrating the "same" events, a technique made most famous perhaps by 
Lawrence Durrell's Alexandria Quartet. The novel is however also a quite 
obvious re-writing of Faulkner's As L Lay Dying, which uses the multiple 
narrator technique within one novel in the same way as Last Orders does. 
Last Orders very elaborately mimics the motifs, themes, structure and formal 
aspects of Faulkner's novel: like As I Lay Dying, Last Orders is the tale of a 
funeral procession both fun and funereal, and it shares with Faulkner's novel 
the use of vernacular speech as well as the inclusion of a single sentence 
chapter, a chapter consisting of a list with numbered entries, as well as a 
chapter narrated by a dead person. In this elaborate appropriation and 
mimicry of an earlier text lies the aesthetic postmodernism of the novel. Last 
Orders, as all postmodernist art, asks of Ezra Pound, "Make what new?", and 
answers itself: "Make the past new!". In doing this, it attests to an awareness 
that the "literary work can actually no longer be considered original" 
(Hutcheon, Poetics 126), and to the realization that, however "universal" and 
"timeless" a work may be, its themes may be forever re-inscribed in new 
forms, or new themes may be inscribed in its forms, or new particularities 
26 She is hardly alone in this respect, neither is she without real life counterparts: Hassan 
recounts of William James how "once he saw the abyss mirrored in the face of a poor epileptic in 
an asylum; the young man sat there, greenish of skin, 'moving nothing but his black eyes and 
looking absolutely non-human'. . . . There it was, the void incarnate .. ." ("The Expense" 16). 
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inscribed in its themes and forms, and so on. Last Orders inscribes new 
particularities in As I Lay Dying, and hence challenges the closure and 
autonomy of Faulkner's novel.27 If the past, as the narrator of Waterland 
believes, "accumulates and impinges" (126) on the present, then 
postmodernist art reverses this order, making the present impinge on the past 
too. Last Orders re-shapes As I Lay Dying, suggesting that Faulkner's novel 
was expecting this re-writing, as well as countless others. In its attention to 
detail and its particularity of setting and vernacular speech, Last Orders turns 
Faulkner's mythical South into the working-class London of Bermond-
sey—or, Last Orders reclaims the working-class London of Bermondsey 
from its exclusion, its exclusion from As I Lay Dying. 8 
The formal mimicry of Faulkner's novel also renders Last Orders a 
double coded text: the novel becomes simultaneously a realist work of 
literature with a classical plot structure and without overt metafictional 
elements, and a text that flaunts its artificiality, its dependence on existing 
forms, and raises questions about representation and literary creation. The 
borrowing of Faulkner's form, then, serves to establish a framework into 
which the fabula of Last Orders, together with its themes and the mode of the 
sentimental, may be inserted with aesthetic success in our cultural 
environment. At the same time. Last Orders comes closest of all of Swift's 
novels to date to fulfilling that aesthetics of vulnerability which Swift himself 
has formulated. 
However, even if the postmodernist formal devices of Last Orders 
serve the sentimentum, they do compromise the mode of vulnerability that 
Swift wishes to attain. The way Swift explains that mode, it would seem to 
require the return to an aesthetic innocence long lost, or to require a 
collective cultural amnesia. It is illuminating here to recall Schweizer's 
observation that "even if artistic representation is fundamentally attuned to 
the incommensurability of its cause, all art must lastly compromise the 
incomprehensible by transforming the formless into form and the unsharable 
truth of suffering into bearable fictions" (3). Swift's consciousness of form 
and his knowledge of what passes for Literature these days, indeed the 
cleverness we saw him renounce above, invade the fiction of Last Orders, 
invade the four men's sentimental journey—or, rather, sentimentum journey, 
journey of the sentimentum. Indeed, whereas Faulkner's novel could still 
hark back to a pastoral society and imagination, Swift's novel, as we have 
27 We should of course note that Faulkner himself was one of the first, if not the first, to 
challenge the closure and autonomy of the work by adding Absalom, Absalom! to The Sound and 
the Fury. 
28 Again, as in Levinas, the other is infinity. In this case, the other(s) of As I Lay Dying, that is, 
all its excluded possibilities, tire number of possible As I Lay Dyings, are limitless. 
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seen, is resolutely urban and makes of Canterbury Cathedral and the Garden 
of England anachronisms stripped of much of their mythical force. Instead, 
"God", taken as the name of spirit and salvation, moves in consumerist ways: 
by the Dreamland amusement park at Margate and at the race track where 
Ray places his decisive bet. As Wheeler puts it, it is from Dreamland's 
"tacky fantasy of the pleasures of mass consumption, rather than from the 
cathedral mass at Canterbury, that symbolic salvation must be found" and 
"[t]he Miracle Worker in this novel is the name of an outsider running at 33-
1" (77). Thus, as ironies abound, so do inklings of a theology that places God 
not just in the everyday, but in the commodification of everyday life. Instead 
of the sentimentality of the death-bed scene or of the country graveyard, we 
encounter the sentimentality of ashes from a plastic jar blowing in over a 
Ferris wheel. If Swift cannot write a sentimental journey, then, he can still try 
to make us acknowledge through our postmodern haze the reality of spirit, 
sentiment and ethics, as these re-emerge in the guise of the sentimentum. 
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Fiction 
Every work of art is the child of its age 
and, in many cases, the mother of our 
emotions. 
—Wassily Kandinsky 
From a novel that begins in enigma and ends with death, to a novel that 
begins with death and ends in epiphany, Graham Swift's oeuvre moves 
toward a sense of affirmation tenable, one might even say endurable, in our 
postmodern clime. It remains to be seen whether the next step in Swift's 
literary production will be a reversal in turn, a new kind of embarkment, or a 
move further in the same direction. The only piece of fiction by Swift 
published since Last Orders is the somewhat grotesque yet sentimental short 
story "Our Nicky's Heart", published in Granta in the spring of 2000. That 
story indicates to me that Swift is much more accomplished as a novelist than 
as a short story writer, and that for a sentimental narrative to be palatable to a 
postmodem taste, it must be self-conscious, ironic and dialogic. "Our Nicky's 
Heart" is none of these things, and hence does not succeed quite like Swift's 
last three or four novels.1 
Whatever the current drift of Swift's literary production may be, 
though, my argument that we may trace an ever more affirmative 
pronunciation of the sentimentum in Swift's fiction holds for the six novels 
of his published so far. My argument would also, for what it is worth, seem to 
be congenial with Swift's own literary intentions or wishes; in a discussion 
with Catherine Bernard about truth in fiction, Swift concludes that "much 
more important for me is the emotional side of fiction. Whether or not they 
can say they've discovered some truth by reading my book, I want my 
readers to have had an experience, I want them to be emotionally involved. If 
it's not about truth, then fiction is about compassion" ("Graham Swift" 13). 
However, while my endeavour to establish and work with the concept 
of the sentimentum may have been sparked by an interest in Swift, it is an 
endeavour that reaches farther than a single author's oeuvre. A larger and 
more general ambition takes hold. To rephrase what I said in the introduction, 
it is not my view that Swift's fictions seminally open up postmodernism to 
' [ should note, however, that Swift's brief memoir of Ted Hughes, "Fishing, Writing, and Ted ", 
published in Granta in the spring of 1999, is a tour de force of extracting poignancy from real 
life experiences. 
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considerations of sentimentality, but rather that they draw our attention to the 
sentimentality that may be, and indeed has been, housed in postmodernism. 
Swift's novels are not alone in accommodating the sentimental in the form of 
the sentimentum in postmodernist fiction. Yet, at first glance, it may seem 
that most other writers of postmodernist fiction are still caught up in more 
overt ironies and double binds than Swift is. To modify this view, in what 
follows I take a brief , suggestive rather than exhaustive, look at a few British 
postmodernist novels published in the last fifteen years or so, that is, in the 
same period in which we may begin to trace the emergence of an aesthetics 
of vulnerability in Swift. The novels in question are Julian Barnes's 
Flaubert's Parrot, Penelope Lively's Moon Tiger and Jeanette Winterson's 
Written on the Body. Bringing in two female authors, as well as one novel 
with a narrator clearly gendered as feminine and one novel with a narrator of 
uncertain gender identity, I approach the issue of the sentimentum vis-à-vis 
gender(ing). After this discussion, I touch briefly upon issues of class and 
cultural identity, and also broaden the field of vision to include postcolonial 
literature in English (or "post-Commonwealth literature") and American 
fiction. 
Let me say from the start, though, that it is British postmodernist 
fiction that seems to me most hospitable to the sentimentum. This probably 
has to do with the sustained relationship said fiction has to the British 
tradition of the realist sentimental novel of the Victorian period. As Malcolm 
Bradbury observes of British fiction of the eighties, which mark the 
beginning of the period of interest to me here, "[t]here was indeed some sign 
of a return to traditional forms, to a conventionalized literariness, to a fiction 
of pure historical recreation or sentimental nostalgia" (Modern 406). 
Importantly, as Bradbury suggests, "it was less that novelists were returning 
to the fictional verities of the past than making the relations of past and 
present narratives a matter for self-conscious literary examination" (406). In 
discussing the relation between the postmodern novel and the Victorian 
novel, Bradbury even hazards that contemporary writers "see some continued 
if perhaps tricky connection between the age of Dickensian fogs and 
Darwinian crises and the nuclear age, the age of postmodern absurdity and 
the nouveau roman" (5). 
Bradbury's suggestions are at least valid for Julian Barnes's novel of 
1984, Flaubert 's Parrot, the novel I would like to discuss now. Barnes's 
novel is indeed a meditation on the great French arch-modernist and 
contemporary of the Victorian novelists, a meditation on the latter half of the 
nineteenth century as it was perceived by Flaubert and on the sustained 
merits of those perceptions. It is also a postmodernist rewriting of Madame 
Bovary, the narrator being a medical doctor whose adulterous wife has died 
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shortly after a failed suicide attempt. Thus, it is indeed a case of making the 
relations of past and present narratives a matter for self-conscious literary 
examination. It is a complex novel, thematically and formally rich, but here I 
want to focus on its striking employment of sentimentality, both as a term 
and as a lived mode of affect. Most conspicuously, the narrative presents 
throughout a quite negative attitude to the word "sentimental" and its 
cognates. To begin with, the narrator Geoffrey Braithwaite notes early in the 
narrative that "all that remains of [Flaubert] is paper" and that "[t]his, as it 
happens, is precisely what he would have wanted; it's only his admirers who 
sentimentally complain" (2). Not much later, Braithwaite considers his quest 
for the parrot that Flaubert kept on his writing desk during the composition of 
Un Cœur Simple, and asks: "Is a reader wrong—worse, sentimental—to think 
of that parrot at the Hôtel Dieu as an emblem of the writer's voice?" (12). In 
similar fashion, discussing the use of coincidences in fiction (to which Ray's 
winning bet in Last Orders would belong), Braithwaite argues that "there's 
something cheap and sentimental about the device" (71). More flippantly, 
tackling the accusation that Flaubert was a m isanthrope, Braithwaite retorts: 
"He loved his mother: doesn't that warm your silly, sentimental, twentieth-
century heart?" (149). However, there is a slippage at the end, in which 
Braithwaite implicates himself in the sin of sentimentalism: learning that 
Flaubert had returned the parrot lent to him by the museum, Braithwaite 
states: "I felt vaguely disappointed. I had always sentimentally as­
sumed—without proper reason—that the parrot had been found among the 
writer's effects after his death" (222). Moreover, for all his pejorative uses of 
the word, Braithwaite is in practice quite sentimental and sentimentalizing. 
The novel thus becomes a kind of treatise on the to-be-or-not-to-be of senti­
mentality. 
Flaubert's Parrot, then, is also a meditation on sentimentality, as well 
as on suffering and on mourning, that of Flaubert and that of Braithwaite. 
The commonplace notion of Flaubert as disempassioned stylist and cynical 
ironist is countered by accounts of the Flaubert who lived, who loved, who 
suffered and who mourned his family and friends. Braithwaite, for his part, is 
mourning his dead wife, Ellen, trying to come to terms with her suicide 
attempt, with her subsequent death and with the fact that she was sexually 
promiscuous during long stretches of their marriage. The issue of Ellen is 
however continually dodged by Braithwaite, who resorts to ellipses and 
postponements when she comes to his mind: "My wife . . . died" (3); "I loved 
her, but I never deceived myself. I remember . . . But I'll keep that for 
another time" (82); "My wife . . . Not now, not now" (120). When he does 
get to what he calls the "pure story" of his wife, in chapter thirteen, the 
chapter still seems to offer more insight into the life of Flaubert than that of 
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Ellen, and he concludes that his wife is "someone I understand less well than 
a foreign writer dead for a hundred years" (201). Braithwaite's discourse, 
then, is marked by the stutters and false-starts we have seen are characteristic 
of suffering and mourning in the narrators of Swift's novels. Moreover, 
similarly to some of Swift's narrators, as well as to theorists such as Kristeva 
and Schweizer, Braithwaite himself explains his silence by claiming that 
"[t]he words aren't the right ones; or rather, the right words don't exist. . . . 
Y ou talk, and you find the language of bereavement foolishly inadequate. 
You seem to be talking about other people's griefs" (191). Indeed, 
Braithwaite is talking about other people's griefs: those of Flaubert and those 
of Louise Colet, Flaubert's mistress. Thus, the reader may well suspect that 
the discourse on Flaubert that constitutes the main part of the novel and 
which is marked by uncertainties about, and critiques of, notions of truth, 
authenticity, centre and ethical justification, is really a projection off the issue 
of Ellen onto the issue of Flaubert—a kind of sublimation. 
At any rate, Braithwaite's is a sentimental project, a project of care for 
but also obsession with an author who expressly wanted posterity to forget all 
about him. By examining Flaubert's letters, notes and Dictionary of Accepted 
Ideas, but also his novels, short stories and plays, as well as what his friends, 
lovers and critics said of him, Braithwaite seeks to reconstruct the width and 
complexity of the artist, rescuing him from facile critiques and commonplace 
notions. In a sense, then, Braithwaite is trying to offer sayings that will pierce 
and disrupt the said. However, as the epigraph of the novel, taken from a 
letter from Flaubert to Ernest Feydau, makes clear, there is a more obsessive, 
possessive and violent aspect to Braithwaite's undertaking: "When you write 
the biography of a friend, you must do it as if you were taking revenge for 
him" (vii). Hence, the novel becomes a posing of the problem of engagement: 
where does it cease being a disinterested caress and become a subjective 
investment in the other, or even an usurpation of the other, an active taking of 
the other as hostage rather than letting oneself be the other's hostage? There 
is a vacillation between caress and violation, both in Braithwaite and in 
Flaubert; or, rather, there is a vacillation between representations of Flaubert 
and self-representations of Braithwaite as either tender and sentimental or 
harsh and cynical. For instance, Braithwaite recalls "Lemot's famous cartoon 
of Flaubert dissecting Emma Bovary. It shows the novelist flourishing on the 
end of a large fork the dripping heart he has triumphantly torn from his 
heroine's body. He brandishes the organ aloft like a prize surgical exhibit, 
while on the left of the drawing the feet of the recumbent, violated Emma are 
just visible" (7). At the same time, in the very novel which Lemot thus 
lambastes for lack of sentimental care, and in the face of all the criticism that 
pins Flaubert down as a cynical stylist, Flaubert writes what Braithwaite 
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refers to as "his sad definition": '"Language is like a cracked kettle on which 
we beat out tunes for bears to dance to, while all the time we long to move 
the stars to pity'" (11). This vacillation, or dual nature, of Flaubert's is 
succinctly summarized in the chapter where Braithwaite imagines Louise 
Colet speaking of her long-lost lover: "He was rough, awkward, bullying and 
haughty; then he was tender, sentimental, enthusiastic and devoted" (177). 
Braithwaite, for his part, tries to adopt the cosmopolitan irony of Flaubert, 
displaying the kind of flippancy, self-contradiction and teasing found in the 
Dictionary of Accepted Ideas; he even presents, in chapter twelve, his own 
Dictionary. Ultimately, though, he seems sentimentally involved, cham­
pioning an ethics of engagement and love: 
[Ellen] didn't ever search for that sliding panel which opens the 
secret chamber of the heart, the chamber where memory and 
corpses are kept. Sometimes you find the panel, but it doesn't 
open; sometimes it ope ns, and your gaze meets nothing but a 
mouse skeleton. But at least you've looked. That's the real 
distinction between people: not between those who have secrets 
and those who don't, but between those who want to know 
everything and those who do n't. This search is a sign of love, I 
maintain. (148) 
However, trying to know everything is, as we have seen in Swift's Shuttle­
cock for instance, a misguided effort. Like Prentis in Shuttlecock, though, 
Braithwaite seems to reach at the end of the novel an exit from the 
maddening and hopeless quest for truth; arriving at the end of the search that 
has animated his narrative, the search for the stuffed parrot which Flaubert 
kept at his writing desk during the composition of Un Cœur Simple and 
which figures in Braithwaite's narrative as a symbol for truth and authenti­
city, he is shown the three remaining parrots at the museum of Rouen, only to 
conclude in a shrug-of-the-shoulders tone: "Perhaps it was one of them" 
(229). Melancholy obsession and monomania seem to have lost their grip on 
him, and so the narrative stops. What level of happiness ensues we do not 
know, but at least redemption seems possible. 
A similar, but also in many respects different, interweaving of past and 
present in the form of historiographie metafiction is found in Penelope 
Lively's 1987 Booker Prize winner, Moon Tiger. Like most of Swift's 
narrators, at least from Tom Crick onwards, as well as like Barnes's Geoffrey 
Braithwaite, Lively's Claudia Hampton is an ironic, wry and flippant nar­
rator. Claudia is an historian, of the self-conscious, narrativist type, and so 
she notes all the problems and cruxes of composing history, which is always 
histories in the plural, and which must deal with the fact that there is always 
181 
An Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
that which is exterior to it. Lying in a hospital bed, suffering from a terminal 
illness, Claudia contemplates writing a history of the world that would really 
be the full story: "from the mud to the stars, universal and particular, your 
story and mine" (1). As Claudia observes, though, "[w]e all look differently 
at it. M y Victorians are not your Victorians. My seventeenth century is not 
yours. The voice of John Aubrey, of Darwin, of whoever you like, speaks in 
one tone to me, in another to you. . . . The lives of others slot into my life: I, 
me, Claudia II." (2). At this point, Claudia stops to consider her perspective: 
"Self-centred? Probably. Aren't we all?" (2). However, her narrative 
becomes an illustration of the limits of one's self-centring and an illustration 
of the inescapable impingement of other selves, other narratives, on one's 
own. "My story is tangled with the stories of others", Claudia notes (5), "| s|o, 
since my story is also theirs, they too must speak—Mother, Gordon, 
Jasper . . . Except that of course I have the last word. The historian's privi­
lege" (6). The thing is, though, that she does not have the last word—the 
novel ends with a third-person narration of her death: 
It is late afternoon. Claudia lies with her eyes closed; she 
breathes loudly, an irregular rasping that makes the bed from 
which it comes the focal point of the room, though there is no 
one but Claudia to be aware of this. . . . 
The sun sinks . . . The room darkens again. Presently i t is 
quite dim . . . And within the room a change has taken place. It is 
empty. Void. . . . No life. Something creaks; the involuntary 
sound of expansion or contraction. Beyond the window a car 
starts up, an aeroplane passes overhead. The world moves on. 
And beside the bed the radio gives the time signal and a voice 
starts to read the six o'clock news. (207-8) 
Here lies the most difficult and vexing aspect of the novel: the novel starts 
and ends with a third-person perspective and throughout shifts between 
Claudia's first-person narration and third-person narrations with shifting 
focalizers, as well as free indirect narration. There is much reason to view all 
these various narrative modes as issuing from Claudia, as she states explicitly 
from the outset that she will let va rious voices be heard. However, if this is 
the case, then how do we interpret the concluding passage of the novel? As 
post mortem, out-of-body narration? Or as the point at which we must 
renegotiate the whole narrative and view it as consisting of disparate voices 
that result in a mode of dramatic irony, much as in Swift's Out of This 
World? The last passage thus serves as a device for radical indeterminacy and 
othering. If we view the whole novel as Claudia's narrative, then it un­
doubtedly constitutes a death-bed realization of the sentimentum: Claudia 
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explodes subjectivity, projecting other voices, decentring her self, reaching a 
level of intersubjective sentimentality. If, on the other hand, we view it as an 
ironic blending of autonomous points of view, then the sentimentum is 
realized on a "hypertextual" level: the reader of the novel is left to balance 
and evaluate the voices, and to see the cracks in Claudia's representations of 
others and in others' representations of her. Claudia's narrative complacency 
is challenged, for instance, in a passage where Claudia's daughter Lisa is the 
focalizer and silently addresses to her mother what is all but a blunt 
metafictional comment: "You are not, as you think, omniscient. You do not 
know everything; you certainly do not know me. You judge and pronounce" 
(56). It cuts both ways, though: Lisa certainly does not know her mother. 
"[W]e all survive in the heads of others . . . appallingly misrepresented", 
Claudia notes (125), and the novel illustrates this misrepresentation, for 
instance, in a passage where Lisa speculates, about her mother, that "very 
likely she has never loved anyone" (124). This passage is deeply ironic, for at 
the root of Claudia's detachment and cool, as in the narrators of Swift and 
Barnes, lies a trauma, a suffering, a loss. As Claudia acknowledges, "[n]ot 
even the most maverick historian—myself, perhaps—would deny that the 
past rests upon certain central and indisputable facts. So does life; it has its 
core, its centre" (70). 
The core, or centre, of Claudia's life, we learn after much circumstance 
and displacement or deferral, is Tom, the great love of her life whom she met 
in Egypt during the Second World War: "I know how I felt—richer, happier, 
more alive than ever before or ever since" (73). She gets pregnant by Tom. 
However, she finds happiness only to find Tom lost in battle and the baby 
lost in a miscarriage. Like Tom Crick, then, Claudia finds out that "history is 
true and . . . unfortunately you are part of it" (103). This "unfortune" dis­
solves rationality and scepticism and opens the cynical and agnostic Claudia 
up to sentimentality and spirituality: 
First there is disbelief, resolute disbelief. No, it i s not possible. 
Not him. Others but not him. And there is hope because missing 
does not necessarily mean killed, missing men turn 
up—wounded, taken prisoner. Or they walk in out of the desert 
days later, unscathed; Cairo is full of such tales. 
Hope becomes endurance . . . with this hollow ache within, 
this tumbling down a cliff-face of fear each time you allow 
yourself to think, to remember. 
Praying. Praying shamefaced in the Cathedral. (127) 
In the face of all this sorrow, Moon Tiger is also a testimony to the 
redemption of time. While time does not heal all wounds, it t ransforms grief 
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and suffering into poignancy, into emotions recollected in some degree of 
tranquillity: "It is like travel. You journey from the event and as it becomes 
more distant it becomes less potent and more poignant, like a remembered 
home. As the weeks go by the knife turns differently" (130). And yet trauma 
must forever be worked upon; it cannot be hemmed in by narrative or 
dissolved by one's changing the topic of conversation: "It is not that [Tom] is 
ever forgotten, but mostly emotion lies dormant; it lies quiet, biding its t ime. 
And then every so often something brings it raging forth, and she is back, . . . 
back in that Cairo summer, back with the raw new truth of it" (150). 
The novel ends, however, on an affirmative and sentimental note, 
narrating Claudia's final moment as one of spiritual elation, approximating 
perhaps bliss: 
And then the rain s tops. Gradually, the room is filled with light; 
the bare criss-crossing branches of the tree are hung with drops 
and as the sun comes out it catches the drops and they flash with 
colour—blue, yellow, green, pink. . . . Claudia gazes at this; it is 
as though the spectacle has been laid on for her pleasure and she 
is filled with elation, a surge of joy, of well-being, of wonder. 
(207) 
The success of this passage depends, though, on the subsequent, very last 
words of the novel: "The world moves on. And beside the bed the radio gives 
the time signal and a voice starts to read the six o'clock news" (208). 
Sentimentality and closure are relativized—Claudia or no Claudia, the world 
moves on; for all the local, temporary bursts of harmony, the six o'clock 
news keep charting a world of suffering and loss. 
Loss is indeed what animates Jeanette Winterson's novel of 1992, 
Written on the Body. "Why is the measure of love loss?" is the somewhat 
sentimental question that opens the narrative (9). What takes place through 
the narrative's intertextual play and ironic juxtapositions, after its initial 
displays of cynicism and disillusion, is an attempt at recovering from loss and 
at recovering what one has lost: the loss and the lost of love. Written on the 
Body is, like Moon Tiger, a tale of losing the love of one's life, and as in 
Lively's novel, what hides underneath the cynicism and the irony is trauma, 
suffering, remorse: as the narrator remarks, "|t|hc hard-bounded space hides 
the vulnerable self' (120). Indeed, even the title of the novel suggests the 
vulnerability of the body laid bare to wounding, to corporeal inscription. 
Thus, the title also breaks down the barrier between textuality and 
corporeality—writing is here not s imply a closed system, but may affect the 
body; word and flesh are wedded; there is no outside text. What has been lost 
has also left its mark, its trace, on the sentimental body, which laid itself bare 
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to inscription by the other in its longing for sentimental union. 
For the novel is also a kind of postmodern Bildungsroman, charting the 
movement of the unnamed, ungendered and bisexual narrator beyond the 
drudgery of promiscuity and adultery, beyond amorous bondage, toward the 
unknown, the impossible, the always yet-to-come: true engagement, the 
risking of oneself. The disruption of drudgery and disillusion is Louise, who 
is "intense and beyond common sense" (91) and who incidentally states that 
"[i]ts the clichés that cause the trouble" (155), a kind of Levinasian statement 
which is adopted by the narrator. Louise awakens in the narrator "the hope of 
a saint in a coracle", the faith, but not the certainty, of finding "another place 
uncharted and unseen" (80), a place beyond clichés, beyond a residing in the 
said. Louise has "set before [the narrator] a space uncluttered by association" 
(81). Such a space, the narrator notes, "might be a void or it might be a 
release" (81), but if one dares risking oneself, one's self, then "a further 
intimacy may begin, the recognition of another person that is deeper than 
consciousness" (82). 
Written on the Body, however, turns into an elegy on the loss of that 
Viens! (to adopt the prayer of the more recent Derrida), the loss of that 
amazing grace. The narrator finds out from Louise's husband that Louise has 
leukaemia. The husband happening to be a specialist in the field, he 
convinces the narrator that Louise will be better off left to his expertise and 
care. Deciding that it is better to be apart from Louise knowing that she might 
be saved, the narrator writes a goodbye-note to Louise and disappears 
without a trace. Subsequently reconsidering, s/he is unable to find Louise, 
who has equally disappeared without a trace. 
And so the narrator is left to seek to recover f rom loss and to seek to 
recover what she has lost. As in Swift, Barnes and Lively, we are faced with 
the subject suffering from history and suffering in history: the narrator notes 
"how easy it is to destroy the past and how difficult to forget it" (17). Buying 
a bicycle because s/he "wanted to be too exhausted to think", she discovers 
that "[s]till every turn of the wheel was Louise" (107). Thus, like Tom Crick 
in Waterland, s/he attempts "to go back to where things went wrong. Where 1 
went wrong" (17). In t he process, s/he also tries to recover, to salvage, the 
saying of love from the said: following Barthes and Eco, the narrator notes 
that '"I love you' is always a quotation", but also, like Barthes in the 
Fragments, that "[l]ove demands expression" (9). Consequently, s/he 
proceeds to compose, again like Barthes, an affirmation, a lover's discourse 
that "unsays" love. As s/he states, "I don't want to reproduce, I want to make 
something entirely new" (108). The entirely new being difficult to produce, 
particularly in language, the lover's discourse oscillates between clichés ("I 
did not know this much happiness was possible" (105)) and unexpected 
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observations and imagery (as in the reversal "Burst figs are the livid purple of 
your skin" (124)), in what is an obvious rewriting of the Song of Solomon. 
As in all postmodernist discourses, the said, the already said, must be heeded 
and then disrupted from within. Thus, through a discourse which, fi­
guratively, dismembers the body of the loved one in order to map and know 
it, and which we recognize from both the Song of Solomon and from 
Petrarch, the narrator moves toward a realization of the limits of possession 
and knowledge: "I know how your hair tumbles from its chignons and 
washes your shoulders in light. I know the calcium of your cheekbones. I 
know the weapon of your jaw. 1 have held your head in my hands but I have 
never held you. Not you in your spaces, spirit, electrons of life" (120; 
emphasis mine). The desire for possession and halt may take hold: "I cannot 
allow you to develop, you must be a photograph not a poem" (119). 
However, the realization of time, of passing, of eruption, of contingency, in 
all its sadness, follows: 
You were milk-white and fresh to drink. Will your skin 
discolour, its brightness blurring? Will your neck and spleen 
distend? Will the r igorous contours of your stomach swell under 
an infe rtile load? It may be so and the private drawing I keep of 
you will be a po or reproduction then . It ma y be so but if you are 
broken then so am 1. (125) 
Still, the novel ends happily, sentimentally even, although the ending is 
ambiguous: "From the kitchen door Louise's face. Paler, thinner, but her hair 
still mane-wide and the colour of blood. 1 put out my hand and felt her 
fingers, she took my fingers and put them to her mouth. The scar under the 
lip burned me. Am I stark mad? She's warm" (190). Does the narrator 
hallucinate, or dream, is she "stark mad", or does Louise really return, and if 
so will she live? The very last sentence hints at both uncertainty and promise: 
"I don't know if this is a happy ending but here we are let loose in open 
fields" (190). Here, the reader's sentimental temperament and abilities of 
suspending disbelief decide which reading of the ending may be operational. 
Written on the Body thus challenges us, not only, as has so thoroughly been 
noted, in terms of gender, but also in terms of sentimentality, in terms of the 
sentimentum. 
With Written on the Body I inescapably come to the issue of gender 
and gendering. Since sentimentality and sensibility have traditionally been 
gendered as feminine, it is of course of some importance to consider what 
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gendering the sentimentum assumes.2 Yet, we must note that, even in the 
eighteenth century, sensibility and sentimentality were held up as ideals for 
men too, as one can tell from MacKenzie's The Man of Feeling, which, 
although it was satirical of the culture of feeling, advocated sensibility in its 
less extreme forms. All the same, if we consider sensibility, vulnerability and 
openness to the other, in their postmodern, Levinasian or post-Levinasian 
form, we must note that, as Gibson suggests, especially when "contrasted 
with the understanding of the term in the Eliotic and Leavisite traditions, 
Levinas's might indeed be thought of as a 'feminized' conception of 
sensibility. Insofar as it i s made into an ethical value in literary criticism, it 
may also tend to privilege a canon of female writers" (168). However, I 
would add that when it comes to male writers of more recent generations, the 
crisis of masculinity and the subsequent renegotiation and reconstruction of 
male identities have resulted in literary representations that would contest a 
privileging of female writers in relation to sensibility.3 Furthermore, as 
Gibson is quick to note, "there is an immediate danger, not only of 
hypostasizing sensibility as 'essentially female', but, in doing so, of 
confirming an order in which sensibility is likely to be proportional to 
powerlessness" (168). This point is elaborated upon by Gibson in his reading 
of the fiction of Jean Rhys: "Indeed, under patriarchy, it is never clear that 
the will to self-exposure is not in fact inverted power, power wedded to 
hopelessness and therefore issuing in a will to self-destruction" (169). 
Refusing this mode of binary thinking, though, Gibson is able to show that 
Rhys's fiction "keeps alive a version of the woman's story which recognizes 
how far sensibility, vulnerability, expenditure without reserve do not of 
themselves have to mean humiliation, exploitation and victimization" (173).4 
I would add to Gibson's assessment that a postmodern, Levinasian ethics of 
sensibility carries within it a hope for, if not reciprocity, then mutuality: one's 
2 See G.J. Barker-Benfield's The Culture of Sensibility for a thorough account of the gendering 
of sensibility and sentimentality as feminine that took place throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, as well as an account of the employment of the concepts and what t hey 
denoted by early women's rights thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft. 
3 One study that addresses the destabilization of masculine identity and its r epresentation in 
literature is Danuta Fjellestad's Eros, Logos, and (Fictional) Masculinity, which presents 
readings of both modernist and postmodernist texts by male writers, including Swift's 
Waterland, with a focus on structures of desire. See also Ellen G. Friedman's "Where Are the 
Missing Contents?: (Post)Modernism, Gender, and the Canon", which, in a Lyotardian reading, 
argues that whereas the unpresentable in recen t male texts is a stable patriarchal and paternal 
order, which is now "the no longer presentable", the unpresentable in female texts is "the not yet 
presented" (242), an "order" yet to come. 
4 See Marianne Noble's The Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature for related 
observations of how sentimentality in nineteenth century female writers' texts usually entailed 
self-victimization. 
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invitation of the other may be disinterested (as far as one's self goes), but not 
indifferent to the nature of the other. As John Caputo argues, "[t]he notion of 
justice as à-venir refers structurally to the vulnerable; to the victim, not the 
producer of the victim. It would never be the case that the 'other' one to 
come would be Charles Manson, or some plunderer or rapist" ("Discussion" 
131). In other words, if woman is cast in the position of the victim, her will to 
exposure does not entail the acceptance of victimhood or the invitation of the 
oppressor. 
Moreover, if we still posit a distinction, as regards the sentimentum, 
between those narrators or characters gendered as feminine and those 
gendered as masculine, that distinction breaks down when we encounter 
Written on the Body. We may be tempted, because conditioned so, to read the 
discourse of the novel as feminine precisely because of its employment of the 
terms of sentimentality and sensibility. But the novel will not support such a 
reading. Furthermore, as we can tell from my readings of Swift and Barnes, 
the sentimentum decisively is at work in l iterary representations gendered as 
masculine. What has taken place, then, if it had not already, is a de-
stabilization of gender differences as regards sentimentality and sensibility. If 
traces of an older dichotomy persist, they do so more as differences between 
individual characters and narrators, regardless of gender, than as firm, 
general differences between gender categories. 
With this said about gender(ing), I would also like to consider the 
sentimentum in tenns of class and cultural identity. One may induce from the 
novels I have presented here that representations of the sentimentum typically 
involve narrators and characters portrayed as intellectual and middle-class: 
Tom Crick is a history teacher, Harry Beech is a photo-journalist, Bill Unwin 
is a professor of literature, Geoffrey Braithwaite is a medical doctor with a 
literary interest, Claudia Hampton is an historian and the narrator of Written 
on the Body is a translator of Russian. The only exception is Last Orders, in 
which the narrators are distinctly working class. Indeed, those narrators are 
the least self-conscious, ironic and allusive, which is why, I believe, they lend 
themselves to the aesthetics of vulnerability as formulated by Swift. 
If one may say, then, without wishing to disregard difference and 
plurality, that the sentimentum is primarily part of a middle-class, intellectual 
identity, may one also say that it is primarily part of a Western European 
identity? I may approach this question by suggesting a few further novels by 
not only British, but also postcolonial or "post-Commonwealth", authors that 
T believe could fruitfully be examined in terms of the sentimentum. These 
include not only other novels by Barnes, Lively and Winterson, but also 
novels by Peter Ackroyd (especially English Music), A.S. Byatt (especially 
Possession), John Banville (especially The Untouchable), as well as novels 
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by Salman Rushdie, Ahdaf Soueif, Michael Ondaatje and Gerald Murnane. 
Not unexpectedly, as far as literature in English goes, the sentimentum may 
thus be found in novels by authors who, while they may have an "ex-centric" 
identity, have a Western, not to say British, education and a Western, not to 
say British albeit hybrid, identity. 
However, it r emains to look to the land "most west" and to note that 
the emergence of the sentimentum (and of a postmodernist aesthetics of 
vulnerability) need not be seen as a British post-imperial or post-
Commonwealth phenomenon. While American postmodernist fiction seems 
to me less hospitable to the sentimentum, I wonder what would happen if one 
read, for instance, Paul Auster's Leviathan, John Updike's Memories of the 
Ford Administration and Don DeLillo's Underworld in terms of the concept. 
Most intriguingly, though, as Stephen Baker observes in his recent study The 
Fiction of Postmodernity, even the American master of the postmodernism of 
play and anti-realism, Thomas Pynchon, has in his latest novel, Mason & 
Dixon, constructed a postmodern realist narrative with a tinge of 
sentimentality—much to the consternation of critics. Some critics have been 
pleased with the development: Baker cites Jenny Turner's review in the 
London Review of Books, in which Turner writes that "[y]ou start the book 
bewildered, then slowly ease into its curious patternings of order and 
disorder. ... By the time you get to the Talking Dog, your face will be 
cracking into the nicest of new-dawn smiles" (qtd. in Baker 129). Turner 
also, as Baker says, "contrasts Pynchon's 'usual weakness for lumbering his 
characters with gross-out names like Tyrone Slothrop or Hubert Stencil' with 
the status of Mason and Dixon as fully rounded and credible portraits of 
historical figures" (129). However, as Baker notes, "other commentators, 
more reluctant to be robbed of Pynchon as a postmodern icon . . . express 
some frustration at these celebrations of 'substantial' characters, the drawing 
of sympathetic and sometimes even 'heroic' figures in whose 'humanity' we 
can perhaps recognize our own" (129). Baker cites Stefan Mattessich, who 
complains that "[t]here seems to be little patience nowadays . . . for reflexive 
textual practices, for double and ironic anti-realist fabulations of the kind 
associated with Pynchon's early work" (Mattessich qtd. in Baker 130). As 
Baker's own reading of the novel shows, though, good old Pynchonianisms 
still abound: "The linguistic, punning playfulness that we would normally 
associate with Pynchon's writing remains a prominent feature of Mason & 
Dixon. Those self-reflexive, cartoonish elements of previous novels' 
characterisation and historical portraits are again stressed in Pynchon's most 
recent work" (133). Yet, as Baker stresses, "for all this postmodern, textual 
playfulness, there remains the scandal of the novel's depth of charac­
terisation—at least to the extent of the two main protagonists. . . . [T]hese are 
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characters who engage readers on both intellectual and emotional levels, 
drawing us into precisely the sort of fantasies of emotional empathy that 
postmodern fiction was supposed to have rendered irrelevant, if not 
ridiculous" (133-34). Could this not have been the assessment of, for 
instance, Waterland, had Swift previously written something like The Crying 
of Lot 49 or Gravity's Rainbow? Interestingly, Baker rounds off his 
discussion of Mason & Dixon with a remark very similar to the one with 
which I concluded my reading of Out of This World. "Mason & Dixon makes 
us feel how even absent history hurts" (136). 
Indeed, the fiction of the sentimentum makes us feel that even what is 
absent hurts: the play of signifiers and the renunciation of presence do not 
constitute the waning of affect. If ethics is first philosophy, if the relation to 
the other is primary, then perhaps what is immanence, what is hither of 
myself, is the ability to be affected by that which is exterior—including the 
narratives of others. This speculation prompts me to comment on my 
reluctance to make clear-cut distinctions between the sentimentum as, on the 
one hand, represented in fiction, or as a critical category, and as, on the other 
hand, something that is at work in soc iety in general, in "actual postmodern 
subjects". This reluctance is due to my contention that representations in 
fiction are precisely representations of at least possible subjects-in-society 
and that as soon as a fictional (re)presentation, a fictional mode of being and 
relating, enters the public sphere, it does so because someone—an editor, a 
reader—has made a connection, recognized something, and the fictional 
(re)presentation subsequently—potentially—influences "actual" modes of 
being and relating. 
Maybe I can say then that Graham Swift's oeuvre so far, together with 
the novels by other authors which I have discussed here, gives us occasion 
not only to (re)locate the sentimentum at the heart—yes, the heart—of 
postmodernist fiction, but also to recognize the sentimentum in (to echo 
Braithwaite in Flaubert's Parrot) our silly, sentimental, twenty-first century 
hearts. 
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Jakob Winnberg 
An Aesthetics of Vulnerability 
The Sentimentum and the Novels of Graham Swift 
Arguing against the view that postmodernism is marked by "the waning of 
affect", this book investigates the fate of sentimentality in postmodernist 
fiction. The investigation focuses on the novels of the British author, 
Graham Swift, tracing in them the emergence of a blending of representations 
of sentimentality with a postmodernist aesthetics and a postmodern ethico-
spiritual imagination—a blending resulting in what is designated by the 
shorthand "the sentimentum". 
The expression of the sentimentum is further shown to rely on Swift's 
move toward the fulfilment of an aesthetics of vulnerability, which 
neutralizes the opposition between irony and sentimentality, and which also 
corresponds to an ethics of vulnerability that has found its formulation in the 
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Through close readings of Swift's novels, 
from The Sweet Shop Owner to Last Orders, it is shown how both the 
aesthetics and the ethics of vulnerability are gradually more pronounced and 
affirmed through each successive installment in Swift's oeuvre. 
Ultimately, though, the ambition of the book is to bring attention to 
an aesthetic and thematic configuration that may be found in a number of 
postmodernist novels. Hence, the study is concluded by comparative and 
complementary readings of novels by Julian Barnes, Penelope Lively and 
Jeanette Winterson that illustrate the wider relevance of the concepts of the 
sentimentum and of an aesthetics of vulnerability. 
"Highly imaginative and ingenious . . . Uses specific 
cases to raise issues of general interest in postmodern 
studies." 
—Brian McHale, Ohio State University 
"Original, lucid, stylishly written, it is at the forefront 
of contemporary debates about the uses of affect in 
literature and culture." 
—Cora Kaplan, University of Southampton 
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